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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL FRONT ORGANIZATIONS:

AN ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL

UNION OF STUDENTS

by

JOHN JAY BARR

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

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The undersigned certify that they have read,  
and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies  
for acceptance, a thesis entitled COMMUNIST INTER-  
NATIONAL FRONT ORGANIZATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE  
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS submitted by John  
Jay Barr, in partial fulfilment of the requirements  
for the degree of Master of Arts.







## PREFACE

We must recognize that the young in many areas of the world today are in the midst of a revolution against the status quo. Their anger is turned on the system which has allowed poverty, illiteracy and oppression to flourish for centuries.

We must recognize one central fact: they will prevail. They will achieve their idealistic goals, one way or another. If they have to pull governments tumbling down over their heads, they will do it. But they are going to win a share of the new world.

This affects...Canada and the United States, and you and me. Our future is tied up with what they think. Like it or not, what they are going to do will have a direct impact on us. We, in turn, are part of their revolution. At least we should be

- Robert F. Kennedy.<sup>1</sup>

Around the world, students are a growing political force. The Communist enterprise, many allege, has used the International Union of Students to politically exploit and utilize the energies and enthusiasms of student groups. This, surely, is a phenomenon worth analyzing.

The purpose of this study is not to show why many modern students are radical in their political sympathies. Nor is it to produce a definitive and singular history of the IUS. Both tasks would be interesting, and possibly fruitful; both, however, are beyond the scope of this work.

The purpose of this paper, speaking broadly, is to analyze the distinctive characteristics of the International Union of Students.

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<sup>1</sup>From a speech delivered by Mr. Kennedy in Toronto, Ontario, in early 1964, as reported in Human Events, XXIV, 23 (June 26, 1964), p.2.







More narrowly, the purpose of this inquiry is to determine the usefulness of one specific conceptual tool - that forged by Philip Selznick in his book, The Organizational Weapon<sup>2</sup> - in understanding the IUS. In that sense, this study may be considered a microcosmic analysis of the adequacy of present Western thinking on Communist strategy and organizational techniques.

Professor Selznick's study is not unique in the field, of course. It has been utilized because it is widely-read, comprehensive, ambitious, and - at least in the writer's opinion - persuasive. It makes broad claims. There is another factor, perhaps as important: while there are other works in the area, few are as well-known and widely-used as Selznick's. In the field of such theories, The Organizational Weapon stands as something of a landmark. Whether it is, in addition, a guidepost or lighthouse is something we will have to consider in the pages that follow.

The plan of this study is quite simple and - at least hopefully - straightforward. First, Selznick's model is outlined in some detail, and analyzed for its empirically testable implications. Second, a brief history is set out of Communism's endeavors - both theoretical and organizational - in the field of youth and students. Finally, the usefulness of the Selznick model in this area is determined by testing its empirical assertions against the concrete and

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<sup>2</sup>Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960, second edition.





available data on the IUS. Neither the second nor the last chapter purports to be a definitive or detailed criticism of the validity and pitfalls of sociological model-building.

Chapter three is partly a factual frame of reference for a better understanding of the IUS, and partly an inquiry into the evolution of Communist tactical doctrine as it pertained to the revolutionary role of youth in general, and students in particular.

Chapter four must not be taken as purporting to represent a universal criticism of the Selznick theory, for not all aspects of the theory are herein tested; only those related explicitly or implicitly to front organizations. On the other hand, a study of the validity of a part of a theory clearly carries some implications for the validity of the theory as a whole. These implications are only markers along the road, however, and not the road's destination.

A number of people were kind enough to give very generously of their time and wisdom in assisting me in sundry ways with this study. Although I am grateful to them all, I should like to single out Professors T.C. Pocklington and R.E. Baird of the Department of Political Science at the University of Alberta, as well as the Department's head, Professor G.R. Davy, for their assistance. Professor Davy facilitated the awarding of the University assistantship which made this study possible.

I should also like to thank Mr. David Jenkins, former





President of the Canadian Union of Students, for his wise advice and guidance. Mr. Jenkins' experience in this field was particularly invaluable as background information in sectors where little evidence of a more formal nature was available. The staff of the Canadian Union of Students in Ottawa was also very considerate in providing me with a number of otherwise-unavailable documents.

Many of the documents used in this study have been placed on file with the Soviet Reference Library at the University of Alberta, where they may be inspected.

John J. Barr.  
Edmonton, Alberta.  
April, 1965.





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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

"The successful Communist exploitation and manipulation of youth and student groups throughout the world today are a major challenge which free world forces must meet and defeat. Recent world events clearly reveal that world Communism has launched a massive campaign to capture and maneuver youth and student groups. The vigor and vitality of such groups constitutes an explosive force of immense proportions. Channeled into proper outlets, this force can accomplish immeasurable good for a peace-loving world. Manipulated into destructive channels, this force can create chaos...Communists are dedicated to the Leninist principle that 'youth will decide the issue of the entire struggle - both the student youth and, still more, the working-class youth.'"

- J. Edgar Hoover<sup>1</sup>

The great revolutionary movements of modern times have drawn their dynamism from a host of sources, but from few groups as consistently as from organized students. Yet much work must yet be done before we shall fully appreciate and understand the revolutionary role that students in particular - and the intelligentsia more generally - have played in modern revolutionary politics.

The last decade has seen public stability dissolved and governments threatened by students in South Korea, Japan, Panama, Venezuela, Algeria, Brazil, Turkey, South Vietnam and Hungary - just to cite random examples. And our time is not unique. Students have

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<sup>1</sup>Communist Target - Youth: Communist Infiltration and Agitation Tactics (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 1.





played a revolutionary role in previous eras as well.<sup>2</sup>

The revolutionary role of students (the young intelligentsia) has not gone unnoticed by students of politics. Crane Brinton, for example, in his perceptive book about the characteristics of social and political revolutions, admits that all major modern revolutions have been preceded to some extent by what he calls "the desertion of the intellectuals,"<sup>3</sup> while Edward Shils writes that modern revolutionary politics "has been a domain very much reserved for intellectuals."<sup>4</sup> Even those who were not "intellectuals" by training or profession, he writes,

have been almost forced into becoming so by the ideological nature of modern revolutionary politics. The prominence of intellectuals in the politics of the new states of Asia and Africa arises in part from the special affinity which exists between the modern intellectual orientation and the practice of...politics which are uncivil in their nature...it was the intellectuals on whom...devolved the task of contending for their nations' right to exist, even to the extent of promulgating the very idea of a nation...the intellectuals have created the

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<sup>2</sup>See, for example, Priscilla Robertson, Revolutions of 1848: A Social History (New York and Evanston: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1960), pp. 206-36, for the role played by students in the 1848 uprising in Vienna against the Monarchical regime.

<sup>3</sup>The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1952), p. 45.

<sup>4</sup>"The Intellectuals in the Political Development of the New States," in John H. Kautsky, ed., Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries: Nationalism and Communism (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1963), p. 196.





political life of the underdeveloped countries; they have been its instigators, its leaders, and its executants.<sup>5</sup>

Students, writes Mr. Shils, have been a leading vanguard of the revolutionary intelligentsia, a group within a stratum, a centre of much "turbulence."

This turbulence flowed more and more into politics, until the students became vital foci of the national independence movements. The secondary schools, colleges, and universities attended by the students of underdeveloped countries became academies of national revolution. It was not the intention of the administrators and teachers that they should become such; rather, the contrary. Nonetheless they did, both in their own countries and in the metropolitan centres of London and Paris, where many of the most important architects of independence were trained, and where they found the intellectual resonance and moral support which sustained them in lean years.<sup>6</sup>

Students, then, have in modern times been an important revolutionary seed-bed. From this seed-bed, revolutionaries of various stripes have sprouted, not all of them of the genus Communist. The Communists, however, have long recognized the political potential of students, and have sought in various ways to exploit it. The convergence of the aspirations of many radically-inclined students and the interests of the Communists is described thusly by one writer:

The vanguardist principle of the Communist movement implies a group of professional theoreticians and revolutionaries. In all revolutions, the intelligentsia

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<sup>5</sup>Ibid., pp. 196-7.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 203.





played the role of a revolutionary 'yeast.' In the Far East where, in spite of the unrest, workers and peasants often remain passive, the most dynamic political element is the student group.

Trained in western ideas and theories, the Asiatic student is far more the idealist than is the military man or the businessman. Relatively well-informed, he studies avidly the march of social progress in the West and morally dissatisfied, he becomes a prophet of reform on behalf of the oppressed. His semi-feudal society offers no satisfactory outlet for his talent and knowledge. Therefore, he is not only ethically but also economically and socially dissatisfied. Only a radical change in the system in which he lives will offer him a chance, a moral and economic revolution and a position in a new ruling bureaucracy. Now enter the communists with their paradoxical, contradictory vision of an equalitarian society and a ruling elite. The student finds in their communist vision an answer both to his moral-political dilemma and to his desire for power status and employment. He at once identifies himself with the 'vanguard' the ruling elite. The vision is appealing, the propagandists are energetic, and Communist literature is ample and easy to get...<sup>7</sup>

In December, 1939, an official directive of the Chinese Communist Party - then engaged with both the invading Japanese and with Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang Government in the struggle for China - explicitly recognized the important revolutionary role of intellectuals. The Chinese Party, as a matter of fact, long cultivated support in the nation's universities and schools; its roots literally took their first hold in the academies. Said the directive:

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<sup>7</sup> Feliks Gross, The Seizure of Political Power in a Century of Revolutions (New York: Philosophical Library, 1958), pp. 265-6.



Without the participation of the intellectuals, victory in the revolution will be impossible. Many local Party units are still reluctant to admit the intellectuals into the Party. These phenomena are the result of ignorance regarding the significant role played by intellectuals in our revolutionary mission, of a failure to appreciate the difference between intellectuals in colonial or semi-colonial countries and intellectuals in capitalist countries....Henceforth, attention should be paid to the following points: a. All Party units in combat areas and in Communist armies should strive to induce large numbers of intellectuals and semi-intellectuals to join our army, enter our schools, and work in our government...We should train them through fighting and work....As for those who are unable or unwilling to join the Party we should establish smooth working relations with them and lead them to co-operate with us.<sup>8</sup>

In 1956, Chou En-lai reiterated a similar theme.<sup>9</sup>

These statements illustrate that at least one important segment of the Communist movement recognized the importance of the intelligentsia as a revolutionary - or at least a partly and potentially revolutionary - group. Over the decades, that awareness has taken a concrete organizational form. The Communists have created a whole spectrum of organizations, some successful, others not, to mobilize and exploit that potential. It is hoped that this study will cast some light upon the organizational evolution of the Communist strategy of exploiting the young intelligentsia for political warfare purposes.

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<sup>8</sup>Quoted in ibid., pp. 267-8.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., pp. 268-9.





## CHAPTER II

### THE SELZNICK MODEL

Most non-Communist analysts contend that the International Union of Students is a "Communist front organization."<sup>1</sup> The objectives of this inquiry are three: (1) to clarify the meaning of the term "Communist front organization;" (2) to determine whether the International Union of Students is such an organization; and (3) to determine the usefulness of Philip Selznick's theory of Communist behavior as an empirical tool for use in (1) and (2).

What kind of an organization is a Communist "front," in terms of its structure, goals, and behavior? Does the IUS resemble a front organization, as far as leading theorists conceive front organizations? To what extent? In particular, does the IUS behave - and is it generally structured and organized - as Philip Selznick would lead us to believe a front behaves, and is organized? These are the kinds of questions around which this enquiry has been organized.

Selznick's theory - he prefers to call it a "model" - has been chosen for two reasons. First, his model - as set out in detail in his book, The Organizational Weapon<sup>2</sup> - is ambitiously conceived. It represents,

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<sup>1</sup>See, for example, Nils M. Apeland, World Youth and the Communists (London: Phoenix House, 1958), p. 28, and Robert H. Bass, "Communist Fronts: Their History and Function," Problems of Communism, IX, 5, (September-October, 1960), p. 12. Both statements are typical of those who hold this view.

<sup>2</sup>Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960, second edition.





in Selznick's claim, a "special key to the understanding of Communism."<sup>3</sup> Any claim as ambitious as that deserves to be challenged and tested. Second, Selznick's model (to use his terminology) was generally well received in the professional literature.<sup>4</sup> Nor are its admirers confined to the academy.<sup>5</sup> It is an influential model, however difficult it would be to show the precise extent of its influence.

This inquiry, then, will both test Selznick's theory (albeit tentatively) and analyze the International Union of Students. The two tasks, here, are complementary and mutually useful.

Before Selznick's model can be tested we must be clear as to its shape and content. This chapter will be concerned with just that, and will require some space. We will necessarily have to examine in passing the conceptual difficulties of "models" in general. The term, as we

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<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. v.

<sup>4</sup>See the reviews, eg., Barrington Moore, Jr., in American Political Science Review, XLVI, 3, (September, 1952), pp. 873-5 ("one of the most sophisticated discussions now in print," "frequently superb"); William L. Strauss, The Western Political Quarterly, V, 4, (December, 1952), pp. 679-80; Herbert Blumer in the American Sociological Review, XVII, 5, (October, 1952), pp. 630-1 (the most laudatory review: "a work of prime importance... penetrating," "thoughtful," "by far the best in available literature.") - the last comment pertaining to the mass-society aspect of Selznick's theory; and C. Wright Mills in the American Journal of Sociology, LVIII, 5, (March, 1953), p. 529 ("not likely to be superceded in our generation," "excellent in design and execution.")

<sup>5</sup>Selznick's theory plays a very large role, for example, in the widely-read book of the Australian anti-Communist, Dr. Fred C. Schwarz. See his You Can Trust the Communists (to be Communists) (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1961), passim.



shall soon enough see, is used loosely and often ambiguously, and will require some clarification. The precise content of Selznick's model - "content," as Simon and Newell define it, is "the totality of the empirical assertions that the theory makes, explicitly or implicitly, about the real world phenomena to which it refers"<sup>6</sup> - is at times difficult to pinpoint precisely. Too, there is the problem of separating what is salient and significant in the model from what is, for the purposes of this study, trivial or irrelevant. These and similar methodological difficulties will have to receive attention. There is, finally, the problem of testing the model. This as well will be discussed.

#### A. Models: Methodological and Conceptual Issues.

There is validity in Vernon Van Dyke's statement that the term "model" has "come to be widely used generally without a clear indication of the meaning intended."<sup>7</sup> As Van Dyke again points out, models are constructs that can be used to imitate, to describe, or to prescribe.<sup>8</sup> In the relationship between the model and what the model relates to, there may be varying degrees of isomorphism, ie., resemblance of form. Imitatory models attempt to be perfectly isomorphic, as with a "model" aircraft. Descriptive or analytical models attempt to explain, and they

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<sup>6</sup>Herbert A. Simon and Allen Newell, "Models: Their Uses and Limitations," in Leonard D. White, ed., The State of the Social Sciences (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 67.

<sup>7</sup>Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), p. 104.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., pp. 104-6.





therefore abstract and give emphasis to certain aspects of reality, which are presumed to be especially significant, ie., heuristic. Prescriptive models have little isomorphism; they represent, or purport to, perfected reality, in the sense of a "model" society.

Selznick's model, it would appear, belongs in the second category: in his own words, "I believe the 'model' developed in this book provides a fair interpretation of the communist 'vanguard' or 'combat' party, wherever it is found."<sup>9</sup>

What, precisely, is the nature of these interpretive constructs?<sup>10</sup> One writer notes that models are used in all social sciences, pointing out that however that non-mathematical models - the kind used by Selznick, we may add - lack the "clarity and precision of the constructions used in theoretical economics."<sup>11</sup>

There is some disagreement on the necessary internal consistency

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<sup>9</sup>Op. Cit., p. vi, italics added.

<sup>10</sup>A part of the verificational process, many argue, is the provision of definitions, which must be operationalized along with the hypotheses. Selznick probably does not offer up a useful definition of front organizations; at least not one which could easily be operationalized. The point, in any case, is that the Selznick model is to some extent defined by the sum total of things it purports to be, and by the total of the things it does. To bring all of this under a simple definition would be quite difficult, although it may certainly be argued that Selznick should have gone about it.

<sup>11</sup>Carl G. Hempel, "Typological Methods in the Social Sciences," in Maurice Natanson, ed., Philosophy of the Social Sciences: A Reader (New York: Random House, 1963), pp. 229-30.





of models. Colin Leys argues<sup>12</sup> that a "logically sound" model - he does not define the term - is no guarantee of a "good theory," but a "logically defective" model cannot hope to furnish an adequate theory at all. A clearer view is given us by F. Zweig, who defines a model as:

A certain imaginative reconstruction of a certain segment of social reality, which comes very near to an artistic design. As an artistic design it must show a unity, a living or organic unity infused with a certain spirit. It must be consistent in its own rights, although not necessarily logically consistent. Like an artist's design, it can hardly be proved or disproved on logical grounds. It justifies its term as a model also in this sense, that it presents a construction which is a clue to an understanding of a real structure but cannot be identified with it. The structure may approximate the model but it can never attain it fully. The model is a mental construct, which never existed as such, although it was built on real experience.<sup>13</sup>

This study will take Zweig as its starting-point, for Zweig alone seems to be on Selznick's wavelength.

As to the realism of models, Arnold Brecht writes that it must be demonstrated, by "observational tests with careful avoidance of wishful thinking and logical pitfalls."<sup>14</sup>

Zweig is careful to qualify his enthusiasm for models with several caveats as to their limitations and pitfalls. First, the model

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<sup>12</sup>"Models, Theories, and the Theory of Political Parties," Political Studies, VII, 2, (February, 1959), p. 129.

<sup>13</sup>The Uses of Models for Social Economic Structures," The Sociological Review, V, (July, 1957), pp. 65-6, italics added.

<sup>14</sup>Arnold Brecht, Political Theory: The Foundations of Twentieth-Century Political Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 111.



must not be confused with the reality it describes: "The main confusion exists in mixing up models with realities and ascribing to them the same order of existence."<sup>15</sup> As well, models have their emotive overtones:

We must be aware that every model is not only a pure theoretical construct, a product of pure knowledge and theory, but it has also its own emotional overtones, it has its appeals and attractions, or repugnance from point of view of interests and established views, or from point of view of social action or programmes. There is hardly any 'ism' which is completely neutral, deprived of an emotional content.<sup>16</sup>

Models, he notes, are useful tools of analysis, but they must be employed with great circumspection. They rest upon both tacit and explicit assumptions, the shape and implications of which we must always remember; they also vary as to complexity and generality. They are only working hypotheses, they cannot be mistaken for reality itself. Still, if all this be born in mind,

model-making for social economic reality is a way of imaginative reconstruction of reality in order to bring out its meaning and its significance to us...In a way it is a process of humanization of history, a process of bringing order and law in the mass of social economic facts, which are put in categories of becoming, of movement and development along certain ordered lines. The use of models in descriptive social studies is both indispensable and immensely valuable.<sup>17</sup>

How is the usefulness of models to be scientifically determined? How are they tested? Here, in the literature, there appears to be a somewhat broader consensus. Leys points out that the model, first of all, has to make specific, precise, testable assertions about reality. These

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<sup>15</sup>Zweig, op. cit., p. 67.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 66.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 72.





are called operational definitions or operational hypotheses.<sup>18</sup> Hempel agrees.<sup>19</sup> Brecht and Zweig, however, appear to agree that a model may still be useful, even if its operational hypotheses are shown to be invalid; for it may cast light on some overlooked aspect of reality, or suggest some new approach to the problem under consideration.<sup>20</sup>

The concrete problem of testing the Selznick model in the area of our concern presents some problems, however. Although we will return to this question in greater detail in the last chapter, it will bear outlining briefly here.

First, not everything in the Selznick model is relevant to this inquiry. The Selznick model purports to explain general Communist strategy and tactics; this inquiry deals only with strategy and tactics relevant to front organizations. Immediately there then arises the problem of determining what, in Selznick's model, is salient for our purposes. Secondly, there is the difficulty of operationalizing his concepts and definitions. Some aspects of the model are already operationalized. Some, as we noted above (the definitions) are not easily susceptible of definition. Others will have to be operationalized for our purposes.

This done, testing the operational assertions is yet another matter. The International Union of Students has not, to this writer's knowledge, been exhaustively analyzed publicly; there are a number of aspects of its organization and operations about which there is much we

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<sup>18</sup>Leys, op. cit., pp. 131-2.

<sup>19</sup>Op. cit., pp. 229-30.

<sup>20</sup>Zweig, op. cit., p. 66; Brecht, op. cit., p. 108.





have not yet learned. Too, many of the sources on the IUS have their biases, this being an acutely political organization. All information against which Selznick's model might be checked is not reliable. Given the terms of reference of this study, in short, it will be difficult always to find congruent, precise, objective and constant data<sup>21</sup> on the International Union of Students.

Other research techniques - surveys and interviews, for example - might rectify some of these difficulties; such methods, however, are beyond the writer's means. The methods used here are useful. All that must be born in mind is their limitations.

#### B. The Organizational Weapon: The Static Model.

The Organizational Weapon, written by a sociologist, is an intensely political book, that is to say it is a book both about and involved in current politics. Given its subject - the character of the Communist political party - it could hardly be otherwise. Selznick is conscious of this. The book, he writes, has as its ultimate aim to 'help sharpen our political intelligence, especially as applied to areas of the world where organizational strategems could still have a great

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<sup>21</sup>The classifications are Hans L. Zetterberg's, in his On Theory and Verification in Sociology (New York: The Tressler Press, 1954), p. 43. They refer to the reliability of operational definitions or hypotheses. Congruency is the extent to which several real items measure the same thing (the same operational assertion); precision is the extent to which one item registers consistently for one observer; objectivity is the extent to which one item registers consistently for several observers; constancy is the extent to which the object measured stays the same, and does not fluctuate.



effect in transforming an ideologically isolated group into a powerful political instrument."<sup>22</sup> Because of its orientation toward action, as opposed to ideology, The Organizational Weapon, Selznick admits, "may be used as an advanced-training manual for anti-communist forces."<sup>23</sup> But while sharpening our political intelligence may be the book's ultimate end, its proximate end - and, indeed, the objective on which it focusses almost throughout - is to analyze and explain Communist political behavior, ie., strategy and tactics. As Selznick puts it:

the basic intellectual task was to formulate a complex hypothesis stating the essential features of a going concern, a system, such that the most important distinctive attributes of communist political action would be accounted for.<sup>24</sup>

Parts of The Organizational Weapon bear little or only indirect relevance to this study, and will not therefore receive much attention. No attempt will be made, for example, to criticize the relevance and veracity of the mass of historical data which permeates the entire volume. Nor will much attention be given to the final three chapters, in which Selznick examines Communist tactics in the coup, the vulnerability of mass society to manipulation and subversion, and the problems of a counteroffensive against Communist activities. Interesting as these subjects are, they bear little relation to this inquiry.

The first two chapters of The Organizational Weapon outline

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<sup>22</sup>Op. cit., p. v.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 16.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. xii, italics added.





Selznick's model of the "typical" Communist Party, in a pure state as it were, at rest. In this section we will examine the static model, enumerating its salient and relevant features - striving at the same time to determine the operational hypotheses that could be drawn from the model and tested. The next three chapters describe the model dynamically, as it interacts with the world. Here, Selznick is concerned to search out the various strategies and tactics the model party pursues in its struggle with its environment. This is the model in action, and again there are operational hypotheses implied in what Selznick describes. Those that are relevant to our area of inquiry will again be enumerated and outlined explicitly, but in the next section.

His approach, Selznick begins, consists in a search for a "latent pattern" of Communist behavior, something the product of a "coherent, adaptive, social organism."<sup>25</sup> Methodologically, he says, his approach resembles that of psychoanalysis, wherein the analyst looks in his patients for "observable 'indicators' that some underlying pattern or configuration exists."<sup>26</sup> As such an approach becomes increasingly sophisticated, it begins to posit - and test - "self-activating, empirically closed systems which have, as is sometimes said, 'laws of their own.'"<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>25</sup>Ibid., p. vii.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. viii.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., pp. viii-ix.





Always, the assumption is that the researcher is dealing with an organic entity; that, at least, has to be the working assumption:

If we wish to study...the bolshevik type of party, or any other institutional structure, we must treat it as an autonomous system, defined by inner potentialities and weaknesses, even though we know that this autonomy is limited and in fact the behavior we observe is a resultant of many interacting forces...in doing so, we set up a simplified model of the institutional system, and test it by seeing whether certain important events, otherwise inexplicable are illuminated or predicted by it.<sup>28</sup>

On the one hand, there is the implication that certain "social configurations" are viable and that they "do persist through time;"<sup>29</sup> on the other, there is the qualification that these entities have an evolutionary life, a growth and maturation (and, presumably, a senility) of their own; "the unfolding of inner potentiality and the movement toward a stable configuration."<sup>30</sup> The "model" itself is an analytical tool:

From among all the statements that can be made about organization, we choose a special set of connected ideas which seems to state the essential features of the phenomenon we are studying. Any such model, hence the 'essential features' expressed in it, is constructed for the purpose of the inquiry at hand and is not meant to be an exhaustive description.<sup>31</sup>

The search was prompted by a prevailing suspicion in the minds of many that the Bolshevik type of party was somehow different, somehow distinct from democratic, parliamentary parties. The precise nature of

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<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. x.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., p. xvi.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. xvi.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid., p. 12.



the difference had not, however, been demonstrated.<sup>32</sup>

Selznick's sources were broad and varied. They came, primarily, from two categories: (1) the historical record on Communism, as available in the various published accounts of both participants and observers; and (2) the personal self-analyses published by members and ex-members of the Communist elite. Of course, this is an intensely political area; it is difficult to procure "unbiased" sources. Selznick argues, however, that all relevant sources must be utilized, regardless of their bias; a skilled observer can make adequate allowances for the biases, and still extract what is instructive.<sup>33</sup> The published works of Lenin and Stalin were extensively utilized, for the simple reason that they have considerable current impact and influence - they continue to be used as training manuals for the Party elite, and are not mere dusty tomes in historical dogmatism.<sup>34</sup>

1. Selznick's Overview.

The Communist Party, Selznick argues, is an "organizational weapon." An organizational weapon is an organization or technique "used by a power-seeking elite in a manner unrestrained by the constitutional order of the arena in which the contest takes place."<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>32</sup>Ibid., p. xii.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., pp. 14-15.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., p. 16.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., p. 2.





The Party, given its goals (ultimately, the concentration of total social and political power in its hands) and its operational code (no holds barred, in its struggle with the status quo), must be subversive of the constitutional order, by its very nature. The Party begins with an ideological commitment; it employs organizational techniques and stratagems to realize that commitment. Ideology supplies a unifying hatred of a common, threatening enemy - the non-Communist world - as well as a rationale for hope and commitment, in the shape of an inevitably blissful future, to be realized on Earth.<sup>36</sup> The Party differs from democratic, parliamentary or constitutional parties in its continuous search for total power,<sup>37</sup> in its ability to deploy members as agents in a professional, committed, full-time sense,<sup>38</sup> and in its paramilitary character.<sup>39</sup> The Party is very much more like an army than like a conventional political party: throughout, it stresses mobilization, discipline, and the manipulability of its members (although, unlike an army, its military character does not extend far into the field of techniques and a general modus operandi).

But the distinctive attributes of the Party need to be outlined at greater length. The Party, in Selznick's static (or pure) model, is distinguished by the following features.

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<sup>36</sup>Ibid., pp. 8-10.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., p. 17.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., p. 21.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., p. 24.



## 2. Total Control of the Individual.

In conventional pluralistic society, a given individual has a number of loyalties and commitments; he belongs to a variety of groups and plays diverse roles. No one group, as a rule, claims - or attempts to claim - his entire energies and loyalties. More particularly, the political parties in such societies tend to be loosely-constituted groups whose largely voluntary membership is only partially mobilized politically by the party's leaders.

Communist Parties, in Selznick's view, differ from conventional democratic political parties in the extent to which they command the total loyalties and energies of their members. This they do by means of two techniques: insulation from outside influences, and absorption into the total control of the Party and its agencies.<sup>40</sup> The two processes complement and reinforce each other.

Insulation of Party members is achieved, first, by a continual emphasis on a Party ideology pretending to be an omniscient and omniscient world-view (in which "outsiders," ie., non-Communists, play either a neutral or a hostile role),<sup>41</sup> and second, by an emphasis on illegality, on conspiratorial work. Conspiratorial work - necessary, given the unlimited aims of the organization, which compel deceit - has the dual consequence of "disintegrating normal moral principles, thereby

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<sup>40</sup>Ibid., p. 25.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., p. 26.





reducing inhibitions that might hamper manipulability, and of increasing the dangers (real or imagined) of leaving the organization."<sup>42</sup>

Absorption is facilitated by three mechanisms: first, the sheer work-load given each Party member leaves him little leisure time in which to develop outside associations; second, the Party creates an entire universe of subsidiary social and service organizations in which each member is strongly encouraged to take out active membership; finally, the Party denies the individual member the right to resign, equating resignation with desertion. It calls down a host of sanctions - from social ostracism to assassination - on "deserters." <sup>43</sup>

### 3. Managerial Leadership.

The simple belief by a group in an ideology the central feature of which is rapid and total social change does not transform that group into an organizational weapon. It is the Leninist identification of the Communist Party as the moving force of historical change that turns Party members into revolutionary agents in every sense of the term; for without the Party, the revolution cannot be consummated. The Party thus takes on a special status. The Communist cannot regard it as a simple useful tool: the Party is everything. Thus the Party tends to identify

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<sup>42</sup>Ibid., pp. 26-7.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., pp. 27-9. On this last point, also see Arthur Koestler, The Invisible Writing (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1956), pp. 388-9.



politics with its own inner administration; and its continual stream of high-pitched activities in the political arena justifies the severest discipline.

The phenomenon described above conditions the entire internal structure of leadership and command in the Communist Party - at least in Selznick's model. Because the Party needs to be efficient to the highest possible degree, it cannot afford energy-dissipating dissension. Factions are forbidden. An internal "loyal opposition" to the existing party leadership cannot be permitted: it would be "objectively" aiding the Party's class enemies, by weakening the Party's cohesion and unity. Everything in the internal life of the Party is politicized, ie., made relevant to politics, judged by political standards. Again, if members of the Party are to be turned into disciplined and deployable agents, they cannot have divided loyalties.<sup>44</sup> The only criticism permitted is "self-criticism" (the exposure of one's personal failures in the Party's service), together with "constructive criticism" - an instrumentalist criticism not of the Party leadership nor of the Party's objectives or ideology, but of the Party's successes or failures in achieving its present objectives.<sup>45</sup>

In all aspects of internal control the operative principle is "democratic centralism," which specifies that all higher party organs

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<sup>44</sup>Ibid., pp. 29-33.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., p. 36.





and personnel are elected by lower organs and personnel; but once elected, the higher organs and personnel have the last word, and make all final decisions on policy. Once policies are formed, adherence to them is compulsory and discussion of them is forbidden, except as has already been noted. What the system becomes in practice is a system in which the party leadership has well-nigh complete power over the rank-and-file.<sup>46</sup>

#### 4. The Role of Theory.

In the Selznick model, the Communist Party is a unique and distinct group. The more esoteric any group, the more it need rely upon some kind of internal indoctrination or conditioning to retain its distinctiveness. Hence, "Bolshevism's radical split from the community and the need to ensure an extraordinary degree of reliability, greatly increase its dependence on an official doctrine."<sup>47</sup> Communist theory plays several roles in conditioning the character of the group. In Dimitrov's phrase, Communist theory provides for Communists "power of orientation, clarity of vision, assurance in work, belief in the triumph of our cause."<sup>48</sup>

Marxism, the first component of Communist doctrine, provides the Party member - and the believer generally - with vivid and manipulable conceptual categories (the oppressors and the oppressed) and

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<sup>46</sup>Ibid., pp. 33-6.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., p. 36.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., p. 39.



with a flexible vocabulary useful in general Party parlance for justifying the current line (by filling general ideas with a varying concrete content). Marxist thinking serves as a base for communication.<sup>49</sup>

Leninism, the doctrinal component most relevant to organization and tactical and strategic behavior, is yet more important. The Party itself is a Leninist creation, and the founder's spirit permeates all aspects of its structure and activity. Lenin was a practical political tactician, as well as a theorist. His ideas, held in the highest repute, still serve as inspiration to Communists, and are a source for constant reference.<sup>50</sup>

Political theory is therefore relevant to the Communist Party in a way it can never be relevant, say, to the Republican Party. Theory, in the Communist model, both claims more and influences more.

##### 5. Party Allegiance.

It was Lenin's central belief that without the Party - the Party he conceived, that is - the dictates of history as Marx had transcribed them could not be fully realized. Loyalty to the Party thus takes first precedence for the Communist over all other loyalties, even loyalty to doctrine. Without the Party, doctrine is impotent.<sup>51</sup> As one "old

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<sup>49</sup>Ibid., p. 39. Communist theory differs from many redemptory creeds in its immanentist orientation; the "New Jerusalem" is to be realized in the here and now.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., p. 41-1.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid., p. 44.





Bolshevik" wrote:

For the proletarian revolutionist, the party is the concentrated expression of his life purpose, and he is bound to it for life and death. He preaches and practices party patriotism, because he knows that his socialist ideal cannot be realized without the party. In his eyes the crime of crimes is disloyalty or irresponsibility toward the Party.<sup>52</sup>

The model Communist, in Selznick's view, relates first to two objects: the Party, and the U.S.S.R.<sup>53</sup> The former, to adopt a Hegelian analogy, is God marching through History. The latter is the Party's first conquest, her homeland and base of power.

Loyalty to the Party is forged in members as much by immersing them in the day-to-day political struggle as by abstract indoctrination. Both kinds of shaping are critical to the member's "bolshevization," i.e., to the shaping of Party members into professional revolutionaries in all the senses of the term.<sup>54</sup>

Constant indoctrination, coupled with the politicization of all public and private life, is the first means of developing total party allegiance. The second is concrete experience; it is in participating in the clash of political struggle that the true bolshevik is forged:

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<sup>52</sup>Ibid., p. 44.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., p. 42.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid., pp. 47-8. Whether in light of the so-called Sino-Soviet conflict this latter loyalty would have to be questioned, is an interesting point. Selznick's book pre-dated the Moscow-Peking controversy somewhat, and is probably somewhat dated in this area.



He learns to identify the enemies of the party and those who may be used to serve its ends. He is exhilarated by identification with an elite group which seems to know what it is doing and where it is going. He learns how to be a communist.<sup>55</sup>

These very concrete educative experiences not only improve the quality and commitment of the Party cadre, they equip the Party with an anxious, willing and able body of members ready to aid the leadership by participating actively in all struggles. The Party's struggles to broaden its influence are also struggles to improve the quantity and quality of its membership.

6. The Press as a Collective Organizer.

Many groups have their own "house organs," which serve as guidelines of internal communication. The Party press, in Selznick's model, is something more. First, because of the Party's internal command and discipline structure (and its refusal to countenance opposition and factions), the press is an airing-place for one viewpoint, and one viewpoint only: that of the leadership. Neither can there be more than one Party newspaper.<sup>56</sup> The press, then, is first of all a cue-giver; it informs the rank-and file what the tactical line, the commands of the leadership, is at any given moment. (In addition, of course, it exhorts, applauds, condemns, and generally serves the propaganda functions of house organs everywhere). It is more as well: it is also the focal

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<sup>55</sup>Ibid., p. 48.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., p. 51.





point of much Party organization.<sup>57</sup> The very task of building a broad news-gathering and distribution system is a means of training and preparing the Party membership in concrete tasks. The Party press, then, is characterized (1) by its rigid and monolithic character vis-a-vis ideology, and the current tactical line; (2) by its refusal to countenance opposition; (3) by the political nature of its newsgathering, news-analysis and new-distribution systems, and of its internal administration, and (4) by the role it plays in communicating attitudes and a general tactical orientation to the rank-and-file.

7. The Role of Conspiratorial Activity.

Originally, in the autocratic environment in which it first functioned, the Bolshevik party was somewhat compelled to adopt a conspiratorial modus operandi. Before long, however, it was shown - so Selznick argues - that the Party found conspiracy a useful and natural supplement to its legal activities even in a democratic situation. Party leaders have often repeated the necessity for conspiratorial activity.<sup>58</sup> Selznick argues that conspiratorial activity is a logical part of Communist activity, given the Party itself. His argument seems to run like this: (1) Communism, with its total goals (and institutional needs in accord with those goals) is in a continuous quest for increments

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<sup>57</sup>Ibid., p. 49.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid., p. 53.



of power, wherever it can find them; (2) each organized group in society offers to those who can control it an increment of power, inasmuch as organized groups make the masses to some extent manipulable; (3) the Communists need such mass-influence if they are not to remain impotent, hence they must join and try to seize the control of organized groups; but (4) the Communists obviously cannot be candid as to their reasons for wanting to participate and lead, hence they must be devious, ie., conspiratorial.<sup>59</sup> At the same time, the "bad reput" of Communists in much of non-Communist society leads them still further to adopt conspiratorial means, to tactically veil their identity and motives. In any case, the further the Communist Party attempts to extend its influence over non-Communist society, the more conspiratorial it must become.<sup>60</sup>

8. Organizational Character-Definition.

Not all groups or organizations have a distinctive character, and not all that do, impress it upon their members. Often a unique mission or a long history will develop a special quality that, in Selznick's words, "suffuses the entire organization." When that happens there will develop in the group a persistent pattern of roles, behavior, and goals. These will be the outcome of the group's "ingrained methods

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<sup>59</sup>Ibid., p. 54.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid., p. 55.





of work, its natural allies, its stake in the course of events, the predispositions of its personnel, and the labels (deserved and undeserved) which have become attached to it. These...reflect the organization's controlling roles and purposes; they generate those established patterns of expectation with which the organization is uniquely identified."<sup>61</sup>

When this occurs over a long period of time, an organization will become adapted to fulfilling certain purposes, and unadapted to fulfilling others. Hence with the Party, conspiratorial work will become an ingrained habit. The Party, as well, needs a distinctive character, a distinctive kind of membership and internal control, for it is in a state of continual political combat, with stakes it regards as very high.<sup>62</sup>

The strong doctrinal commitments of ideology shape the Party's personality somewhat, particularly the Marxian emphasis on a power-centred morality.

How to safeguard the Party's identity and sanctity? First, the Party employs a measure of selective recruiting for its cadre.<sup>63</sup> Certain groups (eg., intellectuals, professionals) are regarded with some measure of skepticism as bases for recruiting. Second, there is the continuous emphasis on indoctrination and learning-through-participation (mentioned above). Selznick summarizes:

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<sup>61</sup>Ibid., p. 56.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid., p. 56.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., p. 60



The willingness of the membership to participate in power struggles; organization of the party along lines which emphasize work in industry; absolute subordination of the press and of the leaders of mass organizations to the centre; inculcation of an amoralism which loosens normal inhibitions against treachery and deceit; doctrinal emphasis upon the indispensability of the vanguard; special education and involvement for potentially unreliable elements - all of these and similar practices create predispositions helping to keep the party in line against corruptionist tendencies which would decrease its utility as an organizational weapon.<sup>64</sup>

9. Infiltration.

Because the Party is totally power-oriented, it must, Selznick argues, employ every possible opportunity in order to squeeze every ounce of influence out of every organizational opening. If members of a Communist "fraction" in a given organization can utilize their concerted action for some tactical advantage, they must.<sup>65</sup> Such fractions (all Communist members of a given non-Communist group are under standing orders to band together and act in consultation, if possible under outside Party direction) must of course operate covertly. Their possibly small size need not be an obstacle, however; a well-organized small group, hard-working, tactically flexible and astute, can wield influence out of proportion to its numbers. Members of an organization, if they happen to be Party members, cannot be viewed as ordinary members - that is Selznick's argument.

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<sup>64</sup>Ibid., pp. 64-5.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., pp. 66-7.





#### 10. Espionage Potential.

Because the Party - subject to previous qualifications - is in allegiance to the U.S.S.R., and because members, in non-Communist organizations, are bounden to act in unison for Party purposes and objectives, there exists in all Communist Parties an espionage potential. This, in Selznick's model, does not mean every Party or Party fraction is an espionage group per se, "but it does mean that they are linked to such (espionage) agencies; that they serve as effective and secure sources for the recruitment of spies; and that they provide the motivation necessary for the participation of otherwise-respectable and idealistic individuals in an international underworld of espionage and violence."<sup>66</sup> Communist indoctrination has a way of dissolving conventional national loyalties and inhibitions against treason.

#### C. The Organizational Weapon: The Dynamic Model.

The Communist Party, even as a model, does not exist in a vacuum, in a "pure state." It exists in reality, in a real world; and Selznick, to complete his picture of the model, has been compelled to sketch it in a "model" real world of its own, interacting with its own environment. This model in action illustrates, concretizes, by its behavior, the strategy and tactics of the model itself. The way in which it interacts with its environment is of course conditioned first, by its own nature, and second, by the nature of its environment. All aspects of

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<sup>66</sup>Ibid., p. 70.



this model-in-action (or, rather, model of action) are not of pressing interest in this study. Hence, again, we will bear down hardest on those aspects of the behavior of the model relevant to our inquiry. The relevant hypotheses of Communist behavior that could be operationalized from Selznick's outline will be saved for a separate, last, section.

# 1. Overview.

The construction of the Communist Party readies the consolidated cadre for action. The Party, however, is an elite organization; it cannot fulfill its mission, it cannot find its way to total power, until it can find some means of tapping the strength of numbers, ie., the strength of the masses. The first and most important strategic need of the party is therefore access to the masses, the avoidance of sterile isolation. The Party must find some way of gaining manipulative power over many organized groups.<sup>67</sup> Why organized groups? Because the Party has before it an image of society that recognizes the vital importance of groups in social control. Writes Selznick:

...apart from the use of broadside propaganda, the party cannot be related to an amorphous mass. Its articulation must be to something definite so that clear lines of access and command may be established. Hence the party must seek a path to, or create if they do not exist, specialized groups which are part of the mass and may form a leading segment of it...there must...be devices that provide the party with links to the social base.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>67</sup>Ibid., p. 77.

<sup>68</sup>Ibid., p. 81, his italics.





In the Communist view, the "masses" are not uniformly manipulable and accessible. The amount of unrest, of discontent, in a group may render it more susceptible to manipulation, to exploitation. So too is the position of the group of interest to the Party: the more it is capable of influencing decision-making, the more valuable will be its penetration and exploitation.<sup>69</sup> Equally important in determining manipulability is the attitude of the group or its leaders toward Communist participation. The very character of the group - whether it is oriented around ideological or non-ideological issues - will also to some extent influence the success with which it may be penetrated and influenced by the Party.<sup>70</sup>

Why the emphasis on the masses? First, the process of learning to manipulate the non-Communist masses is itself an important training-school for the Party cadre. In the cadre, there are layers of varying reliability; the less secure Party member may be made more secure in his self-image when working with those with no party ties.<sup>71</sup> Second, the Communists hold the concept that the masses are inherently liable to control by some elite, inherently liable to be exploited for power purposes by someone. Either way, in this view, the masses cannot be neutral; if the Communist Party does not succeed in influencing and

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<sup>69</sup>Ibid., p. 82.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid., p. 83.

<sup>71</sup>Ibid., p. 85



mobilizing them, some other (less progressive) force or elite will.<sup>72</sup>

Finally, the role of the masses is qualitative as well as quantitative; properly mobilized and manipulated, a portion of the masses can exert weight out of proportion to its numbers:

For the Bolsheviks, the masses represent a vast reservoir of potential energy which can and must be summoned to fulfill the strategic and tactical plans of the vanguard...the effort to involve mass elements in communist enterprises extends all the way from insurrection to the organization of a political club or a guerilla unit. This would be sociologically trivial were it merely a matter of increasing the numbers of those involved...however, it refers to a process which effectively transforms the nature of group relations.<sup>73</sup>

When the Party gains access to the masses in Party-controlled organizations, it seeks to mobilize them more effectively in six ways:

(1) by education - continual propaganda heightens the member's sense of involvement and purpose; (2) by patronage - administered on a political, not a personal basis; it contributes to the politicization of the organization; (3) political fixing - responding to the needs and grievances of members, but lending such responses a political character; (4) social activities - the Party creates even social outlets for members and the masses, again politicization; (5) by finances - the Party institutes organized dues-paying in place of individual and voluntary contributions; this increases available funds, and gives the individual a sense of contribution; and (6) by related mass-organizations - creates

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<sup>72</sup>Ibid., p. 86.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid., p. 96.





multiple-memberships (all of them Party-centered), increases control over the individual, creates different organizations which can be mobilized for concerted attacks on single targets.<sup>74</sup>

The Communist Party in the Selznick model is always willing to countenance and even support the organization of a new mass organization not under Party auspices or control, provided there exists a possibility, even remote, that the Party may gain access to it at a later date.<sup>75</sup>

2. The Strategy of Access.

The need for access is grounded in the Party's basic dilemma. On the one hand, the Party must retain its distinctive identity, its doctrinal purity, its identity - and this requires withdrawal; on the other hand, in order to consummate the revolution it needs to mobilize the masses under its banner - and this requires that it plunge into the struggle where the masses are, appealing, if only nominally, to the masses' interests. The resolution of this dilemma, this basic tension, accounts for much of the historic evolution of Communist strategy, in Selznick's view. If the Party too zealously emphasizes purity and withdrawal, it lapses into impotence, it loses influence, it practices the deviation of "sectarianism;" if, on the other hand, the Party plunges too deeply into the social economic, and political struggle on behalf of, and next to, the masses, it risks losing sight of its own

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<sup>74</sup>Ibid., pp. 98-101.

<sup>75</sup>Ibid., pp. 110-11.



ultimate aims and becoming seduced by those of the masses. This is the deviation of "revisionism." Between the two kinds of error, the Party must manoeuvre.

We have noted that there can only be access - broadside propaganda aside - where there is structure, ie., where the masses are organized. As Selznick sees it, there are essentially two kinds of groups to which the Party can gain access: (1) groups with weak functional organization and little structural permanency in the social and economic base of society (eg., students, the unemployed); and (2) groups with a more secure, essential, grounded role in the structure of industrial society (eg., labor unions). The Party seeks to gain access to the first group by creating for it functional organizational centres.<sup>76</sup> The second, it often will seek to infiltrate and seize by conspiratorial means.<sup>77</sup> Front organizations, apparently, fall into the first category. Indeed, Selznick remarks, front groups play "an important role" in the strategy of access.<sup>78</sup>

### 3. Front Organizations in the Dynamic Model.

#### i. Definition and Types.

Selznick's definition of a front organization may best be seen emerging in his account of the history of Communist mass-organizations

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<sup>76</sup>Ibid., p. 114.

<sup>77</sup>Ibid., p. 171. See also pp. 215-24, and 275-97.

<sup>78</sup>Ibid., p. 114.





generally.

According to Selznick,<sup>79</sup> the Party's first mass organizations or peripheral groups were created primarily for the mobilization and exploitation of individuals already close to the Party ideologically. In this early period of Communism - prior to about 1935, when the Comintern's Seventh World Congress changed the basic strategy - the Party was still in a stage of early adolescence, in terms of its self-confidence. The Party leaders felt their primary objective to be the preservation of organizational and doctrinal purity. Contacts with non-Communists (particularly Socialist trade-unionists in Europe) were forbidden, save on the Party's strict terms (merger with the Party and submission to Party discipline).

The rise of Fascism and the growing confidence of the Party leaders in the loyalty and discipline of the cadres inspired a new strategic turn. The new objective became greater influence over the non-Communist masses through the pursuance of the united front.

As the Party sought to broaden its mass influence, the need for deception became soon apparent. The term "front" came to be used - particularly by Communism's enemies - in the sense of deception ("front" organizations were groups operating for partisan political purposes behind a non-political facade), rather than in the sense of the "trade-union front," ie., the military connotation.

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<sup>79</sup>Ibid., pp. 115, 144.



"Front" organizations, thus, have two over-riding distinguishing features: (1) they seek to enroll the masses, regardless of their political persuasion, under a common banner having no ostensible identification with Communist aims; and (2) they are secretly and conspiratorially controlled by the Party. In point of fact, the more the cold war became a settled fact and the more the defense of the U.S.S.R. became a prime objective of Communist Parties everywhere, the more utility front organizations came to have; for clearly, the less the front groups became burdened with the difficult task of propagandizing for communism,as such - with all the obvious implications that provided the public - the more they could propagandize for specific Soviet objectives, as pressure-groups, without incurring immediate suspicion.<sup>80</sup>

ii. The role of Fronts in the Strategy of Access.

Front organizations provide the Party with new access in a number of ways.

First, front organizations are an important forum for the airing of the current Soviet propaganda line, under "non-partisan" auspices. The Soviets can only stand to benefit when a nominally non-Communist organization (a front) echoes their political position.<sup>81</sup>

Second, fronts may provide the Communist enterprise with what

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<sup>80</sup>Ibid., pp. 119-20.

<sup>81</sup>Ibid., p. 121.





Selznick calls "incidental organizational utility," ie., additional organizational advantages and strength. Fronts may, for example, be used to raise funds for the Party, tapping sources the Party could not normally reach. Fronts can better utilize the energies of lukewarm pro-Communists too timid to openly work with the Party; fronts may also serve as Party recruiting agencies, and they certainly provide the Party with a host of manipulable satellites which can be mobilized for concerted propaganda attacks on specific targets.<sup>82</sup>

Fronts, third, can help provide access to those unstructured but psychologically vulnerable sectors in a population (Selznick particularly notes the intelligentsia) by exploiting the "symbols of liberalism."<sup>83</sup>

Fourth, fronts can be utilized to intervene selectively, as an "impartial but interested organization" on behalf of beleaguered local communists in various locales.<sup>84</sup>

In a like vein, front organizations can serve to put pressure for "unity" on non-Communist leftists at lower levels. Local Communists may point to the successful operation of "unity" in front organizations,

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<sup>82</sup>Ibid., pp. 122-3.

<sup>83</sup>Ibid., pp. 148-9.

<sup>84</sup>Ibid., pp. 157-9.



using this as a goad on the non-Communist left.<sup>85</sup>

Finally, front organizations may go a step beyond access, toward mobilization. If a given front can mobilize the energies of the entire membership (ie., including non-Communists) on behalf of Communist goals, so much the better. Hence, front organizations which being as confederations of national groups or otherwise distinct units may be transformed into individual-membership societies, where the Communist cadre - with its inherent unity and mobility - can be even more effective in asserting or seizing control.<sup>85</sup>

iii. The Role of Fronts in the Strategies of Neutralization and Legitimacy.

Selznick argues that the Party - and its organizations as well, of course - pursues two other strategies in addition to that of access. They are the strategies of neutralization and legitimacy. He explains them as follows.

The fratricidal hatred which has traditionally accompanied Communist-Leftist relations is difficult to comprehend, save as the struggle of similar groups for an identical social base. Anyone who threatens the Party's primary social base - be it working-class or peasantry, or for that matter any vulnerable social group - threatens

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<sup>85</sup>Ibid., p. 162.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid., pp. 160, 165.





the Party itself; for without such roots, the Party is impotent, and knows it. Hence the Party always seeks first to neutralize those who compete with it for its social base. And it seeks to neutralize them by every conceivable means.<sup>87</sup>

The communists can compromise with the 'class enemy,' they can even support him, but they dare not tolerate the political existence of those who may offer the target groups an alternative ideological leadership or who can effectively expose the totalitarian practices of bolshevism in power.<sup>88</sup>

The strategy of neutralization compels the Party to direct its attention at two groups: (1) those who compete for the allegiance of the Party's own cadres (eg., Trotskyites), and (2) "those who threaten the party in the arenas of action, who compete with it for control over target groups and institutions."<sup>89</sup>

Clearly, if this is true of the Party it is true as well of those organizations the Party controls. It does not seem unreasonable to suspect that front organizations under Party control - especially as the fronts themselves are considered vital sources of access, ie., strength - will behave in precisely the same way vis-a-vis rival organizations. That implication in Selznick is quite clear.

Selznick goes on to argue that the strategy of neutralization manifests itself in four distinct tactics, viz., (1) the destruction

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<sup>87</sup>Ibid., p. 227.

<sup>88</sup>Ibid., p. 227.

<sup>89</sup>Ibid., p. 227.



of rival groups through infiltration and disruption, (2) the suppression of "left-wing anticommunism" by neutralizing effective anti-communist work, rather than openly propagating pro-Communism, (3) the use of the informal veto as a means of forcing anti-communists to remain silent, and (4) the use of terror as a means of intimidating opponents.

The first tactic includes the infiltration of Communist fractions into rival organizations, after which time the fractions foment factional struggles and disrupt proceedings before pulling out, taking with them those allies they have managed to win over.<sup>90</sup> The second tactic is carried out by the infiltration of vital communications channels, which permit of the neutralization of anti-communist propaganda.<sup>91</sup> The third tactic is closely related; the informal veto is employed whenever a Communist fraction threatens to withdraw from an organization unless its feelings are respected regarding "objectivity," ie., the avoidance of any discussion or action harmful to the U.S.S.R.<sup>92</sup> The last tactic employs terror in all its shades and degrees - from verbal name-calling slander and personal calumny - the "big lie," in short - right up to violence and, in extreme cases, assassination.<sup>93</sup>

The second major defensive strategy of the model Communist enterprise, in Selznick's view, is the strategy of legitimacy.

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<sup>90</sup>Ibid., p. 232.

<sup>91</sup>Ibid., p. 229.

<sup>92</sup>Ibid., p. 235-6.

<sup>93</sup>Ibid., pp. 236, 238, 242.





All groups and leaders anxious to wield power on a permanent basis beyond the naked-power level, Selznick argues, seek in some way to justify their power by reference to some principle or argument acceptable to their community. The search for legitimacy - the right to govern, the right to participate - involves all organized formal institutions,<sup>94</sup> and not just governments.<sup>95</sup>

The Party's search for legitimacy is essentially an attempt to convince populations that the Party has a right to legal and public existence, and a right to compete on an equal basis with democratic parties. The Party, early in its existence, was not anxious to gain legitimacy; it had its own work of inner consolidation still to pursue. Once it became consolidated, however, and began to search for means of extending its influence more deeply into non-Communist areas, it was necessarily led into an attempt to justify its existence, its right to equality with other groups. Conspiracy, to emphasize the point, cannot function effectively until the Party is an accepted actor in the political process; for only then can conspiracy be carried on covertly while the "legal" party diverts the attentions of the public.<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>94</sup>Selznick defines "institution" in the conventional sociological sense: any established social practice or established social group performing a distinctive function.

<sup>95</sup>Op. cit., p. 243.

<sup>96</sup>Ibid., p. 243.



Front organizations apparently play several roles in realizing this strategy. First, they are useful for mobilizing many in support of the public existence of the Party itself, eg., by issuing petitions for "free speech." This is essentially a propaganda function, again under "objective" auspices.<sup>97</sup> Fronts themselves will try to gain legitimacy, if and when their authenticity is contested. They may do this by identifying with respectable, known non-Communists (or with non-Communist martyrs or symbolic figures). They may, especially in less developed areas, exploit their identification with "world" communities (eg., the IUS would claim to represent "world students"). Where communication between such areas and the more developed world is poor, and the status-value of such symbolism is high, this tactic has impact, and certainly heightens the status of the front in question.<sup>98</sup>

iv. Fronts: Their Internal Organization.

Selznick does not present a systematic "model" of the "typical front," nor does he comprehensively explain how fronts are organized or manipulated. He only provides a scattering of specific and abstract assertions, together with hints and clues, which, taken together, constitute an incomplete portrait.

Fronts may be formed, he says, in either of two ways. First, the Party, seeing an effective functional organization, may seek to

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<sup>97</sup>Ibid., p. 244, 121.

<sup>98</sup>Ibid., p. 249.





enter and seize control of it covertly. It then retains its former name - and, the Party hopes, its former membership, to whom the Party wants to gain access - but its content, its purpose, is altered. All that is left, as it were, is the shell.<sup>99</sup>

The Party, second, may see a tactical opening, a vulnerable area, and organize a group of its own to exploit the opportunity. Fronts of this kind always were fronts; their deceptive nature existed from the first. Secret Party members or trusted sympathizers will first issue a call for a new organization, and perhaps draw up for it a provisional program. On the basis of this, a larger group (still not the general public) will be canvassed for a list of sponsors, each with some reputation to contribute. A trusted man will be appointed provisional secretary, and will be given complete control of files, funds, and personnel - and perhaps some policy powers. An effort will then sometimes be made to have some prominent public figure assume the figure-head leadership of the group (preferably someone too busy to take an active role). When the group finally meets with its full membership, the provisional program and secretary can be easily enough adopted in toto, and the character of the organization will have been hardened.<sup>100</sup>

The Party, says Selznick, has certain key advantages in such an organization. First - this is derived, clearly, from his general

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<sup>99</sup>Ibid., p.125.

<sup>100</sup>Ibid., pp. 123-4.



model - it consists of disciplined and deployable agents; it can be tactically a much more effective group than most others. This is especially the case in light of the division of the "others," and the general apathy that so often prevails in voluntary groups. Leadership, often is almost handed to those who want it.<sup>101</sup> At the same time, Communist members and fractions in groups of this kind - or of any kind - frequently legitimize themselves - they are often the hardest and most disciplined workers, the most "reliable" people.<sup>102</sup>

The importance of central executive posts is clearly emphasized. Those who seize the permanent secretariat, and that aspect of the executive in control of day-to-day administration, have a decisive advantage in organizations; particularly when they are ready, willing and able to use their powers to the fullest. The Communist fraction, Selznick says, will always aim first where the real power is:

The permanent officers who controlled the secretariat held the real power...they settled questions of representation and procedure, made up the agenda, guided the discussion, possessed the knowledge upon which the infrequently meeting bodies... of the Congress ...would have to depend. Moreover, the Secretariat can busily turn out resolutions, sponsor delegations, and carry on factional activities against an existing or potential opposition. Its press can be used for partisan propaganda, and leading opponents can be forced out, either by arbitrary expulsion or by creating conditions which leave no alternative but resignation.<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>101</sup>Ibid., p. 164.

<sup>102</sup>Ibid., p. 250.

<sup>103</sup>Ibid., p. 167.





Selznick, then, would appear to be saying that in front-type organizations, the Communist fraction will always go for the centre of real power, ie., the central executive organs, being willing to make concessions in those areas in which no real power is at stake.

He further argues that the Party tends to carry over into fronts the attitude vis-a-vis opposition and factions it holds within its own ranks, ie., intolerance. The only difference will lie in this, that while factions and opponents within the Party itself may be, indeed must be, "liquidated," in fronts it is not always practicable or tactically prudential to do so. The objective of fronts is access; if the Party purges from a front all non-Communist elements, the front loses its raison d'etre. On the other hand, a too-active, too-militant opposition formally organized and deployed within the front can hardly be countenanced either. The Party, Selznick implies, has to steer a cautious course. It may, perhaps, make concessions on matters of secondary importance. Perhaps it might, if it saw such an action as absolutely imperative or unavoidable, also make concessions on matters of substance, relying upon its basic organizational strength to rectify things later.<sup>104</sup>

#### D. Operational Hypotheses.

We noted previously the important role operationalized

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<sup>104</sup>Ibid., pp. 110-11, 168.



hypotheses play in the testing of general models. Operationalizing is the interpretation - one might almost say the "programming" - of general or abstract theoretical assertions into a more concrete form, one amenable to testing against empirical data. An unoperationalized theory or model cannot be tested adequately; its validity therefore cannot really be ascertained. It gets the theorist nowhere, and may well only confuse or mislead the onlooker.

Operationalizing involves the interpretation of general assertions, perhaps ambiguous assertions, into concrete and unambiguous assertions. It also involves the specification of evidence against which the assertion must be tested, and it certainly involves the specification of conditions under which the assertion would be considered to be verified or disproven. A properly operationalized hypothesis then: (1) is unambiguous as to what it asserts; (2) is outlined relative to some specific body of evidence; and (3) is framed in such a way that the conditions of its verification or disproof are clear.

Selznick admits openly that the testing of his model "presents some knotty problems."<sup>105</sup> It does indeed, particularly for this study; for while Selznick's model purports to render an explanation of general Communist behavior, it concerns itself only marginally with front organizations. Fronts per se are not intensively dissected. Many of

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<sup>105</sup>Ibid., p. xv.





Selznick's assertions about fronts are scattered at random throughout his text. Nowhere in The Organizational Weapon is a complete and self-contained model of front organizations outlined.<sup>106</sup>

Is it then unfair to test - if only partially - the validity of Selznick's model as it applies to front organizations? No, for the simple reason that Selznick invites the rigorous testing of his model by the generous claims he makes for it. It represents, he stresses at the very beginning, "a special key to the understanding of Communism," an "advanced-training manual for anti-communist forces."

To some extent we can only infer how Selznick would have us test his model against front organizations. He does suggest that two distinct kinds of tests could be applied to his general model of the Party: (1) does the model fit a given organization, ie., does a given Communist party behave, and is it organized, as the model suggests?,<sup>107</sup> and (2) does the model state an acceptable general theory regarding the

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<sup>106</sup>The question may then be asked: why choose Selznick? The answer is clear: Selznick's model may not be completely adequate for our purposes, but it is by far the best available. If, in the study of front organizations, the Selznick model is not specifically attuned to our needs, it is much better attuned than anything else available.

<sup>107</sup>Selznick, op. cit., p. xv. The five critical features of the Party model, as Selznick defines them, are: (1) its capacity (relative) to deploy members as agents; (2) its use of techniques of indoctrination and mobilization that withdraw the members from other group loyalties; (3) its broad-scale adoption of subversion as an acceptable means of social action; (4) its use of characteristic strategies for the penetration and manipulation of institutional targets; and (5) its tactical subordination of propaganda aims to organizational needs. See ibid., pp. 137ff.



nature of the Communist type of party?<sup>108</sup> That is, does the general theory account for a "great deal of what needs to be explained?"<sup>109</sup>

The second approach is clearly beyond the scope of this particular inquiry. There is certainly no denying the fact that it would indeed be valuable to know the extent to which Selznick's general theory would provide us with an acceptable explanation for front organizations generally. But unless we assume a priori that all fronts are alike - and we cannot - we cannot draw unequivocal conclusions about all fronts merely by examining one.

Our test of Selznick must therefore be a more limited one: to what extent does the Selznick "model" of fronts - taking "model" to mean our reconstruction of those salient empirical assertions Selznick makes relevant to front organizations - account for the distinctiveness of, make sense of, enable us to understand, the behavior and structure and history of the International Union of Students?

This, to be sure, is not the kind of massive and broad-scaled test capable of handing down a decisive verdict on the overall validity of the Selznick theory. Nor will it render conclusions of that generality. What it does is to usefully illuminate a segment of a larger problem.

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<sup>108</sup>Ibid., p. xv.

<sup>109</sup>Ibid., p. xvi.





What remains for us to do now, then, is to catalogue for later testing the crucial operationalized hypotheses upon which the validity of the model - as it relates to front organizations - rests. This 'model' of operationalized hypotheses is a fair and logical reconstruction of what Selznick has either written or implied relative to front organizations.

i. Politicization.

In the Selznick model, the Party is completely politicized, ie., it views all reality through political lenses, it treats all matters of any substance as political matters. Its politicization, moreover, is one conditioned by the omniscient claims of its ideology: tactical considerations aside, there is no room for critical views having no place in the ideological world-view. Criticism and opposition, in fact, are viewed - again, with tactical prudence - as treasonous. The behavioral result tends towards stridency, intolerance, and the breaking of the accepted rules of civility, whenever such moves are tactically wise.

Fronts, in the Selznick view, are Party subsidiary organizations created solely for political purposes. They are Party-controlled. Presumably, then, they are afflicted to some degree by the politicization that characterizes the Party proper. They owe their existence, their raison d'etre to the Party; they cannot be understood except by reference to the Party organization which sired them.



Certain aspects of international student politics are fairly settled, fairly generally accepted. There is wide support - at least verbally - for democratic procedures in debate and decision-making, for example. Certain agreements, moreover, are a matter of historical record, eg., the agreement of the London student meeting, in 1945, to have the new international students' organization-to-be located in either London or Paris.

If these "rules" be enumerated and collected, we have a body of data against which to measure the IUS. Clearly, many of the rules of student politics are contrary to Communist behavior as Selznick posits such behavior. We would then expect the IUS to break the "rules" with some frequency - more so than its less counterpart, the International Student Conference.

Our first operational hypothesis must therefore be this: the IUS will (1) greet criticism with abuse and dissent with intolerance, (2) from time to time break agreements or the general "rules" of behavior commonly agreed upon - tacitly or formally - in the student community, and (3) generally attempt to make political capital, or give a political construction to, events or facts not directly relevant to students, or to politics.

Evidence relevant to these assertions would include the actions and behavior of the IUS per se - say, in its Congresses, other meetings, and publications - as well as the behavior of organizations or meetings in which, by general agreement, the IUS plays a leading or significant role.





ii. Conspiratorial Behavior.

In the Selznick model, members of the Party are distinguished by their discipline; they are deployable agents, totally committed, responsible to a single chain of command.

Now if front organizations are creatures of the Party, owe their existence and raison d'etre to the purposes and resources of the Party, it follows that they must be under the operational control of the Party. That is, the Party must man the centres of real power, make the critical decisions, and reach policies conspiratorially. The Party must act conspiratorially - that is, in covert combination for some end - simply because the rank-and-file in a proper front organization must, by definition, contain non-Communists; and the Party could not consign or delegate its policy-making powers to such elements.

In a front organization, then, there must be evidence of the existence of two groups: Communists - acting under purposeful control - and non-Communists. If there are Communists, or what we think are Communists, we must expect them to behave as Selznick clearly argues they would behave: there must be evidence, in other words, of a coherent group with closely united ranks, acting in common on matters of substance, demonstrating the probable existence of a common command. The probable existence of such a common command could be determined from two kinds of evidence: first, some actual evidence - an actual exposure, perhaps - of conspiratorial activity; and second, uniform changes in policy.



We should therefore operationally define "conspiratorial behavior" as follows: (1) the existence of a coherent group, in and around the IUS leadership, evincing unified control; (2) the behavior of this group in a unified way, particularly on policy and changes in policy; and (3) the existence of procedures - eg., in elections or floor procedure - suggesting conspiratorial control by the group outlined in (1).

If in the course of our inquiry we should discover evidence of (1), (2), or (3) in organizations or endeavors in which the IUS again played a leading role, then we should be in possession of supplementary circumstantial evidence. But, then, as Thoreau remarked, some kinds of circumstantial evidence are very strong, as when one finds a fish in the milk.

### iii. Role of the Press.

In Selznick's model Communist Party, the leadership places considerable importance on control of the Party press. The press, in the model Party, is important as a propaganda organ, ie., as an organ for the indoctrination of the membership in the ideology. It is also important as a "cue-giver" for the rank-and-file, a ground of communication through which the ranks can be informed of changes in the Party line, quickly and concretely. In the model, the Press presents to the membership, and to the world, a unified front, a single voice: to do anything else would be to foster factions, to deny that the Party can have but one voice. There is no dissent, in other words, in the





columns of the Party press. Also, because the press is a vital cue-giver, it follows slavishly all twists and turns in the Party line. Presumably, as well, it serves some of the functions of "house organs" everywhere else; but Selznick is unclear on this.

Now, again, if front organizations are creatures of the Party through and through, it follows that there is a strongly analogous relationship between the press in the Party and the press in the front organization.

If the Party leadership cannot permit dissent in the Party press for fear of endangering its control, the Party leadership of the front surely cannot permit dissent in - or share its control of - the press for the same reason. Fronts are established, in Selznick's view, for purposes of access. The press, a leading communication medium within the front, is the instrument whereby the leadership utilizes its access to the membership. If it loses control of the press, non-Party forces will in effect gain access to the membership with other views. It follows that that cannot be permitted.

Again, if fronts are created to provide the Party with access, the purpose of the Party in seeking access is important. In the view of Selznick, the Party seeks to gain access less to promote Communist ideology itself than the specific, day-to-day interests of the Communist system, more particularly the USSR. The Party "line" is geared to those interests, or to what Communist leaders see as those interests. Fronts must therefore reflect the Party line, and the main



reflector must be the press of the front concerned.

The operational hypothesis following from this is obvious: in a front organization, the press expresses a single monolithic view, tolerating no dissent; the view it expresses changes in precise accordance with the prevailing Communist line.

"The press," in this case, includes the various publications of the International Union of Students: World Student News, the News Service, official publications (including the IUS "research studies"), and press-releases.

iv. Deception.

Front organizations, Selznick argues, exist on the horns of a dilemma.

If they close their ranks too tightly, they are unable to fulfill their function, which is to gain access to the unconverted. If they open the doors too wide, the Party's leading, controlling role may be endangered.

The first deceptive practice of front organizations is therefore this: they must claim to be perfectly "open" organizations - and indeed admit large numbers of non-Communists - without admitting everyone indiscriminately. Second, they must veil their real character; the Communist orientation of the organization must be hidden, the organization must claim to be independent, legitimate, nonpartisan.

Operationally, then, fronts must have: (1) a facade, a legitimizing "cover," an official purpose overtly unconnected with Soviet





objectives, and (2) a membership open to some extent to non-Communists - but never to an extent endangering the Party's de facto control.

The last will be limited, in all likelihood, only by the character of applicants or members. There is the implication in the very nature of fronts, as Selznick sees them, that non-Communists are permitted - no, wanted - so long as they do not obstruct or refuse to co-operate with the leadership. They are ejected only if they prove disruptive, ie., if they refuse to remain on the leadership's terms. The leadership, again, may compromise with discontented members on non-crucial matters if by so doing it secures some political advantage. But it never relinquishes its central powers.

A number of things may count for evidence under this heading.

The leadership of a front, for example, may be quite secretive about the finances of the organization, if a revelation of financial sources might disclose Communist support or control, thus compromising the organization's facade. A front may further have to resort to deceit in order to substantiate its claims of universalism and legitimacy; we will therefore have to note whether the IUS makes false claims for the legitimacy - representativity - of its member-delegations.

Again, the character of organizations or events in which the IUS plays a leading role is also of marginal and circumstantial importance as evidence.



v. Mobilization of Membership.

Fronts exist for purposes of access, certainly, but not for that alone. The emphasis of Selznick's study is organizational, and he argues - partly explicitly, partly by inference - that front organizations have more than just propaganda functions. Whenever a structured group is brought together under Communist leadership, after all, there exists a latent energy capable of being mobilized and canalized for specific political purposes.

Selznick therefore argues that fronts seek to mobilize their constituent elements in seven ways, by the exploitation of the full political potential of seven devices: education (indoctrination), patronage (for political rewards and punishments), "fixing" (ie., the cultivation of support by the handling of grievances), social activities (for the purpose of insulating the constituents by providing energy-outlets under Party auspices), finances (the institution of regularized dues-paying both guarantees the front an income and, perhaps, heightens the member's sense of involvement), incorporation into a network of related Party-controlled organizations, and - at least occasionally - the improvement of the front's control over membership by the alteration of the basis of participation from group-membership to individual membership. This last, Selznick admits, is a sometimes thing.

Operationally, then, fronts seek to mobilize their members in the following ways. They propagandize constantly, in every medium,





also - if the Party be a guide - by training members "in the struggle," ie., by involving them in political tasks, or giving them ordinary tasks politically construed. They convert patronage into a politically-administered incentive for ideological and organizational conformity. They make the "fixing" of political grievances - in our case, student grievances, student aspirations - into a badge of legitimacy. They provide a wide range of social and physical activities oriented to appeal to students. They provide a regularized system of financial contributions, and integrate the member units into a wider network of Party controlled organizations. Finally, they sometimes seek to bypass the national-unit basis of membership by instituting direct individual membership.

vi. Organizational Tendencies.

Communist parties, in Selznick's view, are deeply - perhaps supremely - conscious of the importance of central power in social organization. They demonstrate their recognition of the importance of power by seeking always to first seize the central executive power in any organization they have ticketed for takeover.

Control, again, is critical in front organizations; if the Party loses control of the organs of real power, it fails in its most critical mission. True, the very right just to participate in an organization, even at the non-executive level, is important to the Party fraction, and gives the Party some access. But final access - and, more important, full mobilization of the membership - can only



come when the Party has control of the reigns of leadership. In this sense, Selznick argues that the Party recognizes the supreme importance of the organs of day-to-day decision-making. The usual character of voluntary organizations lends exaggerated importance to the residual powers allotted to the central organs; properly exploited, they can become the real centres of power, and not the larger, more cumbersome meetings of either the full membership or the elected executive. The functioning executive committee, and with it the day-to-day administrative secretariat is thus the crucial target.

The operational hypothesis then is: the Communist fraction will fight most tenaciously, in an organization's formative stages, for control of the central organs of power, and if successful will press for maximum powers for the organs it controls. It will seek to minimize the entry of non-Communists into the inner sanctum, even while holding to the legalism that the organs of real power in fact are responsible to the organs of theoretical power.

vii. Legitimatization.

A successful front organization must avoid becoming identified as such. It must be able to compete for loyalties on a basis of equality with other groups. If it becomes identified with a particular power - or a particular purpose, perhaps one having but little relation to its claimed objectives - it may be damagingly compromised.

Selznick believes front organizations seek to acquire legitimacy by disavowing partisan objectives and by identifying with accepted





symbols, values, and personalities. If the identification is convincing to the population at which the front is aimed - to which it seeks access - the front organization gains an immediate tactical victory. It is given a voice, an accepted role.

Functionally, the front has an important role to play: it can help legitimize Communist parties or groups at a lower level. The greater its own legitimacy, the more weight it can lend to the struggle. Fronts, then, have some organizational utility.

Operationally, then, fronts: (1) disavow partisan objectives, (2) utilize the target-group's accepted phraseology, (3) identify with non-Communists having repute in the target group, (4) claim universal and representative character, and (5) campaign for the legitimatization of local Communist or Communist-influenced student organizations.

#### viii. Adherence to the Party Line.

Front organizations are partly propaganda devices, devices of access. Hence they may be expected to campaign on behalf of general Soviet interests - as opposed to Communist ideology itself - as they are interpreted in the prevailing general Party line. At the same time, fronts are specialized as to the interest-groups they appeal to; their propaganda must needs be conditioned by the fact. Still further, they are - in Selznick's view - but part of a larger Communist enterprise; so they must be expected to campaign on behalf



of specific Communist purposes within the area with which they are concerned, ie., for our purposes, the area of student politics.

As a primary operational hypothesis, a front organization will echo the prevailing Soviet line on international politics. Put perhaps in a better way, a front organization will never contradict the prevailing Soviet line. If it pursues the line in organizational matters - ie., matters that superficially bear little relevance to the organization's formal area of interest - then that fact may well be of particular interest.

Secondarily, a front will consistently campaign on behalf of the interests of Communist student groups, particularly whenever they may be in conflict or competition with non-Communist students.

It would appear that Selznick's view is that a front might for tactical reasons play up or play down some aspects of the prevailing line, but that it cannot, by its very nature as a tool of organized Communism, contradict the prevailing line. If it did, either or both of two things would obtain: (1) the Party, still in control of the front, would have done so for some tactical reason - thus casting doubt upon Selznick's assertions as to what a Party can do "by its nature;" or (2) the Party would have lost control, either to non-Communists or to a dissentient faction from within its own ranks.

#### ix. Selective Intervention.

Because, in the Selznick model, a front is part of a larger organized network, its loyalties are first to members of the network.





Prevailing practice, together with the IUS's claim to be a defender of student rights, would then appear to dictate intervention, as an international organization, on behalf of victimized students. But if Selznick is right, the intervention, where Communist students are involved in the conflict, must be selective: the front must first intervene on behalf of its own. More than that, however the front - because its first function is the furtherance of Soviet objectives - must never intervene on behalf of students where such an intervention would cast an ill light on the Soviet system itself. If students in a Communist country are victimized, it must either remain silent on the matter, or in some way justify inaction by denying that any legitimate student rights have, indeed, been infringed upon.

Perhaps the operational hypothesis may best be phrased in this way. Given reliable evidence either that legitimate student rights have been violated in a Communist country, or that the violation of Communist-oriented student rights elsewhere is either justified or party defensible, a front (in this case the IUS) will (1) refuse to intervene on behalf of the students in the first case, and (2) continue to intervene on behalf of the students in the latter case, probably in the process denying that they are guilty of any wrongdoing.

#### x. Defense of the 'Social Base.'

Because access is so important to Communist groups, Selznick argues, they fear - perhaps above all - challenges by other similar



groups to their base of social power. Clearly it is fair to infer that the same applies to front organizations, the first function of which, after all, is access. Thus when Selznick argues that Communist Parties will construe "unity" to mean the bringing of rivals under Communist control, and that Parties will employ disruption, terror and the informal veto against those challenging their social base, the same must apply to front organizations.

In the case of this study, the "Social Base" of the International Union of Students is in the various national student organizations. This social base is threatened by a similar competitive organization with similar objectives and - formally - similar though certainly not identical values, the International Student Conference.

If Selznick is correct, the basic similarity of the two organizations will not have contributed any basic good-will to their mutual relationships; rather, it will have heightened rivalries.

Operationally then the IUS will have made it clear that its calls for "unity" are in fact calls for unity on its own terms, ie., unity within the prevailing structure and terms of reference of the IUS itself. Further, the IUS will employ, essentially as Selznick has described them, the tactics of disruption, the informal veto, and "terror" - in all its gradations - against the ISC. Internally, we may expect it to employ similar sanctions against those groups or individuals threatening its own "social base" - that is, against





those threatening the established IUS leadership's control of the member delegations. The employment of such tactics will likewise extend to those functions organized by the IUS, for challenges to the integrity of such functions are in effect challenges to the IUS's social base.



### CHAPTER III

The Communist Party and the splinter groups of the revolutionary left are attempting to capitalize on the natural idealism and exuberance of young people. They have had remarkable success in Latin America and the less sophisticated nations of Africa and Asia but, thus far, have apparently made relatively little direct headway with the great mass of American youth. They have, however, met with some success through the traditional 'front group' approach. American Security Council, Washington Report.<sup>1</sup>

An inquiry of this kind requires a factual recounting of Communism's theoretical and organizational response to the revolutionary potential of the young intelligentsia. Of necessity our inquiry will lead us to a brief examination of the various organizations, including the International Union of Students, Communism has created to exploit that potential.

Since 1917, the Communist movement has been, among other things, testing and developing concrete political techniques for the tapping of the various sources of political-revolutionary potential in variegated target populations. This chapter is an outline -- not an exhaustive historical summary -- of a part of that search. This chapter points out some of the directions in which the search has gone.

No student of politics need be alarmed by the contention that Communism -- both as a theoretical system and as a revolutionary

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<sup>1</sup>Washington, D.C., June 8, 1964. WR 64-21.





political movement -- has always drawn heavily upon the idealism (and, to a lesser extent, the self-interest) of intellectuals. Both the Soviet and Chinese Communist movements found their first fertile seed-beds in the radical intelligentsia. As one student of Marxist history writes:

Unlike Christianity, for instance, Marxism's appeal has always been first to the intellectuals. Christianity was resisted by the ancient philosophers, who regarded it as an aberration of the lower classes; it spread from below, upwards. Marxism, on the contrary, has been carried by the intellectuals to the proletarians and peasants. To intellectuals it has appealed as no other doctrine has, because it integrated for them the most fully discordant psychological motives. In Marxism we find for the first time a combination of the language of science and the language of myth - a union of mysticism and logic.

Here was a science which at the same time gave intellectuals a cause, a sense of mission, a conviction that their lives were worth while because history needed them. Here was a system which was both science and ethics, which called itself historical materialism and demanded idealist commitment.<sup>2</sup>

The Russian revolutionary movement -- of which the Bolsheviks were, of course, only a part, and not a unique part -- was a movement rooted, through much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in the

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<sup>2</sup>Lewis S. Feuer, ed., Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1959), pp x-xi.



organizations and aspirations of intellectuals and students.<sup>3</sup> The intellectual radicals of the nineteenth century often shared with their Bolshevik and other heirs a belief in the necessity of a total revolutionary re-organization of Russian society. The early radicals often thought, like the Bolsheviks, that the intelligentsia -- the better-trained, better-educated groups in the salaried class including, of course, the nascent intelligentsia, the students -- ought to play a leading role in this great revolutionary "reconstruction." Finally, the early radicals, on occasion, shared with their heirs similar ideas

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<sup>3</sup>The term "intelligentsia" needs clarification. Members of this stratum are characterized not by intellectual potential or level but by specialized training and education. Members of the intelligentsia would find their occupation, predominately, in the non-manual skills and professions. It is a distinct group, politically, to the extent that its specialized training equips it with advantageous skills and distinct political, cultural, and social attitudes. The intelligentsia found no official recognition under the old Tsarist system; it belonged to no "estate." In the Soviet Union, it has been accorded a special status with special privileges, together with a leading role in the Party. It still has not been recognized as a class: it is said to consist of the "best sons and daughters" of the "toiling workers and peasants." The Soviets have given some recognition to the progressive character of the intelligentsia in some non-Communist emerging nations - the 1961 Party Program specifies that the intelligentsia, as part of the "national bourgeoisie" of these nations has a progressive role, for the time being. In 1934 Stalin explicitly argued that in the revolutionary struggle, "the assistance of the technical intelligentsia must be accepted," even though it did not play "an independent historical role."

See The Communist Conspiracy: The USSR (Washington: Committee on Un-American Activities, 1956), Part 1, Section B, pp. 294-7. For a description of the present role of the intelligentsia in the emerging nations from the standpoint of a more detached social scientist, see Edward Shils, "The Intellectuals in the Political Development of the New States," in John H. Kautsky, ed., Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries: Nationalism and Communism (New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1963), pp. 195-234.







as to how the revolution ought to be brought about, and by what kind of party. In this connection it is interesting to note that Lenin drew extensively, in his plans for the Bolshevik Party, from earlier anarchist-terrorists like Mikhail Bakunin, S.G. Nechayev, and Peter Tkachev. Dostoevsky had called fanatical Russian revolutionaries "the possessed," and certainly, before Lenin, no one deserved the label better than S.G. Nechayev, who wrote in the Catechism of the Revolutionist:

The revolutionary is a man offered as a sacrifice. He has neither personal interests, affairs, feelings, ties, property, nor even a name of his own. He is totally absorbed by a single, exclusive...passion: the revolution .... He has broken all connection with the legal order and the entire civilized world, with the laws, conveniences, morality, and generally recognized customs...He knows only one science: destruction.

For him all is moral that favors the triumph of the revolution, all is immoral and criminal that holds it back...Severe with himself, he must also be severe toward others. All feelings of affection, all tender feelings of kinship, friendship, love, and gratitude must be suppressed in him by the sole cold passion for revolutionary work.<sup>4</sup>

When Lenin -- himself an intellectual of good family<sup>5</sup> --

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<sup>4</sup>Quoted in Herbert McClosky and John E. Turner, The Soviet Dictatorship (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1960), pp. 44-5. For their analysis of the Bolshevik tie with the Russian past, see "Bolshevism and the Revolutionary Heritage," ibid., pp. 39-69.

<sup>5</sup>See Robert H. McNeal, The Bolshevik Tradition: Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1963), pp. 1-11; Stefan Possony, Lenin: The Compulsive Revolutionary (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1964), pp. 4-14; and Bertram D. Wolfe, Three Who Made a Revolution: A Biographical History (New York: The Dial Press, 1948), chapter two, passim.



later collected these ideological tendencies and shaped them into a concerted and systematic revolutionary theory, he was therefore building on the revolutionary experience of previous political 'militants.' Lenin merely brought to the task a massively dedicated revolutionary drive, a talent for systematization, and an acute political horse sense.

Before Lenin, however, the state of systematic revolutionary theory in Russia was somewhat underdeveloped. We must look to the writings of Lenin if we want to discover a good deal about Communism. More particularly, for our purposes, it is in Lenin that we find the first tentative beginnings of a theory of revolution taking account both of the necessity of front organizations -- although Lenin never called them that, and never developed the idea fully -- and of the revolutionary potential inhering in youth and students.

In What Is To Be Done?,<sup>6</sup> Lenin developed the first systematic expression of Communist revolutionary theory -- most particularly that part of theory having to do with the structure and strategy of the revolutionary party elite. The crux of Lenin's theory was contained in one portentous paragraph:

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<sup>6</sup>V.I. Lenin, Selected Works in Two Volumes (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1952), Vol. I, Part 1, pp. 203-409.





To bring political knowledge to the workers, the Social-Democrats ie., the Communists must go among all classes of the population, must dispatch units of their army in all directions.<sup>7</sup>

The role of the revolutionary Communist elite, Lenin thought, was to detect -- with the "infallible" tools of Marxist analysis -- the social, economic, and political realities of the "revolutionary situation;" to formulate the "correct" line of behavior for the revolutionary proletariat within that context; and then to carry the Dictates of History, as the Party had infallibly interpreted them, to the proletariat for action -- to the proletariat, that is, as well as to all classes and groups prepared to play a "progressive" role in the unfolding of the historical drama. The Party, to be sure, was to be an elite, a vanguard, an elect leadership. It was to control its own membership according to the most stringent criteria. The elite character of the Party was to be reflected in its own membership, in its tactical sophistication and discipline, and in its unique understanding of history's logic. But its elitism extended only to its own structure and membership, and never to its relation to the revolutionary masses. In isolation lay stagnation and impotence, the worst humiliation conceivable for those with the only keys to history's inner chamber.

The central problem of the Party, as Lenin and his heirs saw it, was that of creating and maintaining a viable relationship with

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<sup>7</sup>Ibid., pp. 287-8, his italics.



the masses, with the proletariat. The Party has to avoid becoming isolated from the masses, for in that eventuality it loses all influence over the course of events. On the other hand, the danger pervading a too-close relationship between the Party and the masses is a loss of revolutionary energy and perspective, a dilution of enthusiasm in the pursuit of the masses' historically irrelevant day-to-day aspirations. A proper relationship lies somewhere in between: the Party would have to influence (hopefully, control) the masses without being influenced by the masses -- at least beyond the point necessary to appreciate the aspirations of the masses sufficiently to exploit those aspirations. As Lenin put it:

We must take upon ourselves the task of organizing an all-round political struggle under the leadership of our Party in such a manner as to obtain all the support possible of all opposition strata for the struggle and for our Party. We must train our Social-Democratic practical workers to become political leaders, able to guide all the manifestations of this all-round struggle, able at the right time to 'dictate a positive program of action,' for the restless students, the discontented Zemstvo Councillors, the incensed religious sects, the offended elementary school teachers, etc., etc.<sup>8</sup>

He asked: but has the Party sufficient resources to assume such a grandiose role? "Of course we have," he answered:

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid., p. 294, his italics.





We would be 'politicians' and Social-Democrats only in name (as actually very often happens), if we failed to realize that our task is to utilize every manifestation of discontent, and to collect and make the best of every grain of even rudimentary protest... Indeed, is there a single class of the population in which no individuals, groups, or circles are to be found who are discontented with the lack of rights and with tyranny, and, therefore, accessible to the propaganda of Social-Democrats..? <sup>9</sup>

Lenin argued that close association with the masses would not dilute the Party's revolutionary fervor for three reasons: (1) the Party itself would organize the "public exposures;" (2) all questions raised by agitation would be elucidated "in a consistently Social-Democratic spirit, without any concessions to deliberate or non-deliberate distortions of Marxism;" and (3) the Party would provide its own (unspecified) institutional channels for the mobilization and direction of popular sentiments against specific targets, thus safeguarding its own political independence.

In another passage, Lenin hinted at the need for mass-organizations to spread the Party's influence among various kinds of interest-groups. He did not call them front-organizations, nor did he spell out in detail how they were to be organized or to which specific groups they were to appeal. But he did argue that they were needed:

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<sup>9</sup>Ibid., pp. 296-7, my italics.



The centralization of the secret functions of the organization by no means implies the centralization of all the functions of the movement...the active and widespread participation of the masses will not suffer; on the contrary, it will benefit by the fact that a 'dozen' experienced revolutionaries, trained professionally no less than the police, will centralize all the secret aspects of the work...the centralization of the most secret functions in an organization of revolutionaries will not diminish but will rather increase the extent and quality of the activity of a large number of other organizations which are intended for broad public and are therefore as loose and non-secret as possible...we must have such circles...everywhere in as large a number as possible, and with the widest variety of functions...<sup>10</sup>

What was to be the role of the intelligentsia in all this?

Lenin strongly intimates throughout What Is To Be Done? that the intelligentsia is to play an important tactical role. On the one hand, the Party itself recruits members from among the intelligentsia:

As I have already said time and again, that by 'wise men' in connection with organization, I mean professional revolutionaries, irrespective of whether they are trained from among students or workingmen.<sup>11</sup>

On the other hand, the intelligentsia promises to be a fertile seed-bed for future Communist conversions:

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<sup>10</sup>Ibid., pp. 337-8, his italics.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 336, his italics.





Are there not advanced people, 'average people,' and the 'mass' among the intelligentsia too? Does not everyone recognize that popular literature is also required for the intelligentsia, and is not such literature written?...we can and must educate workers (and university and high-school students) so as to be able to discuss these revolutionary questions with them.<sup>12</sup>

By 1902, then, Lenin had given explicit recognition to four facts central to the later rationale for a front-organization aimed at youth and students. First, there was the necessity of an elitist revolutionary cadre, proven by experience, tightly disciplined, tactically flexible, to formulate revolutionary strategy. Second, there was the imperative necessity for the cadre to sink the deepest possible roots in the masses, channeling mass aspirations and dissatisfactions with the status quo into the struggle against the existing order. Third, there was the necessity for the Party to draw the masses into the revolutionary struggle by creating Party-controlled mass organizations (the exact structure of which Lenin was, in 1902 at least, unprepared to define). Fourth, Lenin had sometimes given recognition to the revolutionary potential of radical youth and students, and of the intelligentsia generally -- a potential that had to be tapped.

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<sup>12</sup>Ibid., pp. 343-4, his italics. For other Leninist analyses of the day-to-day importance of students in Bolshevik tactics, see "The Student Movement and the Present Political Situation," Collected Works (fourth edition; Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1963), XV, pp. 213-19, and "The Drafting of 183 Students Into the Army," ibid., IV, pp. 414-19. See also Lenin's Marx, Engels, Marxism (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960), pp. 99, 576-99, 604.



A qualification is in order here. Bolshevik theorists never conceded that the intelligentsia as a broad grouping -- much less youth or students as a part of that larger grouping -- had any independent existence as a "class," in the Marxist sense. In the Marxist scheme of things, the intelligentsia occupied no distinctive role in the economy -- at least not a role capable of being expressed in terms of property-ownership. There was in Bolshevik theory no recognition that the character of the intelligentsia could only be explained in non-economic terms. Yet if the undeniable revolutionary significance of the intelligentsia in Russia had no palpable impact upon the formal structure of orthodox Marxist theory, it did have an impact upon day-to-day tactics. If Lenin, as a Marxist, was unwilling to alter his intellectual system in order to make room for a new factor that would not fit -- the intelligentsia -- he was, as a political tactician, willing to make tactical provisions to ensure the full exploitation of all groups having revolutionary potential. Hence, while the Party continued to operate, ostensibly, under an overarching ideology which took no cognizance of the important revolutionary role of the intelligentsia, it adapted that ideology, that doctrine, so as to make practical tactical allowances for the intelligentsia's potential.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup>It made allowances in order to exploit the political potential of other non-proletarian groups as well, of course. At various times and in various circumstances, the Communists have aimed specific appeals at veterans, professional people, (lawyers and scientists, just to name two kinds), farmers and religionists. See Philip Selznick, The Organizational Weapon (Glencoe: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), pp. 144-224, and Eugene Lyons, The Red Decade (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merill Company, 1941), passim.





Now, in Lenin's day -- that is to say, before his years as head of the new Soviet state -- the organizational techniques by which the Bolsheviks sought to mobilize non-Communist revolutionary energies were relatively unsophisticated. Before the 1920's Lenin had only noted the need to develop effective techniques of mass-influence. The full development of Lenin's germinal ideas waited for Lenin's heirs, for later generations of Communists.<sup>14</sup>

Communist youth-organizations on the international scale were at first linked with the already-extant Young Communist League in the Soviet Union itself. In 1919, the Young Communist International was created; it drew much of its membership and leadership from the old, defunct, Young Socialist International, which in turn had been organized by the first international Congress of Socialist youth organizations in Stuttgart, in 1907.<sup>15</sup> The YCI was put under the leadership of Willi (Wilhelm) Muenzenberg, the former executive secretary of the

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<sup>14</sup>Lenin, to be sure, was not the only influence upon Bolshevism. His influence, however, owing to the unique character of the Party, and to the unique character of his relationship to the Party - he is literally its founder, prophet, and patron saint - has been thorough and profound. Other influences came to bear upon the Party's decision-making both before and after Lenin's death; that goes without saying. Lenin's influence was profound before his death, however, because of the organizational power which he wielded and because of the respect in which he was held. His influence remained powerful after his death because: 1) his views were always held up as the model of Communist tactics and outlook; 2) his teachings formed the basis of what was taught to generations of Party tacticians; and 3) the Party, being a particular kind of totalitarian combat party, was particularly receptive to Lenin's outlook and attitudes vis-a-vis Communism's enemies.

<sup>15</sup>The Young Socialist International was affiliated with the old Second International, which the Bolsheviks left. Today, the Second International is made up of groups representing the non-Communist Left.



old YSI. Muenzenberg was to become, in subsequent years, one of the most original and brilliant propagandists of the Soviet cause. In the early 1920's, he presided over the creation of the first prototype Soviet mass-organization, the International Workers' Aid (IWA), a relief agency which collected money and supplies in the West (from both non-Communists and Communists) for the war-torn Russian countryside.<sup>16</sup> It is difficult to evaluate the precise impact of Muenzenberg upon official Soviet thinking in the front-organization field. He was apparently inhibited somewhat by the growing Stalinist bureaucracy. Whatever his feelings to the contrary may have been -- of these we have no real record, we can only hypothesize -- the Young Communist International never became the same kind of mass-organization as the IWA. The YCI was not a front-organization: its membership was never open to those not already committed to the Communist cause, and its purpose, to judge by all the available facts, was less the influencing of young people and students in general than it was the grooming of already-committed pro-Communist youth for futures with the Communist Party. Its membership figures revealed that quite

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<sup>16</sup> For more on Muenzenberg, see Arthur Koestler, The Invisible Writing (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1956), pp. 205-12; and Nils Apeland, World Youth and the Communists (London: Phoenix House, 1958), pp. 16-21. Muenzenberg, it is thought, was assassinated in France in 1940 by the G.P.U., after he refused to return home to Russia during the Great Purges.





clearly.<sup>17</sup>

The Soviet Communist leadership did not confine its youth-directed activities to the YCI in this period, it should be noted. In 1921, the Party's Central Committee created and placed under its direct control the Scientific Group for the Study of the Orient and the University of the Peoples of the East -- the latter a school for the training of young Asian revolutionaries.<sup>18</sup>

When J.V. Stalin came to power in the U.S.S.R., he claimed to appreciate the teachings of Lenin. In particular, he claimed to appreciate Lenin's teachings vis-a-vis the necessity of binding the masses to the Party by means of domestic and international mass-organizations. Stalin saw mass-organizations both as an aid in consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat within the Soviet Union itself, and an aid in revolutionary activities abroad. He

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<sup>17</sup>In 1928 the YCI claimed an international membership of two million young people - but 95 per cent were from the Communist youth organizations of the Soviet Union and Communist-controlled China. See Robert Bass, "Communist Fronts: Their History and Function," Problems of Communism, IX, 5 (September-October, 1960), p. 10. The Comintern, under which the YCI operated, had rather stringent membership requirements of its own. For the 21 conditions of admission to Comintern membership, see Sidney Hook, World Communism (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co. Inc., 1962), pp. 36-42. If the limited clues are any guide, relationships between the two groups were very close. Statute #15 of the Comintern gave the Comintern's Executive Committee a "decisive vote" in the Executive Committee of the International League of Youth, a co-ordinating body to which the YCI belonged. See The Communist Conspiracy: Communism Outside the United States, Part 1, Section C, p. 27.

<sup>18</sup>See Stefan Possony, A Century of Conflict (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953), p. 153.



called mass-organization "transmission belts," and said of them:

What are these 'transmission belts,' or 'levers' in the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat? What is this 'directing force'? Why are they needed? The levers or the transmission belts are those very mass organizations of the proletariat without whose aid the dictatorship cannot be realized.

The proletariat needs these organizations because without them it would suffer inevitable defeat in its fight for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, in its fight for the consolidation of its own power, in its fight for the building of socialism...without them a dictatorship of the proletariat to any extent durable and firm is impossible.<sup>19</sup>

In one passage, Stalin wrote that mass-organizations dealt with the trade-unions, the Soviets, the cooperatives, and the Youth League (whose task he described as "educating the young generation in the spirit of socialism").<sup>20</sup> In another, he added to the list of mass organizations "factory organizations, parliamentary groups, non-Party womens' associations, the press, cultural and educational organizations... and revolutionary fighting organizations (in times of open revolutionary action)"<sup>21</sup> -- a much more complete, and instructive, listing.

In 1926 the late O.V. Kuusinen demanded in a speech that the Party expand its influence further. Kuusinen, a veteran Finnish Communist, was a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee after 1941, and until his 1964 death a CPSU Secretary. He told the enlarged Executive Committee of the

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<sup>19</sup>"On the Problems of Leninism," Problems of Leninism (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953), pp. 164-5.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 166

<sup>21</sup>"The Foundations of Leninism," ibid., p. 103.







Communist International in March, 1926, that:

The first part of our task is to build up not only Communist organizations but other organizations as well, above all mass organizations sympathizing with our aims and able to aid us for special purposes... Besides this we require a number of more or less firmly established organizational fulcrums which we can utilize for our further work, ensuring that we are not condemned to the task of influencing the mass politically merely to see this mass influence constantly slip through our hands. We must create a whole solar system of organizations and smaller committees around the Communist Party, smaller organizations, so to speak, actually working under the influence of the Party but not under its mechanical control.<sup>22</sup>

Kuusinen's call<sup>23</sup> notwithstanding, it remained true for nearly a generation after the Revolution that the international "mass organizations" of the Soviet Union were organizations of restricted membership and fairly strict ideological discipline; they embraced "masses" of Communists and pro-Communists, but not "masses" of people, in any general sense. In addition, of course, the national units of the YCI were always openly pro-Communist: the leading role of higher Party

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<sup>22</sup>"Report of the Commission for Work Among the Masses," International Press Correspondence, VI, 28 (April, 1926), p. 429. Hereafter abbreviated as Inprecorr. Inprecorr was the one-time journal of information of the Comintern, circulated to the world's Communist Parties.

<sup>23</sup>The precise impact of Kuusinen's speech is difficult to measure. The speech would have been authorized in order to have been given. The speech did not immediately produce any concrete alterations in the Comintern's policy line. On the other hand, it must have been noted: Kuusinen was an Old Bolshevik, a respected member. At his death in 1964, he was regarded, apparently not without affection, as something of a Museum Piece - he was the only high Comintern official to survive Stalin. For other Kuusinen views, see his book, Youth and Fascism (New York: Workers Library Publishers, 1935), pp. 28-30.



organs in the YCL's was never much disguised.<sup>24</sup> The YCI defined its own role in the following way:

The YCL is a much broader organization than the Communist Party...the YCL should therefore strive to exceed the CP in numerical strength...Although the YCL is a mass organization, this does not eliminate the usefulness of non-Party mass organizations of the working youth for special tasks. These auxiliary organizations are a sort of 'transmission belt' which link up the YCL more closely with the masses. In order to extend the guiding influence to the youth in the mass organizations of adult and young workers (trade unions, sport leagues, various auxiliary organizations, etc.), the YCL organizes its members in these organizations into YCL fractions. The fractions are the mouthpiece and more important instrument of the YCL in these organizations...the YCL does not limit its activities to the framework of 'legality' ordained by the bourgeoisie. In its struggle against capitalism the YCL is continually compelled to combine its open legal activity with illegal and semi-legal work...<sup>25</sup>

The YCI, then, in order to broaden its influence among the masses was prepared to infiltrate existing non-Communist mass youth organizations, and to work from within. It was also willing to create its own mass organizations:

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<sup>24</sup>If the YCI ever had any misconceptions as to its exact status vis-a-vis the Comintern - and there is evidence it did - the Soviet leadership soon corrected them. The limited organizational autonomy of the YCI, in the early years of its life, was replaced with a strict subordination to the CPSU. Said Comrade Stalin: "Without such guidance, it will be unable to perform its fundamental task." See Apeland, op. cit., p. 18.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., p. 19.







But even in a state of illegality the YCL must remain a mass organization, ie., it must not lose contact with and influence over the masses. For this purpose it creates various legal organizations (including political ones) of the working youth. But the YCI looks upon these organizations only as legal forms of work for the illegal YCL.<sup>26</sup>

The mass-organizations of the YCI were a step toward front organizations, but they were not, in themselves, front organizations. The YCI organized political study-groups, athletic clubs, students' organizations, and the like. But they tended too much to reflect the rather narrow and restrictive character of the YCI itself, and their political leanings and intent were always patently clear. Moreover, the YCI did not disguise the leading role it played therein: the twenties and thirties, in much of the West at least, were times in which while it might not be utterly respectable to be a Communist, it was at least less risky than it has otherwise sometimes been. The YCI therefore had no fears -- save tactical ones -- in allowing its leading role to be known.

The YCI, it is important to note, apparently paid only passing attention to the political importance of students. This is to be seen in some of its official records.<sup>27</sup> The YCI was also

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<sup>26</sup>Ibid., pp. 19-20.

<sup>27</sup>A resolution of the plenum of the YCI's Executive Committee in April 1928 recognized the need for greater YCI efforts in the youth field and expressed hope that progress would be made in the armed forces, the factories, the sport movement, and in the "villages" - but said nothing about students. See Inprecorr, VIII, 22 (April 12, 1928), pp. 433-6.



apparently bound somewhat in its effectiveness by the rather uninteresting and old-fashioned character of its approach to work with youth.<sup>28</sup>

Actually, this inadequate appreciation of the potential role of youth and students was the fault of the Communist leadership itself. As early as 1928, N. Bukharin told the Comintern's Sixth World Congress that:

The number of organized young comrades is either declining or stationary. There is no doubt that the Communist youth movement suffers from excessive sectarianism; our Youth International is unable to penetrate all the organizations where young workers are to be found and to influence them. Our tactical orientation in the youth organizations is still distinguished by a certain narrowness.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>28</sup>The YCI leadership in this period, it would seem, was not unaware of the crudeness of the organization's tactics. In YCI minutes there are frequent mentions of the uninteresting character of much YCI activity, viz., "The so-called New Working Methods, ie., the reactivization of the Leagues, the getting rid of the dry and uninteresting character of the League work, are developing only in Germany with good success." And again: "By developing the New Working Methods to a greater extent, by overcoming the dry and uninteresting character of the League work, which alongside of factory nuclei work is of decisive importance for liquidating the fluctuation of members, at the same time a decisive check must be given to those opinions which aim at restricting the political activity of the YCL. The 'new methods' must not only be applied to Agitprop work but to all spheres of mass work and the fight of the YCL." Ibid., p. 435.

<sup>29</sup>"Our Tasks and our Shortcomings," Inprecorr, VIII, 41 (July 30, 1928), p. 736.





He ended with a prophetic appeal:

Comrades, the youth problem is one of the most vital problems of our time...if we devote our attention to great political problems without at the same time trying to penetrate all mass organizations...the great masses of the youth, human material, will be lost to our cause...we have paid very little attention lately to the youth movement. What is the situation in the youth movement? The youth are now much worse organized than the adult proletariat.<sup>30</sup>

At least two other major Soviet-sympathizing writers showed, almost inadvertently, that Communist tacticians had unwisely overlooked, respectively, the importance of students in particular and the intelligentsia in general, during this period.<sup>31</sup>

The Young Communist International, prior to 1935, had two built-in deficiencies in its approach: first, its generally inadequate appreciation of the potential role of youth and students, and second, its stilted and self-admittedly unappealing tactics and programs in the youth field. But perhaps the largest burden with which it was

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<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 736.

<sup>31</sup>J. Peters, The Communist Party: A Manual on Organization (New York: The Bookmailer, n.d.), p. 17; William Z. Foster, Toward Soviet America (Balboa Island: Elgin Publications, 1961), pp. 227-9. Peters was a leading Communist functionary who was deported from the United States for espionage in 1949. His book, originally printed by the Workers Library, speaks of "neutralizing" the "petty bourgeoisie," especially the teachers, intellectuals, and students. At the same time, it ascribes to them a lesser role in the class struggle than is given to the Proletariat. Foster - twice the national chairman of the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA) - speaks of the growing pro-Communism of many intellectuals and of the need for the Party to exploit that radicalization. At the same time, he admits that the Party has far to go in this direction.



saddled in this period was the entire Communist movement's attitude toward non-Communists, an attitude that at times verged on paranoia in its suspiciousness of "outsiders."

It will be recalled that prior to 1935, Soviet leaders saw the "imperialistic" West as the supreme international threat to the Soviet system. Hence it tended to regard all bourgeois countries and parties -- and, certainly, individuals (including individuals of a non-Communist but leftist persuasion) -- with distaste, refusing to co-operate with them. It was during this period that the Soviet-backed German Communist Party helped to bring Hitler to power by joining with the Nazis in attacking the non-Communist left -- the Social-Democrats and non-Communist trade-unionists. It was a "sectarian" period; the Communist Parties of the world were not only skeptical of non-Communists, they were distinctly hostile towards them. In such an atmosphere it is not surprising that the Young Communist International garnered a scanty harvest in cultivating the individuals of the non-Communist Left.

By about 1934, however, Soviet leaders began to view the growing strength of the Fascist countries with alarm, and began to see the need for closer collaboration with the anti-fascist Western powers. This new realization, in time, produced a fresh overall strategic orientation that was reflected right through the World Communist movement.

The general shift was formally announced at the Comintern's Seventh World Congress in Moscow in August, 1935. Keynote speaker





Georgi Dimitroff proclaimed what he called "a new tactical orientation for the Communist International."<sup>32</sup>

The Comintern, Dimitroff said, had before 1935 engaged in "sectarianism" -- in "bare appeals and abstract propaganda." It had become isolated from new mass-aspirations and interests. Marx, he said, had written that Communists "must take things as we find them," which meant, in the specific situation, increased Communist activities where the masses were. Dimitroff, warning against "revolutionary phrase mongering," said the new line of the Comintern was in favor of co-operation with all "anti-fascist" (even bourgeois) groups willing to join actively in the struggle against fascism, and for working-class interests (or both).

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<sup>32</sup>J.B. Matthews, "Triumph of the Trojan Horse," Soviet Total War (Washington: Committee on Un-American Activities, 1956), pp. 110-36, summarizes and quotes extensively from Dimitroff's speech. The complete speech is found in The Communist Conspiracy: Strategy and Tactics of World Communism (Washington: Committee on Un-American Activities, 1956), Part 1, Section C, pp. 292-336. (Dimitroff, it should be noted, was at the time of his speech something of an international Communist hero. He had been the principal defendant in the Reichstag Fire Trial, and had given the Nazis no end of embarrassment). Here, the record must be set straight concerning my use in this study of various documents published by the Committee on Un-American Activities. Some of the Committee's activities and publications have in past been subjected to very considerable criticism. Whether those criticisms have been just or unjust is not germane at this point, for the reason that I have employed very few of the Committee's own interpretive documents in this study. Most of the Committee documents that I have utilized have been comprehensive collections of other official documents. They have been utilized as source material, in other words. As source materials they are often excellent, particularly if read critically.



One Communist tactic to be more widely-employed, he told the delegates, would be that of the "Trojan Horse:"

Comrades, you remember the ancient tale of the capture of Troy...the attacking army, after suffering many sacrifices, was unable to achieve victory until with the aid of the famous Trojan horse it managed to penetrate to the very heart of the enemy's camp. We revolutionary workers, it appears to me, should not be shy about using the same tactics with regard to our fascist foe, who is defending himself against the people with the help of the living wall of his cutthroats.

He who fails to understand the necessity of applying such tactics in the case of fascism, he who regards such an approach as 'humiliating' may be a most excellent comrade, but, if you will allow me to say so, he is a windbag and not a revolutionary...<sup>33</sup>

Youth, he said, presented a particularly acute problem:

In speaking of the youth, we must state frankly that we have neglected our task of drawing the masses of the toiling youth into the struggle against the offense of capital ...we have not always taken count of the specific economic, political and cultural interests of the youth. We have likewise not paid proper attention to the revolutionary education of the youth.

In a number of capitalist countries, our Young Communist Leagues are still largely sectarian organizations divorced from the masses. Their fundamental weakness is that they are still trying to copy the Communist Parties, their forms and methods of work, forgetting that the Y.C.L. is not a Communist Party of the youth. They do not sufficiently take into consideration the fact that this the YCI is an organization having its own specific tasks. Its methods and forms of work, of education and of struggle, must be adapted to the specific level and needs of the youth

The main task of the Communist youth movement in capitalist countries is to advance boldly in the direction of bringing about the united front.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. 316.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., p. 318, his italics.







All Communist youth organizations, he said, must begin forming, with all deliberate speed, an anti-fascist united front, appealing to youth in all areas of life -- in sports circles, schools, labor groups, and the like.<sup>35</sup> Later, the Congress officially ratified his proposals in a formal resolution.<sup>36</sup> Earlier, Dimitrov's call had been echoed by Comrade Kuusinen, who stated:

We want to attack our class enemies in the rear when they start the war against the Soviet Union, but how can we do so if the majority of the toiling youth follow not us but for instance the Catholic priests or the liberal chameleons?... We need a revolutionary youth movement at least ten times as broad as our Parties and a united youth front hundreds of times broad still...<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>35</sup>Ibid., p. 319.

<sup>36</sup>For the relevant part of its text, see ibid., p. 357. The concept of the "United Front," often the occasion of some confusion, deserves clarification. From about 1921 to 1934, Communist appeals for "unity" were appeals for unity "from below" - that is, they were appeals aimed at rank-and-file Socialists to desert their established leadership for the Communist Party. Prior to about 1934, in other words, "unity" appeals were propaganda appeals aimed at unifying the Communist Party and the Socialist rank-and-file against the (Democratic) Socialist leadership. After 1934 and the Comintern Congress above described, "unity" appeals called for a "united front from above," that is, an alliance of the leadership of the Party with the leadership of anti-fascist groups. The Party retained its aims, but sought to realize them on the basis of bringing non-Communists into alliance with itself, on the basis of some temporary concessions and a number of temporary common interests (ie., the defeat of Fascism).

<sup>37</sup>Quoted in The Communist International Youth and Student Apparatus (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 2. This monograph was prepared for the Senate Judiciary Committee's Internal Security Subcommittee by Herbert Romerstein, a former Communist and long-time student of the Communist youth offensive.





The YCI reflected the new line, after 1935, by shifting its guns to the dangers of fascism and joining in a number of co-operative ventures with like-minded Socialists and liberals. The Congress had instructed the Executive Committee of the YCI to

take effective measures to overcome the sectarian secludedness of a number of Young Communist organizations, to make it the duty of Young Communist League members to join all mass organizations of the toiling youth (trade union, cultural, sports organizations) formed by bourgeois-democratic, reformist, fascist parties, as well as by religious associations; to wage systematic struggle in these organizations to gain influence over the broad masses of the youth...<sup>38</sup>

The success of the new campaign was patchy, and in any case the entire effort was cut short by the signing of the Hitler-Stalin Pact and by the War. Before the experiment ended, however, the use of united-front organizations with a mass-base had spread quite widely and with very considerable success in some areas.<sup>39</sup> On the student plane, American Communists managed to effect a merger between the Student League for Industrial Democracy (a Socialist group) and the National Student League (a Communist group attached to the YCI)

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<sup>38</sup>Quoted in "Troubled International Fronts," Youth and Freedom, VI, 1-2, p. 3. This periodical, published by the Institute for International Youth Affairs in New York, is probably the best monthly reference on the student movement. It is an invaluable source.

<sup>39</sup>The American League Against War and Fascism, formed in 1933 as a Communist-led mass organization, reflected the new line by becoming, after 1935, a front organization. After that date, Communist members and leaders claimed to represent "other" organizations instead of the Party. Party boss Earl Browder, for example, claimed to represent the International Workers' Order, "a fraternal organization." The Party thus maintained its control - only secretly - and broadened its influence vastly. See Selznick, op. cit., pp. 146-8.





to form the American Student Union. The Communists, by dint of superior organization and tactics, soon ousted the Socialists from the ASU's leadership and were thereafter, by virtue of the fact that the ASU was now recognized by many as a legitimate and representative students' union, able to attract many non-Communists to membership and influence.<sup>40</sup>

The War and the Hitler-Stalin Pact wreaked havoc with the YCI. The French YCL section was suppressed by the French government after the Pact was signed, while the German section was suppressed by the ascendant Nazis. The Soviet Union had a bitter war to fight, little energy to expend on international subversion, and a number of Western allies to assuage. In 1943, the YCI, together with its parent, the Comintern, was dissolved.<sup>41</sup>

Before turning to the revival of international youth and student activities after the war and the Communists' development for

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<sup>40</sup>See ibid., pp. 150-1. Space does not permit an exhaustive listing of all Communist youth and student activities during this era. The existence of such activities can only be noted. For details of the three major anti-war strikes of youth and students organized by the CPUSA, see The Communist Conspiracy, op. cit., Section E, pp. 329-30, 335-8. For information on the American Youth Congress, see ibid., pp. 339-42. For information on the several "World Youth Congresses for Peace," see ibid., Section B, p. 179. See the same reference and page for some mention of the United Students International, formed in Paris in 1937 of both Communist and Socialist students. The International, at the outset, had 70,000 members from some 24 countries. The student strikes and the United Students International appear to have been both united-front endeavors that were markedly successful in bringing large numbers of non-Communists under Party leadership, if only temporarily.

<sup>41</sup>In all likelihood, the leading cadres and apparatus of the YCI were retained intact for re-deployment after the war. This, to be sure, is only a personal suspicion, but hardly an unreasonable one.



the first time of a true front organization aimed at students, it may be well to ask just why -- the Nazi menace having disappeared at war's end -- the Soviets would seek to continue, indeed to expand, the united-front approach through the institution of front organizations. It is true that the original rationale for the united front had disappeared. But the new configuration of world political forces was becoming such that the Soviets were presented with the prospect of a growing number of non-Communist allies in the struggle with the still-dominant West -- the newly-emerging anti-colonialist nations, to be precise -- and with a wide network of world contacts, established during the united-front era. The success of the united-front campaign, where it was successful, indeed had established a network of relationships that by their own logic prompted the Soviets to continue things after the restoration of the "peace." There had been during the whole wartime period, it would seem, no significant or across-the-board alteration of Soviet international objectives, and every institutional aid in the attainment of those objectives would therefore remain welcome. After all, the experience of the united-front in the West had been that the Party was capable of quietly drawing into its web of influence large numbers of non-communist political innocents. Why would the technique not work even more efficaciously, applied on a world-wide scale?

The War was in its final year when there came two simultaneous calls for a new world student federation. One call came, in March, 1945, from the British National Union of Students (BNUS).







The other sounded from Czechoslovakia.<sup>42</sup> The British organized a meeting of allied students then in London and the meeting appointed a committee to organize a larger gathering in the autumn. The Czech students -- many of whom had been active during the war as Partisans -- also planned an autumn meeting, for Prague. On August 14, so as to avoid later conflicts or misunderstandings, both groups agreed that neither meeting would be regarded as the founding convention of a new international students' conference.<sup>43</sup>

The London meeting was confronted almost immediately with a critical challenge.

Just a few weeks earlier, the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) had been founded, also in London. At the outset, WFDY received the tremendous support of a host of idealistic non-Communists, many of them still buoyed up by the spirit of confidence and optimism that had animated the wartime east-west alliance. Only 3.5 per cent of the WFDY delegates, nominally, were Communists; the majority of the delegates represented Socialist, religious, trade-union and sporting groups. But almost as soon as the founding conference got

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<sup>42</sup>The only previous international student organization was the Confederation International des Etudiants, a Europocentric organization with a small membership but, apparently, considerable prestige. The Confederation, based in Brussels, was destroyed by the Nazi occupation forces in 1940.

<sup>43</sup>An excellent and exhaustive history of this period is found in Peter T. Jones, The History of the U.S. National Student Association Relations with the International Union of Students, 1945-1956 (Philadelphia: The Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1956). Not everything, it should be emphasized here, that took place during this period is detailed in this chapter. Other detailed material is found in later pages.



underway, it became evident that WFDY was under the control of Communist delegates and personnel. Communist fractions voted more systematically, were better-disciplined, and were tactically better able to discourage opposition by waving the bloody shirt of wartime unity. The Communists, by the Conference's end, had captured all the key positions of control and achieved many key points on policy. Professor Harold J. Laski -- hardly an extreme anti-Communist -- could write:

During its progress it became clear, in fact, that the conference was dominated by the Communist youth, who had so arranged its programme and procedure that the strategic control of the conference's policy was almost wholly in their hands. It is not, therefore, surprising that the permanent organization which has emerged from the London Conference should be, for all intents and purposes, a body which is destined to play variations upon the Communist theme.<sup>44</sup>

The problem confronting the London Conference was whether or not the new student organization ought to affiliate with the WFDY. A majority proved, after some debate, to be opposed to direct affiliation. The London Conference then set up machinery to arrange a constitutional convention for a new international student movement in the summer of 1946. The Conference recommended that the Convention be held in Paris.

In Prague, however, Communist-aligned students meeting at the "World Youth Congress" attempted to have the Conference transformed into a legislative assembly for the founding of the new world student

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<sup>44</sup>"Students and Politics," The Nation, December 21, 1946.





movement - in complete contravention of the prior agreement made with the London meeting. The proposal was overturned, although there is some suspicion that the Communists acquiesced in the move only when they saw that their proposal would injure their chances of taking over a more representative students' movement later.<sup>45</sup>

The real struggle for the control of the new student organization did not begin until 1946, however.

The London meeting appointed a twelve-member International Preparatory Committee (IPC) to handle the organization of the new movement's constitutional convention in Paris in the summer. The London meeting made the mistake, however, of giving the IPC a general and unlimited mandate - to "take any action in the interests of students."

Communists or pro-Communists secured a majority on the IPC, after which it: (1) gave unrestricted policy-making power to an executive; (2) against the London meeting's explicit decision decided to hold the constitutional convention in Prague, rather than in Paris; (3) manipulated the credentials committee, enlarging unrepresentative Communist student representation at the convention, penalizing non-Communists; (4) used its general control of planning to abandon the uncontroversial established agenda and substituting in its place a highly politically-oriented one; (5) made no comprehensive report on its activities to the Congress - the body to which it

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<sup>45</sup>Jones, op. cit., p. 5.



was responsible.<sup>46</sup>

The IPC did not stop there. It also proposed -- this is critical -- that all member national unions of students in the new organization be constitutionally required, as the price of membership, to carry out the decisions of central governing bodies; and that very wide policy-making powers be granted to a special twelve man executive committee appointed to run the organization's day-to-day affairs freely between sessions of the full Congress.<sup>47</sup>

At the Prague convention dissenters from the proposals of the Communist-leaning delegations were branded "fascists;" to create a proper political climate, the government courteously supplied buses to transport the delegates out of town to witness the evidence of Nazi war horrors. The slogans of "peace," "unity," and "cooperation" were very popular, and were used time and again to control the direction of debate. One calculation shows the balance of respective delegates to have been about 164 Communist or pro-Communist delegates out of a total of 244; in other words, the Communists or their allies secured an

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<sup>46</sup>Apeland, op cit., p. 24. An example: the IPC certified a minority Indian Communist student group rather than a larger and, apparently, more representative group from the Indian National Congress. The same happened with Italy and Republican Spain. The descriptions of "Communist" and "non-Communist" were made by observers on the scene. Presumably their judgment was guided by the performance of the various actors. Some students, of course, would have already had known political affiliations. Apeland's evaluation, then, of who was what, was presumably guided by the performance of those of an unknown political leaning with those of a known persuasion. Admittedly, this can be a rough method. At times, however, it has utility, however much purists may scorn it.

<sup>47</sup>Jones, op.cit., p. 10.





effective working majority.<sup>48</sup>

The International Preparatory Committee's new agenda was accepted, bringing political topics to the forefront. A combined resolution was passed, condemning fascism, reaction, and imperialism, urging all students everywhere to fight for a better, more peaceful and democratic world, and proclaiming solidarity with students from the underdeveloped areas fighting against colonialism. Although a minority of the delegates had profound misgivings about the action, Prague was approved as the new organization's headquarters. The name of the organization was designated the International Union of Students (IUS).

The real struggle, once again, took place over the issue of how the IUS was to be organized. The Communist delegates wanted, in addition to a Congress to meet every three years, an interim Council on which all member-nations would have a seat and a seventeen-man executive committee with a permanent staff and policy-making powers. They also wanted the IUS affiliated with the WFDY and the policy-making functions of the organization to be blessed with a compulsory character

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<sup>48</sup>The same measurement of political sympathy apparently obtained here as well. (See above). Employing it, one pair of observers counted the Communist delegates as follows: USSR, 24; Poland, 15; Yugoslavia, 15; Rumania, 10; Bulgaria, 10; Mexico, 6; Hungary, 7; Czechoslovakia, 15; Finland, 5; Egypt, 2; India, 6; Mongolia, 5; Iran, 1; Greece, 1; Albania, 2; Algeria, 1; Britain, 14 out of 20; France, 12 out of 20; Italy, 4 out of 10; Republican Spain, 8 out of 11; U.S., 2 out of 25. Jones, *ibid.*, p. 18. Jones himself says at one point (pp. 9-10) that 6 of the 25 American delegates showed pro-Communist leanings.



(making member-adherence compulsory).

The non-Communist delegations were shocked, surprised, startled. The American delegation protested the move to give the Executive Committee policy-making powers, pointing out that such an organ would have effective control over the Congress, rather than vice-versa. The proposal was amended to give the Executive Committee administrative powers only.<sup>49</sup> Opponents of the proposal to affiliate the IUS with the WFDY were only able to secure a compromise; the affiliation was accepted, but it was placed in the by-laws, rather than in the IUS Constitution. (This, presumably -- at least so ran the reasoning of the "compromisers" at the time -- would permit the IUS to disaffiliate at some later date, could the necessary votes be secured). Finally, on the question of the binding character of membership -- the question as to whether the IUS was to be a free federation of autonomous units or a rigid, highly-centralized organ of international control --

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<sup>49</sup>Ibid., p. 10. Why the Communists would consent to such an amendment can of course only be conjectured. Perhaps they were willing to make compromises on non-essential points, for the sake of keeping the non-Communists within the organization. The validity of this speculation would appear to be heightened by the fact that the amendment was of a kind that could not threaten longer-term Communist purposes, ie., it could easily be deleted or contravened later. (Something like this happened in the WFDY). In all united-front manoeuvres the Party has operated under a "minimum program," ie., a series of conditions which must be fulfilled by the other members of the front. The exact conditions have varied from time to time, but have always been calculated on the basis of the Party's power self-interest. They have always been such as to maximize the Party's power in a given "coalition," in short. As we shall soon see, beyond a certain point, the Party will not go.







an American motion protecting minority rights was defeated by a vote of 160 to 71, with 13 abstentions.<sup>50</sup>

Before the vote, the Dutch delegation had warned the convention that if minority rights were not guaranteed, it would have to leave. The vote was, for them, a slap in the face. A hushed Convention hall heard the leader of the Dutch delegation speak:

...we in Holland know the idea of democracy, but that is something quite different from the policy of domination that some groups have shown at this Congress towards the minorities. And let us not talk about the fight against fascism as long as we have in our midst delegates who do not dare to give their personal opinion because of fear of getting into difficulties with their governments at home. The acts and decisions of the IPC...have already furnished evidence of the completely one-sided political influence this body exerts.

...I have no choice but to declare that the Dutch Union of Students will not become a member of the International Union of Students, and consequently cannot accept its seat in the Council.<sup>51</sup>

The rest of the convention only served to demonstrate further the helplessness of the non-Communist delegations. Time and again, most of their attempts to brake the speed, if not the direction, in which the IUS was all too clearly speeding, failed. Even when a list, prepared and distributed by the Russian delegation and outlining exactly who would be elected to what offices and which countries would

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<sup>50</sup>The Finns, who voted with the majority, later explained to questioners that they had done so - in contravention of previous positions taken - because they feared for their jobs when they returned home, if they failed to comply. Jones, p. 22.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid., p. 23.



have Executive Committee seats, fell into the non-Communists' hands, they were unable to turn it into political capital. The Executive Committee was elected by an open vote -- a proposal that a secret ballot be taken was overruled by the Communist votes -- and Josa Grohman, a Czech, was elected to the IUS Presidency.

The homeward-bound non-Communist delegations were split along several lines. Everyone -- or nearly everyone (one exempts the pro-Communists in the Western delegations) -- was discouraged by the way in which things had been handled and by the direction in which the IUS had so clearly moved. Yet many voices derided the idea of a Western pull-out; it would only remove what voice the West had, they argued, and further it would split the international student community. "Unity," after all, was still a value worth fighting for.<sup>52</sup>

Dissension and unease pervaded the IUS until 1948, but the Communists and their fellow-travellers continued to consolidate their power and control. Still, many non-Communist members hung with great tenacity to their hopes for the organization and refused to disaffiliate. Then, in February, there exploded upon the IUS a political issue the disruptive effects of which could not be ignored. It was upon this issue that the IUS first foundered as a representative international students' organization.

In February, the elected government of Czechoslovakia fell

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<sup>52</sup>See Ibid., pp. 29-46 for a review of U.S. student attitudes toward and relations with the IUS during this period.





before a Communist coup. The coup was an embarrassment to the IUS because its headquarters were in Prague and it could hardly hope to take a stand on the crisis without offending the critical sensibilities of someone. But even that was not the biggest issue. The non-Communist students of Prague, in the midst of the turmoil, marched to President Benes to demand the preservation of parliamentary government, and while marching were fired upon -- with several casualties -- by the police, commanded in turn by the Communist Minister of the Interior. In addition, Communist "action committees" seized the University in Prague, fired non-Communist professors for alleged "fascism" and banned non-Communist students.

When a number of delegations in the IUS demanded that the Executive Committee protest these outrages, they received only continual evasions. The American, Danish, Swedish, and Swiss groups then broke from the IUS, and the whole history of the international student movement in our time took a new turn.<sup>53</sup>

The IUS, at subsequent meetings of the leadership, refused to do anything substantive to bring about a reconciliation with the

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<sup>53</sup>For an account of this action, see Apeland, op. cit., pp. 22-28, and Jones, op. cit., pp. 47-62. See Jones, pp. 54-5 for the U.S. student vice-president's own explanation of his reasons for resigning the IUS.



dissident delegations.<sup>54</sup>

Any remaining doubts the most stubborn of western IUS collaborators may have had about the organization's complete subservience to Communism were smashed by two events in 1950: the IUS's expulsion of Yugoslavia, and its support of the Communist North Korean aggressors in Korea.

The Yugoslav group was ejected from the IUS on trumped-up charges -- in conformity with the Cominform line -- after being arrested and held incommunicado by the Bulgarian police.<sup>55</sup> The IUS refused to protest the action. The Yugoslav students were denounced as "fascist agents, imperialist servants, betrayers of the peace." The French National Student Union then left the IUS. When the Yugoslavs were formally ejected five months later, it took a massive British effort -- the British NUS, under strongly leftist leadership, was still an IUS member -- to persuade the Executive Committee to give the Yugoslavs even a hearing. During the hearing, the following exchange took place. It is very illuminating, in the attitudes of the IUS leadership it reveals:

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<sup>54</sup>The IUS Secretary, British student Tom Madden, called all disaffiliators "reactionaries," adding, "There is no place in the IUS for ultimatums of a unilateral character or for attacks on the unity of students in all parts of the world. The IUS is a united organization based upon a single set of principles and not a loose coalition of differing or opposition points of view." *Ibid.*, p. 61.

<sup>55</sup>Apeland, *op. cit.*, p. 36.





Grohman (IUS President): "Is it true that there are 4,000 students in jail in Yugoslavia?"

Bucevic (Yugoslav Representative): "This is a fiction. We think you should take as a basis for discussion our memorandum on relations between the People's Youth of Yugoslavia and the IUS."

Berlinguer (IUS Secretary-General): "This is going too far. We have already gone a long way to meet the case of the Yugoslavs...We have allowed them to answer questions when the constitution merely says that they should be present at the discussions. Now the Yugoslav observer is trying to lay down the law about how the Executive shall proceed. I would repeat the question: Is it true that there are thousands of students in jail in Yugoslavia?"

Bucevic: "This is fiction."

Grohman: "So I understand that you refuse to reply."

Stanley Jenkins (British member): "Bucevic has replied and has said that the statement is fiction."

Luis Ascarate (IUS Treasurer): "On a point of order, we understand that the Yugoslav is being questioned, and it is very difficult if Jenkins interrupts the questions and answers." <sup>56</sup>

The British could hardly have been accused of being impatient with the IUS. Revolted by the Yugoslav case and by the IUS's support for North Korea, the British finally withdrew in 1951. Just prior to that, in December, 1950, they called an informal conference of seventeen non-Communist student groups, and listed the failures of the IUS as follows:

- (1) Over-emphasis on political questions.
- (2) Partisan political analyses.
- (3) Inefficiency in practical activities.
- (4) Frequent political purpose of practical activities.
- (5) Increasingly unrepresentative character.
- (6) Repeated breaches of the constitution.
- (7) Fundamental issues being settled out of council.
- (8) Uncompromising attitudes to any opposition.
- (9) Neglect of minorities.

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<sup>56</sup>Quoted in ibid., p. 37.



As a bill of particulars it lacked little. It seems to have lost little of its veracity with the passage of many years.

In December, 1950, the Scandinavian student unions hosted a meeting of twenty-one non-Communist students' groups and the meeting founded the International Student Conference (ISC), a loose assemblage of national unions of students that meets regularly in Congresses and has a full-time co-ordinating secretariat with administrative -- and some very limited policy-making -- powers. The history of the international student movement since 1950 has been in the main the history of the struggle between the IUS and the ISC.

By the Spring of 1952, the NUS's of Norway, Denmark, Belgium, France, Canada, Switzerland, Australia, Brazil, and Scotland had broken with the IUS and joined the ISC. The IUS claimed a 1946 membership of 1.5 million students from 38 countries; a 1955 membership of some 5 million from 72 countries, and a 1956 membership of some 3 million students from 36 countries.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>57</sup>By 1956 the IUS had only 20 national student unions in its ranks, twelve of which - the greatest bloc in the membership - were from Communist countries. See John Clews, "Communism's Fourth 'Lever': The Youth and Student Fronts," Problems of Communism, V. 6, (November-December, 1956), p. 41. All students have had difficulty in interpreting the "membership figures" of the IUS as a criterion of its overall influence. The reasons for this are complex, and outlined in more detail later in this study. In a nutshell, however, the problem is one of determining (1) how representative the various student groups with IUS membership are in their own countries, and (2) to what extent various student groups with sporadic IUS membership are influenced by the Union.







After 1951, the IUS continued to follow closely every twist and turn in the Soviet Party line. It supported the Soviet position on the East Berlin uprising of 1953, the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, and the adoption of "peaceful coexistence." It supported the Cuban Revolution, upheld the Castro regime at every turn, and intervened selectively on behalf of persecuted pro-Communist students around the world, ignoring consistently the similar plight of anti-Communist or non-Communist student groups under other regimes. Its propaganda theme has consistently been peace, general and complete disarmament, a ban on nuclear weapons and testing, attacks on imperialism and colonialism and support for national-liberation movements, and defense of the gains of Communism.

The ISC -- as will be noted in greater detail later in this study -- adopted a position that can most accurately be called "non-Communist." That is to say, its position has been independent and often critical of the Communist position, yet devoid of consistent loyalties to any other bloc "line" as well. As the ISC absorbed more and more delegations from the newly-independent nations of Africa and Asia, its character changed. It became less and less Europocentric and concerned with the issues of the cold war, and more and more concerned with the interests and aspirations of the students and peoples of the underdeveloped emerging nations.

The rivalry between the two organizations manifested itself on several planes. Both groups published regular publications with



large circulations,<sup>58</sup> held fairly frequent student congresses and assemblies and travel exchanges, organized aid campaigns and scholarship drives for students, and intervened, or attempted to intervene with national governments on behalf of various persecuted student-groups. (The ideological selectivity of the IUS in this regard has already been noted).

The IUS demonstrated, throughout the period between 1951 and 1964, excellent organization, considerable tactical finesse, and generous financial backing. It was able to capture world attention by sponsoring or promoting (along with WFDY) eight mammoth youth festivals: Prague, August, 1947; Budapest, August, 1949; East Berlin, 1951; Bucharest, August, 1953; Warsaw, August, 1955; Moscow, August, 1955; Moscow, August, 1957; Vienna, July-August, 1959; and Helsinki, July-August, 1962.<sup>59</sup> The ISC, operating on a much less lavish scale, was unable to muster anything as grandiose; but it did manage to get a good deal of mileage out of its far more meagre resources.

The ISC proved to be a good deal less anxious to impose a single dogmatic ideology upon all of its members, a good deal less anxious to trumpet the propaganda claims of a single bloc, and much

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<sup>58</sup>The IUS publishes World Student News monthly from its Prague headquarters. The ISC publishes a similar kind of magazine, The Student, also monthly, from its offices in Leiden, the Netherlands. The comparative circulations of the two journals are examined later in this study.

<sup>59</sup>Details of the various Festivals are given later in this study.





less anxious to exploit every opening for sheer political advantage. It has been somewhat more interested in practical day-to-day student interests, although it certainly has not ignored political issues.

The IUS remained throughout the period a tightly-organized and highly-disciplined unit. Towards the end of the period from 1951-1964, however, there were growing signs that some dissension was growing within IUS ranks. The Sino-Soviet conflict was making its influence felt. At the time of this writing, the argument has not produced a split in the IUS, but there has been sporadic talk of a new, Chinese-sponsored, international student organization for "real" radicals.<sup>60</sup>

With regard to membership, the ISC seems to have been more representative of the world's national student groups for most of the later period, although fluctuation in membership figures, and considerable difficulty in establishing objective criteria for measuring relative influence has made this difficult to measure. It is generally accurate and fair to say, however, that the IUS has become largely the province of two kinds of student groups: (1) State or Party-controlled student groups from within the Communist countries themselves; and (2) much smaller student groups from the non-Communist world -- groups frequently unrepresentative of the students of their "home" nations.

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<sup>60</sup>See Frank Griffiths, Sino-Soviet Conflict at the 7th IUS Congress (Ottawa: National Federation of Canadian University Students, n.d.), passim.



The IUS has been aided in its proselytizing by the generous incentives it is able to offer interested groups or individuals. The ISC has been hampered by the shoestring-nature of its operation and by the substantially more meagre material incentives it can offer, but it has been aided by its flexible structure, its capable co-ordinating secretariat (COSEC, for short), and the idealism that pervades its operation.<sup>61</sup>

All through the period of the rivalry of the two organizations, there has been a constant jockeying for position carried on amidst mutual calls for "unity" that failed to materialize.

In 1945, it appeared that the international student community -- or at least what a number of idealistic students saw as a community, or a potential community -- was going to manifest its "unity" in unbreakable institutional forms. By 1964, nearly a generation later, the "movement," if such it can be called, was bitterly split into two mutually warring camps of intrigue. Late in 1964 there was increasing talk that the IUS itself might split, the Chinese leading the way to yet a third international student organization. If things looked bleak for world unity in 1964, they looked as bad for student unity. Perhaps it was foolish for student leaders to expect anything else. If the lights of student unity were already dim at the end of the Second World War, twenty years later, they had nearly been extinguished.

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<sup>61</sup>This whole comparison is got at in a much more systematic and thorough way later in this study. The problem is exceedingly complex, and cannot be treated adequately here.







## CHAPTER IV

### THE VALIDITY OF THE SELZNICK MODEL: THE NATURE OF THE IUS

We have reconstructed those aspects of Philip Selznick's theory of the Organizational Weapon relevant to our study of the International Union of Students. We have interpreted the salient and critical aspects of his theory into operational hypotheses capable of empirical testing. We have noted the conditions under which the hypotheses are to be tested, and the conditions under which we might consider them either validated or disproved. We have, finally, sketched for reference purposes and for background the general history of Communism's theoretical and organizational attempt to exploit the revolutionary potential of students.

What now remains is the testing of the ten operational hypotheses, and the inferring from the test results of the conclusions of our inquiry.

#### i. Politicization.

A distinguishing aspect of front organizations, in Selznick's view, is the extent to which - as against similar kinds of functional organizations not under Communist control - they are politicized, ie., totally conditioned by, totally committed to, politics; more particularly, to the politics of a particular ideological power-bloc.

Politicization, presumably, does not commit a front group to this kind of politics to the extent that it completely ignores the



interests of its "constituents." A front group does engage in a certain amount of general propaganda having only marginal or insignificant relation to its constituents; but more importantly, it gives a particular political cast to its activities that do relate to its constituents' interests. A rival kind of group similar in other ways but not under Communist control, and genuine in its primary concern for the interests and aspirations of its constituents, might take a considerable, even a passionate, interest in politics; its interest, however, would not be completely colored by a single ideology or the interests of a single power-bloc - assuming a plural composition - and it would certainly take in a large number of "non-political" questions.

The characteristic of politicization, we have already noted,<sup>1</sup> may best be operationalized - for our purposes - in three assertions. According to these, the IUS, if it is a front organization, will (1) greet criticism, internal or external, with abuse, and dissent with intolerance; (2) from time to time, when there is tactical advantage to be gained, break formal agreements, or the formally and tacitly agreed-upon "rules of the game;" and (3) generally attempt to make political capital of or give a political - ie., a partisan - construction to events or facts not directly relevant either to students or to politics.

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<sup>1</sup>Supra, Chapter II, section "d" (i).





The available evidence would seem to indicate that the International Union of Students is, indeed, politicized in this way. Some of the more striking evidence will illustrate.

In 1948 the IUS leadership evicted the Yugoslav student delegation. The move was in accordance with a general shift in the Communist line at the time, which in turn grew out of the Stalin-Tito controversy. No substantive reasons were offered up by the IUS leadership for their decision to evict the Yugoslavs.

The Yugoslavs, after much struggle, managed to get a hearing before the IUS executive. The leading members of the latter body commenced to launch a bitter attack upon the Yugoslav representative, Jaksa Bucevic. Whenever Bucevic attempted to meet their charges, he was told that he was being un-co-operative, that he was failing to answer the questions. When British delegate Stanley Jenkins, now growing impatient with the badgering Bucevic was getting, attempted to speak up on the Yugoslav's behalf, he was curtly informed by the leadership that he was "interrupting."

Jenkins stubbornly fought on. At the 1950 IUS Congress, he sought on the floor to reopen the question of Yugoslav membership. He provoked an unprecedented wave of abuse. Alexander Shelyepin, IUS Vice-President - later appointed chairman of the Soviet State Security Committee, part of the Soviet State police - hailed the Congress's

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<sup>2</sup>Supra, Chapter III.



"indignant rejection" of suggestions by Jenkins and Danish student leaders in favor of "collaboration with the fascist Yugoslav leadership." The Union of Czechoslovak Youth, not content to merely imply that Jenkins was a fascist collaborator, accused him of attempting to "smuggle into the Congress a defense of Tito-fascist bestialities." Izvestia told the world that Jenkins was clearly an "agent of international reaction."<sup>3</sup>

The Prague IUS Congress in 1950 got under way just two months after the outbreak of the Korean War. A reference to North Korea at the first session provoked a 25-minute flood-lit demonstration throughout the hall; the North Koreans were hoisted aloft and born on the shoulders of the Communist delegations. The British - at this time still grimly clinging to the hope that the IUS could be "reformed" of its partisan tendencies - sat quietly through the demonstration. When, at the end, a British delegate arose to criticize the IUS for violating its own charter by supporting the North Koreans, he was accused of "treachery." The British delegation was compared with "Hitlerite youngsters."<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>John Clews, "Communism's Fourth 'Lever:' The Youth and Student Fronts," Problems of Communism, V, 6, (November-December, 1956, pp. 41-2.

<sup>4</sup>Nils M. Apeland, World Youth and the Communists (London: Phoenix House Ltd., 1958), p. 40.





The responses of the IUS to criticism in its early years set the rule for later years as well. Illustrative of this has been its response on several occasions to the remarks of non-IUS "observers" sent to its formal congresses.<sup>5</sup>

Typical in many ways was the experience of Mr. Walter Tarnopolsky, sent as an observer by the National Federation of Canadian University Students (NFCUS, now CUS - the Canadian Union of Students) to the Sixth IUS Congress in Baghdad, Iraq, October 8-17, 1960.

In his brief address - all observers are invited to speak in an "intervention," inasmuch as they attend at the IUS's invitation - Mr. Tarnopolsky extended fraternal greetings, and congratulated the IUS upon its stand in opposition to a number of dictatorial regimes in the non-Communist world. He went on to say that the International Student Conference, the non-Communist student group, had taken a similar stand against repression. The difference, then, he said, appeared to lie in the response of the two organizations to repressions of students in Communist countries. On such matters, he noted, the IUS never spoke

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<sup>5</sup>The practice of several of the Western national unions of students sending observers to the various meetings of the IUS has on occasion been criticized. Whatever its other merits and implications might have been, however, the practice has had this to say for it: the observers have provided students of politics in the West with some of the most acute and up-to-date insights into the internal operations of the IUS that we have. The reports of the observers are, by and large, indispensable sources of information.



out. He made reference to Tibet and East Germany, together with Hungary. "If students have died," he asked, "surely the IUS should concern itself and say who killed whom and why...why doesn't the IUS executive committee report say anything?"<sup>6</sup> He concluded:

A world student forum which does not recognize differences of opinion, which is one-sided or partisan, which spends its time merely attacking, and not working and planning constructively, will not succeed...we must build a framework within which students can express their opinions independently of their governments, and within which they can build and not destroy.<sup>7</sup>

The reaction proceeded apace. The Chinese delegate, responding to the mention of Tibet, called Tarnopolsky's remarks "a provocation against the Chinese people and students and against our Congress." Tarnopolsky, he shouted, was a "running dog of American imperialism," an "insincere" "hypocritical humanist" from a country "with a reactionary past." The Cuban delegate alleged that Canada was a mere mouthpiece for Britain. The Hungarian delegate said Tarnopolsky's remarks accorded neither with truth nor reality, and that he obviously only wanted to "hinder the work of our Congress." The East German delegate

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<sup>6</sup>Tarnopolsky intervention (speech) to the Sixth IUS Congress, Baghdad, Iraq, October 8-17, 1960, in Canadian Students and International Affairs, a memorandum submitted by the National Federation of Canadian University Students to the Canadian Department of External Affairs (Ottawa, 1961), Appendix 3, p. 10, his italics.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 12.





said Tarnopolsky's remarks were "similar to the language of the militarists in West Germany." "I forbid you to talk like that," he shouted, after which the audience broke into - in Tarnopolsky's words - an "intense, rising and falling, rhythmical clapping, very prolonged."

Seven more delegations then came forward to carry on in the same line. Tarnopolsky, they said, was dishonest, a tool of war-mongering interests, a "slanderer," and a "provocateur." It was asked whether he had been paid by the hour or by the day to make his remarks. The Chinese delegate then returned to reiterate everything he had said previously.<sup>8</sup> When the British observer later remarked that in some British universities the works of Marx and Lenin, together with Pravda and Izvestia, were studied in an unexpurgated form, the Soviet delegate shot up shouting that this was an "attack on the Soviet system of education," and demanding the right to "reply" immediately.<sup>9</sup>

Tarnopolsky concluded in his report to the CUS:

There are very obviously certain questions which cannot be asked, or topics which cannot be discussed...when such questions are asked the person is called a 'provocateur' or a 'reactionary' or a representative of 'negative forces'...the extreme bitterness of the attack, the personal insults included, and the vituperative nature of it was matched only by the enthusiasm and length of the rhythmical clapping that followed every insult. With the exception of a few neutrals and the Observers, everyone else showed his complete and obvious approval...<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>8</sup>Ibid., pp. 13-4.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 8.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 7.



The evidence is abundant that suggests that this attitude toward criticism has persisted by and large throughout the IUS's history.<sup>11</sup>

The observer of the National Union of Students of England, Wales, and Northern Ireland (NUSEWNI), Bill Savage, saw the same attitude manifested throughout the Seventh IUS Congress in Leningrad, August 18-28, 1962.<sup>12</sup>

At that Congress, the delegates of the Japanese Zengakuren (National Association of Students' Self-Government Associations) issued statements and spoke out against the nuclear tests of both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. The Zengakuren delegates - themselves ideological radicals, but not activists under Communist organizational discipline - attempted to take a principled stand, in short, one having no obligations to any power-blocs.

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<sup>11</sup>See for example the report of Dave Peel, observer for the Canadian Union of Students (CUS) at the Fifth IUS Congress in Peking, September 4-14, 1958, Appendix 2 of ibid. Writes Peel: "Politics, to these people, cannot be separated from other parts of life; a student does not exist outside life, and life is politics. The problems of these students are political problems, and to separate politics from problems is (for them) absurd." Ibid., p. 6, italics added.

<sup>12</sup>See his article, "A Deepening of the Division in the Student World," in Youth and Freedom supplement on international student politics (New York: Institute for International Youth Affairs, n.d.), pp. 11-17. Hereafter, Supplement.





In Moscow, en route to Leningrad, the Zengakuren delegates were accosted by a mob and then arrested, when they sought to distribute their leaflets. In Leningrad, at the Congress, they were physically prevented from distributing their statements at their hotel. When they did re-iterate their stand verbally at the Congress itself, they were subjected to the full range of polemical vituperation.<sup>13</sup>

Similar repression of all dissenting opinion characterized the last two IUS-backed World Festivals of Youth and Students (Vienna, July 26-August 4, 1959; Helsinki, July 26-August 6, 1962). On both occasions the Festival leadership - dominated by officials of WFDY and the IUS - employed a variety of means for the silencing of opposition and criticism. Not the least of these was the action of Festival head Jean Garcias, a French Communist and WFDY functionary, who personally forcibly restrained a young Icelandic peace marcher from carrying a placard reading "Stop the Tests in East and West," in the closing

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<sup>13</sup>For an account of the entire run of events, see Frank Griffiths, Sino-Soviet Conflict at the 7th IUS Congress (Ottawa: National Federation of Canadian University Students, n.d.), pp. 4-5, and passim, together with The Communist International Youth and Student Apparatus (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 7. The latter is a monograph prepared for the Senate Internal Security Sub-Committee by Herbert Romerstein, a former Communist now serving as a professional consultant on Communist youth activities. Although argumentative, it makes a number of fine points and contains a good deal of information not otherwise available.



parade.<sup>14</sup>

It might have seemed to many - and indeed it did - that the placard was innocuous enough. And it was. The problem was, however, that it attempted to place some blame for the arms-race upon both the East and the West, rather than just upon the West, as does the Communist line. Only the politicization of an organization could prompt such an attitude.

The second part of the operational hypothesis - that the IUS will break the rules of the game, and its solemn agreements - again finds more than ample substantiation in the available evidence. The entire first five years of the IUS were taken up with the efforts of the Communist fraction to wrest complete control of the organization from those over whom the Party had no organizational control. In the process a number of agreements and rules had to be broken, if the objective were to be secured. And broken they were.

The process has been sketched to some extent elsewhere in this study.<sup>15</sup> It suffices to mention here that the Communist

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<sup>14</sup>See Paul Sigmund, "Helsinki - Last Youth Festival?," in Problems of Communism, XI, 5 (September-October, 1962), pp. 58-62; Youth and Freedom, V, 4, a special supplement on the Helsinki Festival, hereafter Helsinki Supplement; and Morton Schwartz, "Moscow's Experimental Venture: The Vienna World Youth Festival," in Problems of Communism, VIII, 5 (September-October, 1959), pp. 53-6.

<sup>15</sup>See supra, Chapter III.





fraction gained the upper hand tactically by breaking three central rules and agreements.

First the International Preparatory Committee (IPC), which had been created by the London student meeting, was taken over by a disciplined Communist fraction.<sup>16</sup> The Committee - already having been granted extensive powers by the London meeting - then proceeded to draft itself a constitution giving unrestricted power to a small central executive. It then decided, summarily and upon the motion of the Soviet member, to ignore the decision of the London meeting to locate the proposed new students' organization in Paris, and to locate the organization instead in Prague, Czechoslovakia.<sup>17</sup> It attempted to justify its action with the argument that "the French students found themselves unable to accept the task of organizing a Congress this year."<sup>18</sup> That was the first broken agreement.

The IPC soon gave other evidence of the influence it was under by sending - without any consultation with anyone - permanent representatives to three leading international front organizations, WFDY, the Women's International Democratic Federation, and the World Federation

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<sup>16</sup>Peter T. Jones, The History of U.S. National Student Association Relations With The International Union of Students, 1945-1956 (Philadelphia: The Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1956), pp. 7-8.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., pp. 7-8.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 8.



of Trade Unions.<sup>19</sup>

The second agreement was broken at the World Student Congress in Prague in November of 1945. There, the Czech Communist students broke the agreement made with the London student meeting that neither meeting would be regarded as the founding convention for the new students' organization. They were dissuaded from trying to turn the Congress into a constitutional convention only by pressure from above, it appears.<sup>20</sup>

The IPC, last, appointed a Credentials Committee for the IUS's first founding meeting. This Committee systematically over-represented Communist student delegations at the expense of non-Communists, even when the latter were clearly the more representative of their own student communities nationally. The IPC, at the same time, drew up and gave each delegation to the Congress an all-new, politically-oriented agenda, one day before the opening session. It was completely unakin to the agenda drawn up and accepted four months previous.<sup>21</sup>

The point need not be labored. The available evidence is unequivocal: the disciplined Communist minority sometimes went to great

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<sup>19</sup>For an interesting history of the latter organization - carrying with it many parallels with the case under discussion, incidentally - see Walther Schevenels, Forty-Five Years: International Federation of Trade Unions (Brussels: International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, n.d.), passim.

<sup>20</sup>Jones, op. cit., pp. 5-6.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., pp. 12-18.





lengths to secure for itself tactical advantages. If in order to do so it had to break agreements previously arrived at, or rules generally accepted, it did so.

The same tendencies have always obtained in the IUS-sponsored World Festivals of Youth and Students. Before the Helsinki Festival, IPC head Jean Garcias - mentioned previously - announced that "participation in it, irrespective of their political opinions, religious belief, race or nationality." "No tendency predominates," he said, "each can express his own opinions with due respect for those of others."

This pledge was broken throughout the Festival. A seminar on education, for example, was initiated by its East German moderator announcing that each speaker would have only ten minutes, in order to allow everyone a voice, and a question period at the end. Three Communist-country delegates then consumed two hours and ten minutes, and the session ended without any questions whatever. Such incidents were the rule.<sup>22</sup>

As to the third factor - the general politicization of the IUS - it is perhaps appropriate to note that this was the factor which brought on the first split in the newly-formed organization. We have noted how the IPC changed the agenda of the first IUS Congress, giving

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<sup>22</sup>The Communist International Youth and Student Apparatus, op. cit., p. 31; see also Helsinki Supplement, op. cit., passim.



it a more political - and partisan - orientation. In the first years of the IUS the entire orientation of the organization was "anti-fascist;" it took the non-Communist delegates some time to fully realize the political content of this slogan. When the cry of "fascism" was used to silence all dissent from the plans of the central IUS leadership, the meaning became clear enough however.<sup>24</sup>

Politicization has continued to characterize the deliberations of the IUS over the years. Wrote CUS observer Dave Peel, who attended the Fifth IUS Congress in Peking in 1958:

The discussion which was supposed to centre on this (executive committee) report last five days (it was scheduled for three) and brought out some of the most violent political attacks that I have ever heard. Almost every delegate or observer made a speech, lasting from 15 minutes to over an hour, in which he said anything at all that he wanted to say. Many speakers...did not once mention student problems or even students. Most...devoted less than a quarter of their time to student questions, and many of them spent this time in wild and unjustified criticisms of the ISC and COSEC, often entering into minute or imaginary detail.<sup>25</sup>

The various "commissions" of the Congress, Mr. Peel notes, mandated to deal, each of them, with separate and distinct problems, all seemed to wind up discussing the same thing: "imperialism."

Most interestingly, Mr. Peel noted,

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<sup>24</sup>Apeland, op.cit., p. 25.

<sup>25</sup>Canadian Students and International Affairs, op. cit., p. 4.





the Congress resolutions on strictly student problems cover a fair amount of ground and cover it fairly well. They are mainly concerned with the particular activities of the IUS...these resolutions did not arouse much interest even among the IUS members, most of whom were more concerned with political questions.<sup>26</sup>

The content of many resolutions was equally interesting.

The "General Resoution on Latin America" was primarily concerned, Peel reports, with student groups in that part of the world, and with what the IUS could do to help them.

The "Resolution on Solidarity with the Students of Yemen and Oman," on the other hand, contained not a single reference to students at all. It only demanded at some length the removal of British troops from that part of the Middle East.

One delegate to the Helsinki Festival was particularly interested to note the politicization of the student delegations from the various Communist countries. They could, he noted, be jovial and friendly, even effusive with the Western delegates one day - and the next day, in the Festival political arena, bitterly, even fanatically, hostile.<sup>27</sup> Comments the delegate:

The drastic switch in the Rumanian's attitude was far less a question of mere hypocrisy than a result of the change of his situation. In the morning politics was forgotten, and

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<sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 8, my italics.

<sup>27</sup>Steven V. Roberts, "Problem in Communication," Helsinki Supplement, op. cit., pp. 21-2.



the two groups could meet and make friends as people, not as representatives of countries and ideologies. In the afternoon the air in the hall was rife with tension and emotion. The crowd was highly partisan, and like Pavlov's dogs reacted hungrily to any mention of 'imperialism' or 'colonialism.'<sup>28</sup>

An official Soviet source, in fact, has explicitly stated the need for the politicization of delegations from the Soviet bloc to international conferences:

When Soviet jurists participate along with bourgeois scholars in the work of some organization for comparative law, they must expound and defend Soviet concepts, point out the superiority of the Soviet legal system as being a system of the highest historical development, without looking for what is common to socialist and bourgeois law.<sup>29</sup>

At the Sixth IUS Congress in Baghdad, the organization's politicization was manifested in an unmistakable form. The IUS Constitution (Section Three, Article "a") states that the organization is opposed to discrimination on a number of grounds, including discrimination on the grounds of "political conviction." But in the report of the Executive Committee of the Sixth Congress, and in the Congress's resolutions, no mention was made of the organization's opposition to discrimination of that kind. When CUS Observer Walter Tarnopolsky inquired why,

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<sup>28</sup>Ibid., pp. 21-2.

<sup>29</sup>Professor Romashkin, Director of the Law Institute at the USSR Academy of Sciences, quoted in "Soviet Policy Regarding World Youth," Bulletin, Institute for the Study of the USSR, VIII, 3, (March, 1961), p. 28.





the Rumanian delegate went into a long and acrimonious dissertation stating that this wasn't the place to ask questions about the Peking Congress, that I didn't understand the issues involved, that I was only interested in obstructing the work of the Commission and that I should be ignored and that the Commission should not be held up by such trifling matters.<sup>30</sup>

The various Communist student groups at the national level have always been quite explicit in arguing that the duty of their members was to campaign or to proselytize, not to pursue free and open inquiry. Instructed the "Free German Youth" of East Germany just after the Berlin Wall was erected:

Talk with all the honest elements, reply to their questions, but strike down the agitators, because one cannot talk with them. Bring to each heart hatred against your mortal enemies, against militarists and fascists. See that young people can no longer be influenced and informed by the agitators and liars of the isolated West. Explain to the boys and girls that the radio stations of West Berlin and the member states of NATO transmit agitation from the enemies of our class.<sup>31</sup>

It is not difficult to see how far a politicized approach like this takes one from the unprejudiced search for truth the most self-conscious elements of the international student community have always held up as the ideal.

The IUS-sponsored World Festivals of Youth and Students have always manifested politicization in its most gross forms. Exhibits of

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<sup>30</sup>Tarnopolsky, op. cit., p. 7.

<sup>31</sup>Quoted in Mailand Christensen, "The Prospects for World Student Unity," in Supplement, op. cit., p. 38.



art, for example, have featured propaganda posters depicting the current Communist line. Every attempt to bring to the Festivals artists and performers from the Soviet bloc has been accompanied by propaganda equating the skill of the artists with the glorious achievements of the Socialist Motherland.<sup>32</sup> Examples of this kind of thing could be multiplied almost indefinitely; the overwhelming impression got by non-Communist student delegates to IUS meetings all over the world has been of an unbridgable chasm in communication. Again and again non-Communist delegates record in their reports the extent to which the dogmatism, partisanship, and total partisan political orientation of the IUS and many of its leading member-delegations struck them as having no counterpart in their prior lives as students.

Recent years and new developments in relations within the Communist system have done much to illuminate a new aspect of the politicization of the international front organizations generally, and the IUS in particular. The Sino-Soviet conflict has indelibly stamped its impression upon the IUS, and in the process revealed a good deal - hitherto unknown - about its inner workings.

What is relevant under this heading, insofar as the Sino-Soviet conflict is concerned, is the extent to which political controversies having little directly to do with students have split the organization,

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<sup>32</sup>See Helsinki Supplement, op. cit., passim. For the political use of the "folklore festival" at the Second Latin American Youth Congress (sponsored by the IUS), see Youth and Freedom, VI, 4, p. 4.





rended its facade of unity, and embroiled it in controversies diverting its attention from its professed area of interest.

The struggle, apparently, was prompted by a number of factors - partly by the enmity aroused by the Chinese invasion of India, and partly by ideological differences over how best to wage the struggle for power. The various fronts - the IUS certainly included - have become the focus of the rivalry on one organizational plane, and have frequently become open battlegrounds. The various neutralist members, in their turn, have been disgusted by the various displays of fraternal zeal, and have protested that the organizations are losing complete sight of their avowed objectives. The Institute for International Youth Affairs has commented:

That this dissension has impaired the efficacy of the Communist-controlled international organizations and their attempts to present themselves as broadly-based non-partisan movements representing the universal aspirations and interests of students or women or peace-lovers - as the case may be - without regard to politics is now quite obvious. Delegations from the non-committed countries have shown increasing annoyance at the tendency of the conferences to degenerate into sounding-boards for controversies which have no bearing whatever on the advertised purposes of the conference.<sup>33</sup>

The effect of this squabbling has been to expose somewhat the

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<sup>33</sup>"Sino-Soviet Split Cracks the 'Fronts,'" News Features, IV, 6 (July 16, 1963), p. 1. News Features is published - with Youth and Freedom - by the Institute for International Youth Affairs.



politicized character of the IUS. Hence a left-leaning Indian student delegate to the IUS-organized Seminar of Students of the Underdeveloped World was led - after witnessing for days the feuding of the Soviet and Chinese groups - to denounce both for involving India in their "sinister machinations."<sup>34</sup> Non-Communist African and Asian delegates, disgusted with similar events at various meetings sponsored by the many front organizations, have several times walked out.<sup>35</sup> The CPSU has admitted that the bickering has weakened the front organizations,<sup>36</sup> and several planned conferences have had, as a result, to be cancelled.<sup>37</sup> The Chinese, equally incensed, have accused the IUS Secretariat of "shameful capitulation to imperialism" for supporting the Moscow Test-Ban Treaty, condemning "certain IUS leaders who tail after the Soviet Government..." At the same time, the All-China Youth Federation accused WFDY - hence, by implication, the IUS, too - of "arbitrarily" serving "the Soviet Government's foreign policy."<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>34</sup>Youth and Freedom, VI, 1-2, pp. 28-9, and The New York Times, July 15, 1963.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., p. 7.

<sup>36</sup>Moscow News, No. 29, July 20, 1963, quoted in Ibid., p. 7.

<sup>37</sup>Ibid., p. 7.

<sup>38</sup>Hsinhua (Peking), August 15, 1963, in Ibid., p. 7.





All the available evidence, then, suggests strongly that the International Union of Students confirms the first three-part operational hypothesis of Philip Selznick's model of a Communist front organization.

The IUS, first, has tended to greet criticism with abuse and dissent with intolerance. It has sometimes permitted criticism or dissent to be voiced - most frequently, by official non-Communist observers - but not, it would seem, with any genuine intention of listening to or heeding it. This, it has demonstrated by the hail of abuse with which it has almost invariably greeted the dissent.

Second, both the IUS as an organization and several of the leading Communist student groups within the organization, have on many occasions broken both specific agreements with others - with either the ISC or with non-Communist student groups - and the general "rules of the game." Last, the IUS has generally manifested a tendency to view all student problems as political problems, as well as to use the arena of student politics for the pushing of a distinct, partisan, political point of view often having no particular relevance to student problems or interests.

ii. Conspiratorial Behavior.

It is essential to the Selznick model of a front organization that there be some evidence of covert control by a disciplined Communist minority. Now evidence of such control and of the existence of such a



minority is by its nature - if we assume that the group in question is good at being conspiratorial, and this is clearly Selznick's assumption - difficult to come by. This is particularly the case with international front organizations - or alleged front organizations - whose centres of power and meeting-places are often less than readily accessible to outsiders.

The IUS certainly does not encourage more than very token participation in its proceedings by trained observers from rival organizations; and the views of many more sympathetic participants in the IUS itself, even when they are willing to communicate their experiences, is often somewhat less than critical and penetrating. We are therefore left with fragmentary evidence, not all of it complementary. This fact must shape our conclusions somewhat.

Operational conspiratorial behavior takes three forms, for our purposes: (1) evidence of the existence of a coherent group in and around the IUS leadership, evincing unified control; (2) unified behavior of the group, particularly on policy and policy changes; and (3) the existence of procedures or practices (perhaps in elections or floor procedure) suggesting conspiratorial control by the selfsame leadership group.

The available evidence on the internal operation of the IUS comes primarily from two sources. The first is the reports of the various observers sent by Western student unions or the ISC to the





various gatherings of the IUS (at least to those to which the IUS has permitted access). This group includes the correspondents of the Institute for International Youth Affairs (publishers of Youth and Freedom). The second source, in some ways a more interesting one, is the dissident Chinese Communist delegations. They have seen fit to expose, as we shall soon see, much about the IUS that had heretofore existed only as rumor, suspicion, or partially confirmed investigation.

The IUS, it is generally agreed, is made up of student groups falling into five loose categories. The first is national unions - or student sections of youth movements - from the so-called "people's democracies" - the USSR, Communist China, the East German regime, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, Albania, Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Mongolia. The second is national unions of students from non-Communist countries (Bolivia, Sudan, Ecuador, Japan, Iraq), some of them also ISC members, others not. The third is organizations of students from colonial or dependent countries - a group rapidly in decline with the disappearance of colonialism. The fourth is groups of students from one country studying in another - the Jordanian Students Association in the UAR, for example. The fifth is, in CUS Observer Dave Peel's words,<sup>39</sup> "student organizations of a somewhat debatable nature," some of them allegedly national student unions from countries where a national student union already exists (India,

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<sup>39</sup>Peel, op. cit., p. 3.



Mexico), others of them of a character "not readily definable."<sup>40</sup>

Now the leading core of the IUS has always come from the first group. It was the student groups in this category that first provided the IUS's organizational impetus, that made the proposals, that contributed the personnel to man the permanent staffs, and that were elected to the first executives. The student unions from these countries have continued to hold the leading posts in the IUS and to hold the positions of executive power. Where "outsiders" have been allowed into the inner sanctum of power, as we shall note in a later section, they have usually been foreign Communists, people we might reasonably expect to be under some kind of organizational discipline.

Most IUS Congresses have followed a similar procedure. There has generally been an opening plenum with speeches of greeting by all delegations. The Congress has then usually broken into work commissions, for the drafting and preliminary discussion of resolutions in specific areas. The Commissions, after several days of meetings, report to final plenums, and the resolutions are debated in final form. ("Elections" are usually held in this last phrase). That is the substance of the legislative process.

The specific forms this process has taken at various Congresses has demonstrated fairly convincingly the covert control exercised over most aspects of the proceedings by the IUS leadership

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<sup>40</sup>Ibid., p. 3.





in the executive and secretariat. At the Peking Congress, for example, the resolutions of the commissions were presented to the final plenums of the Congress by a "reporter" for each commission. In most cases, the "reporters" were members of the executive.<sup>41</sup> Often the resolutions thus presented had been altered in form - sometimes in substance - from the form adopted in commission. In the reporting stage, the resolutions were frequently not read aloud, and often IUS members were not even given copies of the resolutions for which they voted.<sup>42</sup>

The debate, generally, was brief and unmarked by any real disagreement or conflict. Most resolutions were passed unanimously.

The almost monotonous regularity with which the various resolutions were presented and passed was what most impressed the Canadian observer:

...the Congress...heard only one point of view on each question. Indeed, in many cases, it heard nothing at all. There was never any attempt to hear a word about the other side of the issue, no queries were made about what were alleged to be facts, there was never a bit of an investigation into any of the situations pronounced upon, not a question was asked. Time after time, a resolution was proposed in a commission, the mover perhaps said a few words (usually very biased and violent) in support of it,

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<sup>41</sup>Ibid., p. 7. In the ISC, members of the executive and of COSEC are allowed to take only a very limited role in the proceedings; they are not, for example, allowed to play an active or interventionist role in floor proceedings, and are not allowed to sit with their national delegations.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., p. 9.



it was seconded, passed, put before the plenary session later, and passed without a murmur. The delegates showed no sense of responsibility whatsoever, giving their support indiscriminately to resolutions on situations of which they had no knowledge or only the sketchiest outline of a prejudiced report.<sup>43</sup>

The guiding role of the Communist delegations was apparent to the CUS Observer:

The Communist control is still there, and it is still obvious. One does not have to be particularly sharp to see delegates turn to discover what the Soviet Union is doing before they vote, or to overhear Soviets or acknowledged communists from other countries trying to convince a delegate with an independent turn of mind what line he should take or what vote he should cast. This is not simple imagining on the part of western observers, for some of the non-communist members have complained about it in disgust. Since most of the non-communists are there to champion their own causes (and who can blame them?) they usually go along, for not to do so would endanger their support from the organization.<sup>44</sup>

The USSR-Satellite bloc has manifested, then, great coherence and unity, and a consequent leading role in the IUS as against all non-Communist elements. This appears to be as true of neutralists within the organization today as it was of Western student groups earlier.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>43</sup>Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., p. 10. One former CUS official has suggested, somewhat facetiously, that while in the IUS all delegates look to see how the USSR votes and then vote the same way, in the ISC all delegates wait to see how the USA votes and then vote the opposite way.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., p. 10, describes the disunity of the neutralists at the Peking Congress.





The Canadian observer at the Baghdad IUS Congress noted that the resolutions were not really drawn up in the commissions at all; "sub-commissions" were appointed to draft all resolutions for the commissions proper, and the appointments to the sub-commissions were inflexibly arranged earlier.<sup>46</sup>

Most resolutions, in fact, were drawn up before the commissions actually met - drawn up, that is, translated into the official Congress languages, and mimeographed. There never was, in fact, any "call" for "volunteers" to the various sub-commissions.<sup>47</sup> The amending procedure followed a similar tack. At one stage the delegate from Cyprus, also a member of the IUS Secretariat, rose to announce that specific and formally accepted amendments to a resolution he was sponsoring were unnecessary; he would listen to suggestions in the debate, "keep them in mind and incorporate them."<sup>48</sup>

At several of the Congresses, the IUS executive has appointed itself as a "steering committee," with very considerable powers over procedure and debate. This was the case at the Prague Congress. At the Peking Congress, the steering committee was elected at the outset from a list prepared in advance by the IUS executive.

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<sup>46</sup>Tarnopolsky, op. cit., p. 5.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>48</sup>Ibid., p. 6.

<sup>49</sup>Peel, op. cit., p. 7.



At the Leningrad Congress, delegations, in order to gain a place on the speaking list, had to hand their names to a member of the Secretariat on the steering committee. The committee - and, indirectly, the Secretariat - thus had complete control; not surprisingly, this resulted in some dissatisfaction on the part of delegations who were continually ignored.<sup>50</sup> The way in which the steering committee was elected to the Leningrad Congress also leaves the strong suspicion that the entire election was rigged in advance by the IUS executive.<sup>51</sup>

The seeming permanency of the IUS executive and secretariat is itself instructive. The IUS Constitution provides that no one shall be appointed to the Secretariat who at the time of the appointment has finished university or college for more than three years. Yet the President of the IUS, Czech Jeri Pelikan, served until his forties, when he was replaced by a virtually unknown in student circles, one Zbynek Vokrouhlicky, then 35.<sup>52</sup>

The election of Vokrouhlicky was itself illuminating for those anxious to uncover the existence of a covert Communist control of the IUS. His election by the executive committee was baldly announced to the startled committee, meeting in Algiers; the evidence

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<sup>50</sup>Savage, op. cit., p. 11.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid., pp. 11-12.

<sup>52</sup>See Youth and Freedom, VI, 1-2, p. 31.





suggests that he was merely announced and appointed, not elected.<sup>53</sup>

Former President Pelikan was named Director General of Czechoslovak State Television.

It must be said, however, that we do not know a great deal about the inner workings of the IUS elections. There is some tantalizing evidence, but not enough to permit of any sweeping generalizations. All that can be said conclusively is that there appears to be something a trifle strange about what we do know. The IUS has not gone out of its way to dispell our ignorance: it refused to allow non-IUS observers to sit in on the election of the Executive and Finance Committees at the Leningrad Congress, for example.<sup>54</sup>

The Helsinki Festival manifested tendencies of its own - which have already been noted and which do not require further elaboration - demonstrating an organizational tie between the permanent Festival leadership and the several delegations from the USSR and Eastern Europe. The two co-operated closely on a number of matters, but most importantly whenever any student or delegation threatened to weaken the Festival leadership's control of the proceedings.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>53</sup>Ibid., p. 31.

<sup>54</sup>Savage, op. cit., p. 11.

<sup>55</sup>Helsinki Supplement, op.cit., passim; and Communist Youth Activities (Eighth World Youth Festival, Helsinki, Finland, 1962), (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), particularly pp. 1803-06. The latter is a record of hearings held by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, Hereafter, Communist Youth Activities.



Until the Sino-Soviet debate was born, these facts were argued, primarily, by the non-Communist student groups opposed to the IUS. The Sino-Soviet debate has cast new light on the realities of the situation since, and lent new veracity to older arguments.

In their criticism of the Soviet-dominated World Congress of Women, the Chinese threw much light upon the techniques with which the Communists of the Soviet-oriented variety have assured their control of the proceedings of the various front organizations. The Chinese charged that the invitations to the Congress, the manipulation of the proceedings the voting of the elections, and the contrived psychological pressures, were all means of assuring the ascendancy of the Soviet and pro-Soviet group in and around the executive and secretariat of the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF - one of the international front groups).<sup>56</sup>

In particular, the Chinese charged that the preparatory committee was appointed selectively, and composed of trusted pro-Soviet (as opposed to pro-Chinese) activists, and that this committee issued invitations so as to assure a sufficient proportion of pro-Soviet delegates. The selfsame preparatory committee, the Chinese further charged, appointed a pro-Soviet plenary chairman who in turn interpreted all rules of procedure in accord with Soviet interests. Control

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<sup>56</sup>For the complete critique, see Hsinhua, July 18, 1963, and the Chinese booklet, The Struggle Between Two Lines at the Moscow World Congress of Women. An excellent summary appears in Youth and Freedom, VI, 1-2, pp. 4-6.





of the key organs gave the pro-Soviets an opportunity to control proceedings by demanding advance censorship of all proposed reports and speeches (they had to be supplied in advance for "translation," the Soviets argued), controlling the time allotted to individual speakers, and by appointing only trusted and disciplined activists to key floor positions (commission chairmen, commission "reporters" of resolutions, etc.)

The Chinese argued - and it seems plausible - that nothing was spared in denying them free access in the Congress. Chinese delegations were refused the floor, sessions were suddenly adjourned when Chinese speakers mounted the rostrum, loudspeakers went dead and lights were turned off. The chairman interrupted the Chinese speakers so many times that their speeches were broken up, and Chinese protests were over-ruled by the chair. Nor did these tactics exhaust the leadership's repertoire.<sup>57</sup>

The voting and elections, the Chinese charged, were rigged from the start. Only one list of nominations - that prepared surreptitiously some days earlier - was accepted. New nominations were over-ruled. Few votes were taken; nominations were approved by acclamation. Final drafts of resolutions voted upon by the plenum were not even circulated to the delegates. Commented the Chinese:

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<sup>57</sup>For the others, see ibid., pp. 4-6.



When the executive committee of the WIDF was being elected, the leader of the Soviet delegation and certain leaders of WIDF adopted the most wicked means to manipulate and control the election, to prevent those who disagreed with their line from being elected. They unilaterally declared that the original members of the executive remained and only several new members would be added...the nomination of Vietnam and Korea was proposed and seconded but the executive chairman totally disregarded these proposals...<sup>58</sup>

The last tactic employed by the leadership group was the utilization of what the Chinese chose to call "the cheering squad." The IUS saw the use of a cheering squad at the Seventh IUS Congress in Leningrad; there, several hundred (Savage says perhaps 400) Komsomol members from the Leningrad district were brought into the plenary sessions to burst into cheering or booing at the behest of the leadership.<sup>59</sup> The psychological effect of such demagogic tactics is well-known. Properly employed, the cheering squad can pressure dissenters from the leadership into submission, and lend illusory weight to the leadership's supporters.

There is a growing body of evidence, to conclude, suggesting - no, strongly confirming - the existence of a coherent group in control

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<sup>58</sup>Ibid., p. 6. It should be understood that the Chinese - if their past behavior be any guide - would behave in precisely the same way, and employ the same kinds of tactics, did they hold the heights of power.

<sup>59</sup>Savage, op. cit., p. 12.





of the central executive organs of the IUS; a group demonstrably willing to use a number of conspiratorial ruses for the strengthening of its control. The evidence, clearly, is incomplete. It does not tell us the identity, person by person, of the inner controlling group. Nor does it prove very instructive as to the mechanisms of communication and control both within the group, and between the group and the rank-and-file. On the other hand, the evidence does point to the existence of a coherent leadership group in the IUS, based primarily in and drawing its critical support on all substantive matters from, the USSR and the East European countries. The evidence also indicates strongly that the IUS leadership employs a number of covert techniques for the consolidation and furtherance of its power over the organization. There is, finally, as we have seen and will see further later, evidence that similar covert or conspiratorial control by a disciplined Communist group exists within functions supported by the IUS, most notably the various World Festivals of Youth and Students. Evidence of this kind is likewise incomplete, but it certainly supplements and adds weight to the evidence more directly relevant to the IUS. Conspiratorial behavior, in other words, has to some extent characterized both the inner workings of the IUS and some of its external functions.

A problem, however, remains, and Selznick never really comes fully to grips with it. It was pinpointed by Robert Michels in his trail-blazing 1915 work, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy, passim, in which he argued,



with extensive evidence in his support, that there is in all social organizations an "iron law of oligarchy," ie., a universal tendency toward the centralization of executive power in a few hands. If we grant this, and there is evidence in its favor, how can the centralization of power in the IUS be said to differ from the centralization of power in similar organizations? What is the result of conspiracy, and what the result of universal organizational tendencies? Selznick provides us with no real clues, although he seems to imply that the totalitarian pattern of centralization is somehow more thoroughgoing and rigid than otherwise. Still, it remains true that the only distinctive feature of executive centralization in front organizations is its extremity, and the degree even of this might be difficult to measure. The fact that the ISC in recent years has seen fit to adopt an increased centralization of powers will be noted by those who argue that the IUS - or any front - is not that distinctive. This "feature" of the IUS, in Selznick's view, is therefore a rather weak reed.

iii. Role of the Press.

We have noted that in Selznick's view the press in a front organization has a political, monolithic, line-following character. It plays, that is to say, a positive propaganda role, conveying to the membership the current Communist line - and its changes - and the interest-oriented views of the IUS. It has a monolithic character distinctly shaped by its political orientation: its pages carry messages along a single line and tolerate no dissent from that line.





The evidence on this point is probably the least ambiguous and the least controversial evidence on any of the aspects of front organizations presently under discussion. It will not, therefore, receive much attention; to labor the point would be to break the butterfly on the wheel.

From the standpoint of factual evidence, the situation appears to be this:

The IUS publishes some twelve separate publications, all with a very wide circulation.<sup>60</sup> It is estimated, for example, that the IUS sends some 600,000 issues of its publications to the United States alone every month. They are unlabelled, and often trans-shipped through non-Communist countries.<sup>61</sup> IUS publications are published in up to seven languages.<sup>62</sup> Although their overall world circulation is not precisely known, a U.S. Customs spot check of trans-shipped material through New Orleans, Louisiana, found "thousands of bags of mail each day" en route to Latin American countries, all of it from

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<sup>60</sup>The figures are those of Mr. Irving Fishman, an official of the Bureau of Customs, U.S. Treasury Department, who made a broad study of the matter for the House Committee on Un-American Activities. For fuller details see his testimony in Communist Propaganda, Part 9: Student Groups, Distributors and Propaganda (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958), pp. 2426-2442.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid., p. 2434.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid., p. 2430.



Communist sources, some of it from the IUS.<sup>63</sup>

Two things in particular were noteworthy in Mr. Fishman's findings. First, he said, there was the use of the "pen-pal" ploy, a device really for the lengthening of the IUS's mailing-list. Hence the IUS was employing its publications, under the guise of promoting international friendship, for the purpose of broadening Communism's access to students in the non-Communist world.<sup>64</sup>

Second, Mr. Fishman noted, there was the matter of the financing of the IUS's publications. World Student News, the main periodical of the IUS, costs one dollar yearly for a subscription. But such a sum is "hardly the cost of the paper on which it is printed."<sup>65</sup>

In point of fact, the IUS, in its public budget for the year 1963-1964, only claimed an income of some \$37,000 from the sale of World Student News, "and other publicity."<sup>66</sup> The explanation of one experienced observer is that the IUS distributes World Student News free to members of the national unions of students in the USSR and Eastern Europe; that the magazine is printed for the IUS free of charge by some Communist government publishing house, and that the

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<sup>63</sup>Ibid., p. 2431.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid., p. 2436.

<sup>65</sup>Ibid., p. 2437.

<sup>66</sup>Doug Ward, Associate Secretary for International Affairs for the Canadian Union of Students, letter to the writer, dated January 19, 1965. Hereafter Ward Memorandum.





money which would then normally go to pay the printing costs is then contributed by the IUS's sponsors to the "World Student News" account, where it may be disbursed as policy dictates. Clearly, however, there is insufficient evidence here to permit of any solid conclusions. All that is obvious is that World Student News is receiving some kind of a subsidy, for it could not even be published on the basis of the claims of its publishers.<sup>67</sup>

World Student News, a monthly in five languages (Arabic, English, French, German, Spanish), is the glossiest organ of the IUS. Its pages regularly feature, in addition to "on the spot" coverage of political stories - often having little to do with students - lengthy and verbose policy-statements by the IUS Secretariat and Executive, "open letters" to the ISC, appeals for "unity," and the like. It is fairly liberally illustrated, and although it throughout trumpets the IUS line without dissent - breaking from politics only infrequently - it does so in a fairly attractive manner. World Student News is an official spokesman for the IUS leadership, there can be no doubt of that; according to the available information it has never contradicted the prevailing IUS line, or even suggested that the line might not be infallible.

The much smaller News Service, an unillustrated booklet issued monthly, tends more to be the carrier of the detailed IUS line. It is

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<sup>67</sup>Ibid., p. 2.



a selective montage of student news from around the world. In its first section, headlined "solidarity actions," it outlines the activities of students in various countries in favor of IUS-backed objectives. These columns are likewise used for the exposition of the IUS position, and for publication of official policy statements by the IUS leadership.<sup>68</sup> The remainder is a selective news-roundup, tailored, it would appear, to give the reader the impression that students everywhere - in the West, too - are united in their support for the policies of the International Union of Students. Again, it never contradicts the line: the only student demonstrations or actions in Communist countries receiving mention in the News Service columns are those in favor of Communist objectives, eg., the demonstration of assorted foreign students in Moscow against U.S. Vietnam policy.<sup>69</sup>

Several IUS publications are very broadly distributed, far beyond the bounds of the IUS membership. They are identified with the IUS, but carry not overtly partisan labels, hence could be considered as general propaganda organs of the USSR under the IUS's legitimate "cover." This is a function of front organization publications which Selznick does not appear to have noted or accorded much attention. His focus is too narrow, resting as it does almost purely upon the role publications play in internal affairs.

iv. Deception.

Front organizations, we concluded in an earlier chapter,<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>68</sup>See, for example, the News Service for March, 1965 (No. 5), pp. 1-6.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>70</sup>Supra., Chapter II.





are organizations of deception, in two senses. First, they operate under a public facade, a legitimatizing "cover" having no real relation to the organization's real purposes. Second, they claim an open membership; yet while they do indeed open their ranks to non-Communists (provided they inoffensively and pacifically adhere to certain tacit conditions), they never do so completely, or to the extent of endangering the control of the Communist leadership.

An alleged front organization made up solely of Communists - unless it were a one-time front organization deserted by all its non-Communist constituents - would not be a proper front organization, under Selznick's definition. A proper front contains non-Communists, but only certain kinds of non-Communists participating under certain fairly fixed conditions. The existence of a front's facade implies a good deal about the behavior of fronts generally. If, as Selznick implies, a front will go to great lengths to avoid having its facade compromised or exposed, then we may expect the leadership of front organizations to engage in deceptive behavior whenever confronted with a threat to the organization's integrity. We might expect them to be deceptive about the organization's finances, for example, if a public exposure of its financial sources and disbursements might compromise the facade of nonpartisanship. Or, in another direction, we might expect front organizations to claim a certain representative legitimacy. If their constituents are not, indeed, legitimate (ie.,



representative as claimed), then we might expect the front to claim for its constituents a representativity they do not deserve.

First, the facade.

The International Union of Students has always argued, and never departed publicly from the argument, that it is a universal and representative organization for students from all countries. The Constitution is explicit:

The IUS, as a representative international student organization which defends the interests of students, shall strive for the following aims:

- a) The right and possibility of all young people to enjoy primary, secondary and higher education, regardless of sex, economic circumstances, social standing, political conviction, religion, colour or race; an extensive system of state scholarships and family allowances, the provision of textbooks and school materials free of charge; facilities for the maintenance of health and all other means of improving the living conditions of students.
- b) A better standard of education, full academic freedom and student rights.
- c) The promotion of national culture, appreciation of the cultures of all peoples and the love of freedom and democracy.
- d) The achievement of the unity of the student movement in all countries.
- e) Friendship, mutual understanding and co-operation among all students of the world and the unity of the world student community.
- f) The eradication of all forms of discrimination and, in particular, of racial discrimination.
- g) The realization of the aspirations of students in colonial, semi-colonial and dependent countries struggling against colonialism and imperialism, and for full national independence, which is a prerequisite for the full development of education and national culture.
- h) The co-operation of students with other sections of the population and the development in students of a sense of responsibility towards society.





i) World peace, international friendship among all peoples and the employment of advances in science and culture for the benefit of humanity.<sup>71</sup>

The IUS's propaganda literature takes a similar tack. It says:

The IUS is a representative international organization, grouping national student unions from all parts of the world. It defends the rights and interests of students and bases its work on the principles of the fight for peace, against colonialism and imperialism, for full national independence, for the democratization of education and the improvement of study and living conditions of students.

. . . . .  
The IUS has never seen students as a group set apart or aloof from society and that is why it holds that the solution of specific student questions can only be accomplished in the context of the resolution of the general problems facing society.<sup>72</sup>

The founding of the IUS made it possible to extend advice and help to student organizations, to offer solidarity and assistance to students whenever the need arose, to provide a forum for those organizations which had no other possibility of making themselves heard and to bring students closer together by giving them an opportunity to meet frequently and learn about the lives of their opposite numbers in other countries.<sup>73</sup>

The claim of universalism and representativity - whether or

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<sup>71</sup>Section III of the IUS Constitution: Constitution of the International Union of Students (Prague: The International Union of Students, n.d.), pp. 3-4.

<sup>72</sup>16 Questions and Answers About the IUS (Prague: The International Union of Students, n.d.), p. 3, my italics.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid., p. 6, my italics.



not the claim is a facade is of course the larger concern of this chapter - is certainly there. The IUS makes no bones about what it claims to be. Part of the operational hypothesis thus appears to be confirmed by the obvious evidence.

The continual use of the term "representative" would appear to demonstrate that the IUS does, as well, claim to be open to students of all persuasions, regardless of their politics. Section III, Article "a" of the Constitution, which affirms the IUS's determination to protect and strive for the rights and aspirations of all students (irrespective of "political conviction") appears to imply the same thing. Resolved the Seventh IUS Congress in Leningrad, in its very first resolution:

The Congress notes with great satisfaction that the celebration of the 15th anniversary of the IUS, in autumn, 1961, was an excellent occasion for the majority of students to reaffirm their agreement with the basic principles of the IUS which are fully identical with the aspirations and principles of the majority of national student organizations, members as well as non-members of the IUS.

. . . . .

The Congress reaffirms that the IUS is open, on the basis of its constitution, to all national student organizations without discrimination, that the principles of the IUS, as well as its structure and activity, offer a broad platform for national student organizations to collaborate closely and efficiently, and that there is room enough inside the IUS for all opinions to be freely compared and for common interests and aims to be found.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>74</sup>"Resolution on the Development of the International Student Movement and the Contribution of the IUS in Bringing about International Student Co-operation and Unity," Resolutions of the VIIth IUS Congress, Leningrad, 1962 (Prague: The International Union of Students, n.d.), pp. 9-10, italics added.





In point of fact, as the record clearly shows, the ranks of the IUS were not open to the Yugoslavs, after Tito crossed Stalin; they became closed to the Western student unions when it became obvious to them that the IUS leadership was determined to make not a single concession of substance to their wishes, and they still remain closed to Israel.

What the IUS leadership has sought to do is to claim that the organization's constituent groups are representative, in greater or lesser degree of their national student bodies. In many, many, cases this policy has been shown to have been a deception. The Leningrad Congress - only one of many - may be held up for illustration.

While the Credentials Committee of the ISC consumed some three days and two nights at one ISC Congress checking the representativity of each delegation requesting status, the Credentials Committee of the Leningrad IUS Congress merely checked to determine that the delegations present were, indeed, accredited by their home organizations. The status of a number of delegations of a very dubious character was never questioned by the Committee. The Executive Committee, it was said, had the responsibility of determining the representativity of the delegations; but the Executive Committee has publicly revealed little that would broaden our understanding of its modus operandi.<sup>75</sup> The results were intriguing.

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<sup>75</sup>Savage, op. cit., p. 13.



The delegation from Colombia, which received full delegate status, was shown to represent but 9,000 of the nation's 30,000 students. The Ecuadorian delegation seated at the IUS Congress represented only 3,500 of the nation's 9,000 students. The All-India Student Federation, with full voting rights for India, represented between 5,000 and 10,000 of India's one million students. The so-called Lebanese delegation, representing the Union Generale des Etudiants du Liban, was seated as a full member, even though the organization exists mostly on paper. The Iranian delegation, seated, represented the Teheran University Students' Union, "a group which is virtually unknown at the University of Teheran and is kept alive internationally only as an appendage of the IUS Secretariat."<sup>76</sup> The list of similar cases could be lengthened further.

The IUS or members thereof, has from time to time taken note of the unrepresentative nature of many of these constituent groups, and there has been talk, from time to time, of investigations and reforms. No significant changes have ever come about, however.

The deceptiveness of the IUS has frequently gone beyond the false claims it has made for the representativity of its member-delegations. The leadership has time and again blurred over the distinction - which exists in the IUS Constitution - between representative national unions of students and student groups from

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<sup>76</sup>Ibid., pp. 13-14.





nations having no real national student grouping. Associate and Full members have been lumped together - often to the discomfort of the Associate members - with equal floor privileges.<sup>77</sup> At several IUS Congresses, the seating has been arranged such that members, non-members, observers, and invited guests have been lumped together in a way suggesting a much larger membership and representation than would otherwise be conveyed.<sup>78</sup> The IUS has also had the habit of listing without description the countries "participating" in a given function - implying by so doing that all listed countries sent representatives who took an active part. In fact, many often merely sent observers who took no active role and who resented being used in this way.<sup>79</sup>

The Helsinki Festival, which the IUS backed and had some role in organizing, employed similar devices, often to the consternation of innocent individuals who had no intention of being identified as "participants."<sup>80</sup>

So too at the IUS-organized Second Latin American Youth Congress were unrepresentative Communist student groups held up as

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<sup>77</sup>Tarnopolsky, op. cit., p. 3.

<sup>78</sup>Peel, op. cit., p. 3.

<sup>79</sup>Memorandum from David E. Jenkins, former CUS National President, to writer, dated March 31, 1965. Hereafter Jenkins Memorandum.

<sup>80</sup>See the case of the Philippino journalist Arturo M. Padua, "The Philippines and the Festival," Helsinki Supplement, op. cit., pp. 18-20.



"representing the Youth of Latin America." When a number of non-Communist youth took the universalist claims of the Congress at face value and attempted to gain admittance, they were given short shrift. One was manhandled and threatened with a gun. Another was thrown out bodily. Others were kept under constant physical surveillance.<sup>81</sup>

The behavior of the IUS leading group on the question of the organization's finances likewise suggests that the IUS has been much less than honest in its dealings with the outside world, and that its slyness has been conditioned somewhat by its reluctance to make public its most valuable sources of revenue.

Until the Leningrad Congress, the sessions of the IUS Financial Committee were closed to outside observers. Thus at the Peking Congress in 1958, the observers were able to learn nothing beyond what the IUS said in its official records.<sup>82</sup> The financial sessions of the Leningrad meeting in 1962 were opened, and, indeed, the observers - in the words of one - "were the only ones who asked questions."<sup>83</sup> Despite the fact that more information was made available, however, many important questions were left unanswered.

According to the official records, 95 per cent of the IUS's

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<sup>81</sup>"The Second Latin American Youth Congress," Youth and Freedom, VI, 4, pp. 1-5.

<sup>82</sup>Peel, op. cit., p. 12.

<sup>83</sup>Savage, op. cit., p. 16.





membership fees came from Albania, Bulgaria, Cuba, China, East Germany, Hungary, North Korea, Mongolia, Poland, Rumania, the Soviet Union and North Vietnam. (In 1960-61, the USSR contributed, officially, some £25,000, Communist China some £17,000, and Czechoslovakia £17,200).<sup>84</sup> According to the official budget then discussed, such contributions were the largest source of income. (They were, as Savage pointed out, pretty considerable figures for a student organization even then; in 1960-61 the total of all the national unions' contributions to the ISC was about £6,500).

Two major items on the Leningrad budget intrigued Savage. The first was income from the sale of the IUS magazine, totalled at £10,000. But since World Student News is distributed free in many areas, and since it demonstrably cannot even pay its own costs, this item appears confusing. The second item was receipts from "bazaars," which accrued some £62,600 in 1961-62. When Observer Savage asked for more information on this score he was told by the IUS treasurer that money from bazaars included profits from schemes where, say, North Korean cigarettes, which are cheap, are sold in Czechoslovakia, where they are expensive. As Savage reported:

This sounded to me either like smuggling, in which I am sure the IUS would not engage, or a special economic arrangement which the IUS has made with various governments in the "Socialist camp" in which case the special privilege being

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<sup>84</sup>Ibid., p. 16.



granted would amount to the same thing as an outright grant.<sup>85</sup>

There were a host of other ambiguities in the IUS budget, some of them relating to the £10,000 raised from "income from the realization of parts of travel reimbursement in goods" (no elaboration), some to the £7,600 of claimed income from the "sale of old stock," including flags and badges. "It is impossible to tell whether this high figure is correct, since, although the IUS claims each year to make a similar amount from these sales, it never records any expenditure for the production of badges and flags." <sup>86</sup>

But if the specific details of the IUS's income were a riddle, the details of its expenditures were a riddle wrapped in an enigma inside a mystery. Some £200,000 was listed as yearly expenditure in the Leningrad budget. But as Savage notes:

No information is provided on the number of publications produced nor the cost per issue; no analysis of the cost and distribution figures for each special publication; no mention of the number of persons on the IUS staff and how much they receive under the very general item 'salaries.' There is no breakdown of how many travel grants are given, and to which organizations they were given, for any particular event. Since IUS resolutions never mandate the Secretariat to give a certain specified number of grants for a particular event, there is no control on the IUS Secretariat as to how and on what basis it gives these all-important travel grants. There is no breakdown of expenditures on travel by Secretariat members to various parts of the world and no explanation as to where, when

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<sup>85</sup>Ibid., p. 17.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid., p. 17, italics added.





and why such trips were undertaken. It is thus impossible to judge whether all of the IUS's many activities have been covered by the budget presented to the Congress.<sup>87</sup>

The total budget of the IUS for 1963-64 came to some \$450,000, by the official exchange rate. The figures in this budget are, by and large, as difficult to understand as those in earlier IUS budgets. Informed officials in the non-Communist student unions feel the IUS spends many times the amount it claims to spend.<sup>89</sup> The Vienna Festival, for example, cost at a very bare minimum some \$4,500,000; yet the International Preparatory Committee on which the IUS was represented, was shown to have had only \$1,132,000 on hand.<sup>90</sup> Likewise Festival officials put the Czech contribution to the Vienna Festival at \$260,000 - yet according to several official Czech sources, the Czechs contributed between \$741,000 and three million dollars.<sup>91</sup> Austrian sources estimated that the Soviet Union made funds in excess of \$100

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<sup>87</sup>Ibid., p. 17.

<sup>88</sup>Ward Memorandum, op. cit., p. 1.

<sup>89</sup>Jenkins Memorandum, op. cit., p. 6.

<sup>90</sup>Report on the Vienna Youth Festival (New York: Independent Research Service, 1961, second edition), p. 16.

<sup>91</sup>Ibid., p. 17. Clearly, the various estimated figures conflict. They do show however, that the costs - whatever their precise level - were enormous. They show as well that the official Festival figures themselves are inconsistent.



million available to the Festival organizers. The Helsinki Festival, generally thought to have been the cheapest of the Festivals, cost around \$25 million, or about half of what it is generally thought the Vienna Festival cost.<sup>92</sup> But the stated income sources for the Helsinki Festival could not have paid for more than between five and 8.7 million dollars in costs, leaving an unaccounted-for deficit of between \$16.3 and \$20 million. The Festival leadership never did account for the paying of the deficit from other sources.<sup>93</sup>

The 1963-64 budget, as noted, is in the deceptive IUS tradition. It "tells us very little," in the words of CUS secretary Doug Ward. Recent investigations have shown, however,

at the recent IUS Congress in Sofia, that the Czechoslovakian Youth Organization, Student Section, (CSM) pays for all the expenses of the technical staff of the Secretariat. This would be one of the largest expenses of the IUS, and it was interesting to find this out...I suppose that the major financing of the IUS is from the Czechoslovakian Government, through its Youth Movement. If the Czechoslovakian Government

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<sup>92</sup>Helsinki Supplement, op. cit., p. 6.

<sup>93</sup>Ibid., p. 6. To those who feel that the quoted figures seem high - The Times, London, estimated that the 1957 Festival in Moscow cost \$100 million - the sheer size of the arrangements needs to be stressed. The Moscow Festival, for example, hosted some 30,000 delegates from 131 countries. The organizers had to build a special "Festival City" to house the exhibits, the meetings, and many of the delegations. In addition, they commandeered 2,500 buses, 14 theatres, 15 cinema-halls, six concert auditoria, 30 clubs, 16 music-hall theatres and a number of hotels. All had to be paid for. In addition, the organizers either paid for outright or heavily subsidized the travel expenses of many delegations. Ibid., p. 6.





is recompensed by the Soviet Union, we are not aware of this, but it is certainly very possible.<sup>94</sup>

In summary, then, certain things must be said. The IUS, first, does operate under nominally respectable auspices. Whether these constitute, in light of its genuine nature, a "cover" or not is something that is partially indicated by our investigation in this section, and partially something pertinent to our investigation in this chapter as a whole. The ranks of the IUS are open to non-Communists - and, indeed, do contain a number of neutralist groupings - but, again, only (it would appear) under certain unwritten conditions. We have seen that the IUS is deceptive in this area inasmuch as the leadership has not given concrete form to its more abstract and general claims of openness. In point of fact, the ranks of the IUS are not open to all, but only to all those willing to play the IUS game according to the leadership's rules, ie., to all those prepared to not cross the IUS executive and secretariat, to vote the "right" way on policy questions (unless they are prepared to confront the enormous pressures brought to bear on dissenters), to not object to the patently partisan orientation of the IUS's proceedings. Only in that sense is the IUS "open" to all.

The available evidence likewise indicates very strongly that the IUS leadership practices deception in two important areas relative, respectively, to its "non-partisan" claims, and to its claims of

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<sup>94</sup>Ward Memorandum, op. cit., p. 3.



representativity. In the first place, it consistently refuses to make public the true state of its finances, the identity of its central financial pillars, the extent of their support, and so on (although its secretiveness in this respect differs from the ISC in degree, not kind). It is probably true that secretiveness about financial sources characterizes to some degree all organizations who fear that a disclosure of financial sources could be used as political capital against them. The ISC, for the record, discloses its sources, although it is less than blatant in advertising its dependence upon the contributions of certain U.S. foundations. On the other hand, neither have the foundations exerted, apparently, any iron control over policy (the policy of the IUS being frequently anti-American). IUS refuses to disclose the true extent of its financial commitment in any number of meetings and activities. It refuses to use its great influence to open the books on the various World Festivals of Youth and Students it has seen fit to co-sponsor.

Why it should behave in this way is open, of course, to any number of interpretations. That the IUS does behave in this manner because it fears the compromising of its non-partisan front - as others would argue, including, it would seem likely, Selznick - is one plausible interpretation.

The IUS also continues to claim a representativity it does not have. We have seen that the IUS leadership appears anxious, for reasons known only unto itself, to embrace student organizations not particularly representative of their national "constituents" (claimed





constituents). The fact that it denies admittance to student organizations more representative in character could be conditioned by partisan political considerations of the kind Selznick has outlined - that much, at least, is arguable.

v. Mobilization of Membership.

Selznick argues that fronts, in addition to a propaganda-access function, have an organizational function: that is, they are devices for the mobilization and direction of mass energies, ie., the energies of organized groups. Front organizations - in his view - concretely mobilize the energies of their members in seven ways. The operational hypotheses of this are as follows:

The IUS will: (1) propagandize among its members continually, in a specific way, and, as well, will seek to shape them and utilize their energies by drawing them into the political struggle; (2) convert its resource-patronage into a political tool, a sanction in the hands of the leadership employed for enforcing conformity to its wishes; (3) make the "fixing" of student grievances and the catering-to of student interests a badge of legitimacy; (4) provide a wide range of social and physical activities designed to appeal to students; (5) provide a regularized system of financial contributions from members, and integrate member-units into a wider network of Party-controlled organizations; and (7) sometimes seek to strengthen the central executive's power over individual members by altering the basis of



membership from national-unit membership to individual-membership.

It is a matter of record that the organs of internal communication of the IUS - World Student News, the News Service and the like - are as politicized as the organization itself.<sup>95</sup> They aim at the membership an unrelenting stream of partisan propaganda. The articles generally fall into three categories: (1) laudatory reviews of the work of the IUS, in particular its contributions to peace, progress, and student well-being; (2) heavily-emotive exposes of the machinations of the ISC, and of non-Communist or anti-Communist students and governments generally; and (3) the least-used category, articles of general interest on student affairs, famous universities (usually in the Communist bloc), and the like.<sup>96</sup> The last category is a concession to the maintenance of general reader-interest. The two former categories reflect the intention of the IUS leadership to shape a common political outlook amongst the IUS membership through continuous propaganda. That, at least, would be a plausible interpretation of their motivation.

The leadership has attempted to deepen the political consciousness of the rank-and-file by a number of other means as well. The IUS, for example, supervises the awarding every year of a number of scholarships for Latin American, African and Asian students. The scholarships are tenable at both Eastern European Universities and at

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<sup>95</sup>Supra, pp. 82.

<sup>96</sup>For examples, see World Student News: XVIII, 4 (April, 1964); XVI, 1 (January, 1962); and XVI, 5 (May, 1962).





Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow (nicknamed "Friendship U.")

Formerly the University for the Friendship of Peoples, Lumumba University - along with the November 17th University in Prague - was created expressly for the education of underprivileged foreign students. The curricula at both institutions is heavily loaded with political indoctrination; Communist leaders evidently hope to send pro-Communist students back to their home countries after graduation, where they may then wield useful political influence.<sup>97</sup>

Parenthetically, the experiment has not been a complete success. Many foreign students - studying both at the above-mentioned institutions and elsewhere in the Communist bloc - have had unpleasant experiences with racial discrimination; some of these, together with others disillusioned by the political indoctrination and generally repressive intellectual climate, have returned home in disgust, or left to study in the West.<sup>98</sup>

Not everything is known about the IUS's role in the Communist bloc's overall campaign for foreign students. There were some 30,000 foreign students studying in the bloc (including China) in 1963;<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>97</sup>Bulletin, op. cit., p. 26.

<sup>98</sup>For accounts, see Emmanuel J. Hevi, "An African Student in Red China," Harper's, January, 1964, pp. 63-72, Newsweek, February 10, 1964, and "Those Foreign Students," East Europe, XII, 3 (March, 1963), p. 25.

<sup>99</sup>East Europe, op. cit., p. 25.



how many of these were attracted or brought over by the IUS cannot be said. The scanty available evidence suggests, however, that the IUS plays a significant role.<sup>100</sup>

The role of psychological pressures in deepening the political consciousness of those attending IUS meetings has already been noted.<sup>101</sup>

Another important means of "education" in the IUS lies in the emphasis the organization gives to the political struggle. The IUS has never held much brief for the idea that students are a distinct and limited interest-group whose aspirations can be effected through mere limited or pressure-group means. Mere changes in existing government policy, the IUS has frequently argued, can never bring about a state of affairs in which students can fulfill completely their "proper" role. What students must do, then, is to struggle - along, of course, with other "progressive" elements - for radical and revolutionary changes in the prevailing order. If such elements should include the local Communist enterprise well, then, students will at least recognize their best allies. To take part in the political struggle is, by its very nature, to become involved in politics. The particular brand of politics of the IUS is well known. To participate in many of the activities of the IUS, then, is to become involved in a particular kind

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<sup>100</sup>See Bulletin, op. cit., p. 24, and The Communist International Youth and Student Apparatus, op. cit., p. 30.

<sup>101</sup>Supra., p. 22.





of politics, in a particular political organization. The IUS itself is quite frank about this (although it puts it more euphemistically):

The IUS has never seen students as a group set apart or aloof from society and that is why it holds that the solution of specific student questions can only be fully accomplished in the context of the resolution of the general problems facing society.<sup>102</sup>

The second aspect of mobilization relates to the conversion of patronage from an instrument of personal power into an instrument of political control, ie., an instrument whose use is defined by ideological or party-organizational, and not personal, considerations.

This involves internal decision-making within the IUS proper, and because we do not know a great deal about this general subject, we do not know a great deal about the dispensation of patronage.

Several of the Western observers at the IUS Congresses have noted the timidity, the unwillingness to speak out against abuses, of the neutralists and non-Communists within the IUS. They seem to appreciate that the executive has the command of the organization's most important resources - travel grants, equipment-contributions, scholarships - and that the executive is inclined to dispense them with some eye to political considerations, ie., with an eye to the co-operativity and "progressiveness" of the delegations.<sup>103</sup> Inasmuch

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<sup>102</sup>16 Questions and Answers About the IUS, op.cit., p. 3.

<sup>103</sup>Peel, op. cit., p. 10.



as a number of the member-organizations in the IUS are virtually creatures of the organization, in that they have little independent base of power and little real power or existence apart from the support the IUS gives them, there is probably little inclination on their part to defy the executive, the ruling elite.

The IUS, then, does to all appearances dispense patronage, i.e., does allocate the financial and material resources of the organization, with some reference to the attitudes of the respective member-units vis-a-vis the central executive.<sup>104</sup> What the precise basis or bases of this allocation has been, there is insufficient evidence to say. The available evidence only points to the existence of the kind of patronage Selznick describes; it does not convey the details.

The third point, whether or not the organization makes the "fixing" of grievances one of the bases and justifications of its existence, is unambiguously confirmed by all the evidence. Although this point is dealt with in greater detail below,<sup>105</sup> a few points may just be mentioned here. The emphasis upon the rights and privileges of students is heavy throughout the IUS literature. On the surface of it there is little to distinguish the IUS in this respect from the ISC,

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<sup>104</sup>That it also dispenses the organization's resources - propaganda support, for example - is shown in section nine, "selective intervention."

<sup>105</sup>See ibid.





save emphases. At a less superficial level there are, of course, some profound differences - the extent to which the IUS has regard for all students regardless of their politics, for example. On the surface, however, judged by its own claims, the IUS is a student-interest group first and foremost, and carries on a number of activities oriented to students only. It campaigns for the "democratization of education," it joins in building hostels and stocking libraries, it conducts anti-illiteracy campaigns, it maintains in Peking a TB sanitorium for students.

Nor is this purely and simply a facade having no relation to its real practices. The IUS does "fix" grievances. It does intervene with governments on behalf of persecuted students and it does, without any doubt, conduct campaigns in the student interest. To deny this, in point of fact, is to miss one of the IUS's central functions: for it is an arm of the Communist enterprise globally, and therefore has some very definite and concrete responsibilities to students as a political strata playing an important role within the overall Communist scheme. Part of its real activities, for example, lies in intervening on behalf of Communist students in non-Communist countries. This, in the eyes of the enterprise, is an important task. Nor are the IUS's activities confined to Communist students. Both because there may be tactical gains therefrom, and because the IUS needs a legitimatizing "cover," it assists non-Communist students as well, particularly the left-wing neutralist variety.



All that needs to be particularly remembered is this: the "fixing" of the IUS has a partisan coloration; the IUS may, of course, be "genuinely" interested in student welfare per se. They are just not universally genuinely so interested. It is important to deal with the interests and grievances of students not because they are students - and therefore deserving of help, in some beneficent or idealistic view - but because they are valuable political allies, pawns capable of being manipulated by a greater chess-master, springboards from which the Party may leap to power.

The IUS leadership, to proceed to the fourth point, has always taken cognizance of the importance of social and physical activities, particularly because such endeavors have particular importance for those in the student age-group.<sup>106</sup>

The World Festivals of Youth and Students, which the IUS has backed, have always featured a very heavy dosage of dancing, singing, and general socializing. Folk-song festivals have been a regular feature. The "cultural" activities have of course been injected with a political dye: in an effort to make art into an ally of propaganda, the IUS has always brought in the very best of professional entertainment from the bloc countries. Such "amateurs" tend to be more impressive. The IUS, as well, sponsors within Europe itself a number of

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<sup>106</sup> One must exempt from this category those 30 and 40-year old "students" in the IUS apparat.





regional sports competitions.<sup>107</sup>

Selznick's fifth point - the role of regularized financial contributions in building a sense of "belonging," as well as in providing a sound and stable financial base - seems of only marginal relevance to the IUS. National member-groups are assessed on a regular basis and must pay a contribution toward the organization's maintenance. Selznick's point seems aimed more at individual-membership organizations, however, and the IUS is a national-unit organization. It is therefore at least questionable whether the paying of regular dues to the IUS by its member-organizations strengthens the loyalties of the individuals within the units. In any case, to see as the central issue the loyalty of the individual rank-and-file member of the national unions is to miss the point. The key factor in international student politics is far more often the loyalties of the leaders, especially in areas where communication between leadership and the ranks is poorly-developed, or in areas in which the top controls the bottom, rather than vice-versa. The paying of regular dues seems a minor issue in that context. The other factor, in any case, is that regular dues account for but a fraction of the IUS's budget.

The Soviet bloc, by all appearances, pays the largest part of

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<sup>107</sup> See for details the various sources, supra, on the Vienna and Helsinki Festivals, together with 16 Questions..., op. cit., pp. 33-5.



the IUS budget; a stable and secure financial base is therefore there already, regardless of whether the delegation from Mali chooses to pay its \$200 annual assessment.

The IUS is, of course, well integrated into a network of related front organizations. As early as 1946, as we have noted,<sup>108</sup> the International Preparatory Committee of the IUS took unauthorized steps to send permanent representatives to the other Soviet international front organizations already in existence. At the founding of the IUS, an effort was made by the Communist delegates in the London Conference to have the organization made but an appendage of the WFDY. The attempt was defeated, but the objective was clear enough. Today, the IUS and WFDY continue to co-operate very closely on matters of common interest, particularly in the organization of the World Festivals. The precise inner realities and details of the co-operation are frequently a matter of mystery, however.

As to the integration of the members of the IUS into the international front-organization network, the situation - on the basis of scant evidence - seems to be this. The separate organizations co-operate in uniformly propagating the prevailing Communist line. There is co-operation - and, it would seem, common direction - on that point. All the organizations have often been brought together for concerted attacks on specific objectives before, eg., on defending the Communist

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<sup>108</sup>Supra., (i).





side in the Korean War. Whether the average IUS member is taken more deeply into the network than this is not really too well known. It may be, at the leadership level; but that is only speculation.

On the final point, the present basis of membership of the IUS is membership on the basis of the group, not the individual. A group may fit into any of four acceptable categories for full membership; it may be a national union of students, a co-ordinating committee uniting various student groups where no national union exists, a student organization from a country where neither of the previous exists, or a 'representative student organization abroad which units the largest number of students of the country or countries concerned.'<sup>109</sup> Groups qualifying under the above may also apply for associate status, which carries diminished rights and responsibilities. Groups not qualifying under the above may apply for "consultative status."

According to the IUS no participating group loses its own internal policy-making autonomy. On paper, the IUS can only 'make recommendations to its member organizations and it is up to the latter to carry them out 'as these are in accordance with their constitution and policy.'<sup>110</sup>

Early in the IUS's existence, however, the record shows that the Communist minority sought to arrange the distribution of powers

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<sup>109</sup>IUS Constitution, op. cit., Section V.

<sup>110</sup>16 Questions..., op. cit., p. 3.



between the executive and members so that the decisions of the IUS's "governing bodies" would be binding upon all members. This measure - together with a similar resolution requiring members to support organizations pursuing aims similar to the IUS - was passed by the Communist delegations and their supporters, and triggered the first Western split from the IUS.<sup>111</sup>

vi. Organizational Tendencies.

Selznick thinks the Communist enterprise is supremely conscious of the importance and organizational implications of central executive powers in organized groups. Operationally, then, in the Selznick view, the Communist fraction will fight most tenaciously, in a given organization's formative stages, for control of the central organs of executive power; if successful it will press for maximized powers of decision-making and control for the organs it controls. It will seek to minimize the entry of non-Communists - at least independent-minded and power-conscious non-Communists - into the inner sanctum of power, even while holding to the formal position that all real powers legally reside in

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<sup>111</sup>Jones, op. cit., pp. 21-3. The present Constitution, as amended, says full members accept the obligation "to contribute to the implementation of decisions of IUS governing and executive bodies as far as these are in accordance with their constitution and policy." (Section V). There is no mention of the 1946 provision. It is quite possible that it was deleted in the "liberalizing" amendments of the mid-1950's. The Constitution itself provides no commentary on the amendments, and so one cannot be completely sure. For one estimate of the data and motivation of the change, see Clews, op. cit., p. 43.





the organs of the mass membership.

Much of this ground has already been covered in this chapter. Only two things need to be said.

The first is that the Communist fraction within the IUS went for, and having scaled them clung to, the heights of executive power in the organization's first years in a manner reminiscent of the spirit in which a tiger goes for the jugular vein. On the one hand, the Communist delegations to the IUS's first founding meetings pressed for maximized central powers of decision-making and enforcement.<sup>112</sup> Organizationally, the Communist delegations - the fraction - squeezed every last possible drop of power from every position of strength they held. That they were successful in their objective, and tactically acute in their intention, was the unequivocal lesson of the evidence. They gained complete control of the organization, shaped it along the lines of their objectives, and resisted every attempt to dislodge them or lessen their power. When the Western delegations left, they left in disarray and defeat. Their leaving was their admission of surrender.

The second point is that the Communist fractions generally, and participating IUS groups and personnel in particular, have evinced the same behavior in other organizations since. The best example of this is their behavior in the various International Preparatory Committees of the World Festivals of Youth and Students. Various investigations into

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<sup>112</sup>Supra, Chapter III, Jones, op. cit., pp. 1-28, and Apeland, op. cit., pp. 22-33.



the IPC's have demonstrated clearly that the Communist fractions have always been given the reigns of central executive and decision-making power, and that non-Communists have gained admittance even to the outer fringes only when they proved to be collaborators - using the term in its non-pejorative sense - or harmless figureheads.<sup>113</sup>

vii. Legitimatization.

A front organization cannot hope to compete successfully until it is accepted, ie., until it is generally agreed that it has a legitimate right to participate on the basis of equality with competing groups. Fronts must therefore identify themselves with purposes, values, procedures and personalities having general currency in the strata to which the front hopes to appeal. Fronts, in the Selznick view, have another function over and above their duty to legitimize themselves: that is the duty to use their influence for the legitimatization of Communist groups in their field. Operationally, front organizations (1) disavow partisan objectives, maintaining a pose of universalism, (2) utilize the accepted phraseology of the target-strata, (3) identify

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<sup>113</sup>See particularly, in this connection, Herbert Romerstein's testimony before HUAC in 1960, Communist Training Operations, Part 3 (Communist Activities and Propaganda Among Youth Groups) (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), pp.1425-40, and passim; also Communist Youth Activities, op. cit., pp. 1806-16, and The Communist International Youth and Student Apparatus, op. cit., p.13. (in which is described the reaction of the Communist fraction in the U.S. delegation to a proposal that a new and more representative executive be elected - possibly to replace them). The U.S. delegate to the IPC it is interesting to note, was a Communist Party of the United States member, one Holland Roberts, then aged over 60. Communist Training Operations, ibid., p. 1429.





with non-Communists having reputé in the target group, (4) claim universal and representative character, and (5) campaign for the legitimatization of other Communist or Communist-oriented organizations, in our case, student organizations.

The first point touches upon ground that is, for us, familiar.

Nowhere in the IUS Constitution is there any mention of the terms "socialism," "communism," "socialist bloc," or anything of that kind. The preamble speaks instead of "We, the students of the world," of the Charter of the United Nations, of "service...towards the fundamentals of social and economic advancement," of "liberty," of "peace and progress," and of a "better world." The purpose of the organization?

The purpose of the International Union of Students, which is founded upon the representative student organizations of different countries, shall be to defend the rights and interests of students, to promote improvements in their welfare and standard of education, and to prepare them for their tasks as democratic citizens.<sup>114</sup>

After listing at some length the idealistic aims of the organization,<sup>115</sup> the Constitution specifies that the IUS "shall carry out its activities in the spirit of Section III of this Constitution (in which the aims are enumerated)." The same line is taken in the organization's own propaganda literature.<sup>116</sup> Nowhere are partisan leanings

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<sup>114</sup>IUS Constitution, op. cit., preamble, third paragraph, p.3

<sup>115</sup>Supra, pp. 136.

<sup>116</sup>16 Questions..., op. cit., passim.



admitted. Instead, the appeal is to the whole student community, to the values and interests of all students. (The constant emphasis throughout upon "academic freedom," "university autonomy," "students' rights" and the "democratization of education" is a case in point.)

The usage of accepted phraseology has not been without its unique twists, however. The widespread exploitation of "peace" terminology by the IUS conceals the fact that the organization gives the term a particular interpretation related to politics. In the IUS view - a view derived from the Leninist theory of imperialism, apparently<sup>117</sup> - the Socialist System, so-called, is the bulwark of peace. It cannot, by definition, endanger peace. Moreover, because the coming of the world Socialist System would presage complete and everlasting world peace, the actions of the Socialist System in expanding its power and

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<sup>117</sup> Lenin argued in 1917 - the argument has since become the stock-in-trade of Communist propaganda - that the Capitalist system had avoided the collapse Marx had foreseen by the simple expedient of finding new sources of foreign investment, new markets and trade, in the underdeveloped nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Imperialism was thus the last, decadent, stage of Capitalism expanded to become colonialism. This stage too would pass away and Capitalism would still collapse, he argued, because the revolt of the backward peoples - aided by the Soviets - would intensify the contradictions of the system, send the Western workers finally into revolt, and topple the bourgeoisie. See his "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism," in V.I. Lenin: Selected Works in Two Volumes (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1952), Volume I, Part 2, pp. 433-568. In the Leninist scheme, wars derive from Capitalism's drive for markets and sources of investment, and under the system war is inevitable. The Socialist system, on the other hand, has no private ownership, and moreover the economy is planned. There is no such a thing as political or racially-inspired imperialism. Socialism is both, therefore, incapable of imperialism and incapable of waging war. See Mailand Christensen, op.cit., pp.35-6.





influence cannot, by definition, be anything but peaceful. "Imperialism" - a phenomenon against which the IUS directs many of its energies - is likewise given a partisan definition. It is not seen as any aggressive or interventionist policy of any large power that endangers the rights or sovereignty of smaller powers; for by such a definition, the USSR itself is guilty of imperialism. Rather, "imperialism" is defined in the Leninist sense: the imperialist system is the Capitalist system of the Western powers, advanced to a particular "decadent" stage.<sup>118</sup>

Thus defined, the IUS's fight for peace and against imperialism amounts to a fight for the gains of the Communist movement, and against the non-Communist governments of the world. This kind of semantic manipulation has enormous tactical advantages. It permits the IUS on the one hand to mouth the slogans and phrases of the target-students of the underdeveloped world, of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Thus it appeals to accepted student values. On the other hand, it is able to do so without in any way endangering the legitimacy of the Soviet system. In point of fact it aids the Soviet system by propagating a conceptual framework and vocabulary rendering students more susceptible of Communist manipulation and ideological conversion.

This identification with accepted things for the purpose of

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<sup>118</sup>For the official IUS definition, see ibid., p. 36. For the first-hand reports of Western observers as to the concrete content given the term "peace," see Peel, op. cit., p. 4, and Christensen, op. cit., pp. 35-6. See also Clews, op. cit., p. 42.



legitimatization does not stop with semantical manipulation. The IUS contributes to a number of "good causes" in student eyes, around the world. It runs a TB sanitorium for students in Peking, organizes anti-illiteracy drives, contributes to libraries, organizes student travel tours, and the like. And while it may gain direct political and organization benefits from so doing - eg., by facilitating the travel of Communist student leaders in some areas from their homes to the USSR - it would be wrong to see such activities as being motivated purely by a concern for immediate and direct organizational benefits. The largest benefit is to the prestige of the IUS, ie., as a contribution to its legitimatization as a respectable student-interest organization. Though a more long-run benefit, this is of incalculable importance.<sup>119</sup>

Identification with non-Communists is a device the IUS has employed, although it is questionable whether it has played that significant an overall role. For the record, however, the IUS has prominently applauded, within the pages of World Student News, the late Congolese Premier Patrice Lumumba, and Kenyan Prime Minister Jomo (Mzee) Kenyatta.<sup>120</sup>

Campaigning for the legitimatization of other Communist or Communist-influenced student groups is - as we shall see in more detail in section nine, below - an important part of the IUS's role within the

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<sup>119</sup>See Ward Memorandum, p. 3.

<sup>120</sup>See World Student News: XVIII, 2 (February, 1964), p. 20, XVIII, 3 (March, 1964), pp. 25,27, and XVIII, 4 (April, 1964), p. 28.





Communist enterprise. It is part of the organization's "selective intervention" function. Although the area will be dealt with under another heading, it is appropriate to note here that the IUS's intervention on behalf of beleaguered students - providing their persecutors are not Communist governments - is a vital process by which the IUS both justifies itself generally to students as an acceptable and legitimate international student organization and "protects its own." The two objectives are convergent: by intervening on behalf of student organizations that are either within the IUS membership or in favor of ends with which the Communists agree, the IUS both protects its own social base - its points of access to students - and is able to demonstrate to the world at large its general concern for "students." To the extent that the Communist enterprise values its student allies around the world, the IUS is an exceedingly valuable and useful political tool. Its value, of course, is determined in this area to a large extent by its integrity in the eyes of the political participants. If its facade as a non-partisan international student organization is not taken at face value by government officials, for example, its interventions on behalf of rioting Communist students are unlikely to carry



much influence.<sup>121</sup>

viii. Adherence to the Party Line.

Front organizations, in Selznick's view, are specialized propaganda agencies of the Communist system - among other things. They therefore tend to propagate slavishly the prevailing Communist "line," ie., the prevailing theoretical and strategic-tactical outlook of the Soviet leadership.

Operationally this may all be best put as follows. With respect to general policy, a front organization will never contradict the prevailing Soviet line. Moreover, with regard to specialized policy, it will never take a policy position which would tend to derogate or otherwise cast a bad light upon the Communist system or upon Communist student groups; nor will it take positions which might throw a bad light upon Soviet policies, eg., by offending a non-Communist student group whose policies were favored at the moment, or supported, by Communist leaders.

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<sup>121</sup>The influence carried by international student intervention of this kind is a complex question about which there is little convincing evidence. A CUS interventionist telegram to Cuban dictator Fulencio Batista in 1958, asking him to stay the execution of a condemned student leader, produced results - or so it would seem superficially. Batista answered the wire and stayed the execution. The present Cuban government has apparently been somewhat less amenable to such appeals. When the IUS sent a verbose wire to the UNEB, pledging the defense of "world students" when the revolution overthrew the Goulart government, the reply must have disappointed them. The cable company informed Prague that the addressee's residence had been "closed."





The whole matter is better put in this negative form for the simple reason that non-Communists may from time to time independently adopt positions in accordance with the Communist line. If we want to define as Communistic all those who at a given point in time agree with the Communist leadership, we shall be in an unwholesome position. This is avoided by adopting the common-sense device of inverting the proposition: we then deduce that the Communist apparatus has organizational control - barring some marginal cases - only over those who never depart from its established position. If we detect actors taking the Communist position very frequently - although not always - and never voicing any substantive criticisms of Communism, we may be led to suspect that they are sympathetic to Communism, even though they are formally independent of its organizational discipline. Further inquiries would have to be made before we could justly feel secure in this suspicion, however. This general approach permits us to distinguish among: those under Communist organizational discipline; those independent of that discipline but sympathetic (ideologically or in other ways) to Communism; and those completely independent in every sense.

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That the IUS has never departed from the general Communist line

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<sup>122</sup>The Party line is the policy position of the Party leadership - primarily in the Soviet Union, although the precise mechanics are little-known - expressed through the "cue-giving" media of Party-owned publications, eg., The Daily Worker, Pravda, The Canadian Tribune. The Sino-Soviet conflict clearly complicates this: on a number of matters of both theory and policy, there are now two, and not just one, lines. The majority of fronts appear to be remaining under pro-Soviet control, however.



is confirmed by all the available evidence (and the evidence, in this case, is considerable).

In 1948 the IUS - and Selznick would have us believe this is significant, inasmuch as it demonstrates an organizational orientation having little immediate relevance to student problems - followed the prevailing line in ejecting the Yugoslav delegation.<sup>123</sup> Overnight, for little apparent reason, a delegation that was formerly "progressive" and "peace-minded" became "reactionary" and "fascist."

In 1950, the IUS backed the North Korean aggressors in the Korean War.<sup>124</sup> Before the death of Stalin in 1953 and the change in the line which followed his death, the IUS - like the Soviet Union - regarded all neutralist "bourgeois" governments in Asia as "reactionary" and "fascist." WFDY, the IUS's sister-organization which has always followed an identical line, called Nehru a puppet who had "bound India hand and foot to the imperialist war chariot."<sup>125</sup> When the general Soviet line shifted after 1953, and the Communist enterprise came to look with greater favor upon the Afro-Asian neutralists, so did the IUS. Today, the policies of the organization are very oriented toward Afro-Asian concerns.<sup>126</sup>

The IUS has consistently condemned Western nuclear testing. It has never condemned Soviet tests. Indeed, when the Soviets broke

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<sup>123</sup>Supra, Chapter III.

<sup>124</sup>Apeland, op. cit., pp. 39-40.

<sup>125</sup>Ibid., p. 42.

<sup>126</sup>Ibid., pp. 42-3.





the voluntary test-ban, the IUS did not even mention the fact in its resolutions.<sup>127</sup> The General Secretary of the IUS in fact told the Leningrad Congress that the nuclear tests of the USSR were "defensive," and necessary for the cause of peace.<sup>128</sup> The Chinese delegate went so far as to maintain that while the tests of the U.S. radiated murderous germs the tests of the USSR radiated an "antidote" to those germs!<sup>129</sup> A similar policy was followed - without the IUS protesting its existence - in the Helsinki Festival.<sup>130</sup>

The IUS has supported the North Vietnamese-Viet Cong position over Vietnam, and charged the U.S. with "aggression."<sup>131</sup>

The IUS supported the Panamanian students who instigated the 1964 riots against U.S. Canal Zone authorities.<sup>132</sup> The U.S. was charged with "brutality...exploitation...and discrimination."<sup>133</sup> Yet when a

<sup>127</sup>See Morton Schwartz, op. cit., p. 54, and World Student News, XVI, 1 (January, 1962,) pp. 21-3.

<sup>128</sup>Christensen, op. cit., p. 35.

<sup>129</sup>Savage, op. cit., p. 16. For the Leningrad resolutions, see Resolutions of the VIIth IUS Congress, Leningrad, 1962, op.cit., passim.

<sup>130</sup>Helsinki Supplement, op. cit., pp. 9-10.

<sup>131</sup>See World Student News, XVII, 11 (November, 1963), pp.6-7 XVIII, 3 (March, 1964), pp. 2-7, and executive Committee of the IUS, press release dated March 1, 1964, p. 1.

<sup>132</sup>World Student News, XVIII, 2 (February, 1964), pp. 2-6.

<sup>133</sup>Ibid., p. 4.



special investigating committee of the International Commission of Jurists, in the country at the Panamanian government's request, announced in June, 1964, that the U.S. was "not guilty" of the Panamanian charges - and that, indeed, the Panamanian government had incited the rioting itself - the IUS said nothing.<sup>134</sup>

Nor was this the only case in which the IUS attempted to white-wash those acting in accord with Communist interests. The IUS came to the support of the Communist and Fidelista-oriented student groups in the Central University in Caracas, Venezuela, when those groups took an active role in the assassinations, robberies, and arson that accompanied the efforts of the Venezuelan Communist Party and its ally, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, to overthrow the Venezuelan government and forestall free elections in 1964.<sup>135</sup>

When the left-wing regime of Jano Goulart was overthrown from within in Brazil in 1964, the IUS protested the move. When, in the process, the Communist-dominated Brazilian Students' Union (UNEB) was dissolved by the revolutionary government, the IUS spoke out again.<sup>136</sup> It said nothing, however, about the fact that the UNEB had come under

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<sup>134</sup>Youth and Freedom, VI, 5, p. 14.

<sup>135</sup>Youth and Freedom, VI, 6, pp. 18-19, and World Student News, XVIII, 7-8 (July-August, 1964), pp. 26-9.

<sup>136</sup>World Student News, XVIII, 4 (April, 1964), pp. 5-8.





control of an unrepresentative minority, or about the UNEB's subservience to the Goulart regime, and to a number of Communist embassies from which it was receiving subsidies.<sup>137</sup> UNEB had been a mainstay of the IUS and a "powerful political machine in its own right,"<sup>138</sup> a key linchpin in the Communist organizational enterprise in Latin America.

The characteristic of the IUS's stand on various general and specific issues, in short, has been what Mailand Christensen has called its failure "to apply universal principles universally."<sup>139</sup> The stark partisanship of the IUS - and of a large number of delegations therein - is but a reflection, as Christensen rightly argues, of the lack of autonomy that characterizes student organizations in Communist countries. Many of these unions are but State organs, creatures of the ruling party in a one-party system. To expect them to follow any other course would be naive. Conversely, so long as the underlying system from whence they sprang remains the way it is, it is difficult indeed to see how the character of the IUS itself is going to change.<sup>140</sup>

ix. Selective Intervention.

The IUS claims to be a defender of student rights. Selznick argues that the first loyalties of front organizations - because they

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<sup>137</sup>Youth and Freedom, VI, 5, pp. 11, 27.

<sup>138</sup>Ibid., p. 11.

<sup>139</sup>Christensen, op. cit., p. 37

<sup>140</sup>Ibid., p. 39.



are but a functional part of a larger Communist enterprise - are to the members of the enterprise. The IUS, then, will intervene to protect the rights of students: but first and foremost, the rights of Communist students, or of students pursuing objectives considered desirable by the Communists. The intervention is selective - ie., colored by partisan considerations - because the first loyalties of a front are to its creator - the Communist enterprise - and not to its constituents, in our case students as a whole.

Our operational hypothesis is therefore as follows. Given reliable evidence either that legitimate student rights have been violated in a Communist country or that the violation of Communist-oriented students' rights elsewhere is either justified or partly extenuated the IUS will (1) in the first case refuse to intervene on behalf of the students under attack by the Communist government, and (2) continue to intervene on behalf of the students in the second case, denying in the process that the students are guilty of any wrongdoing, or that there could be extenuation for their suppression.

Cases of the first kind have been all too common in the IUS's history. The first - the refusal of the IUS executive to intervene on behalf of students attacked and killed by Communist-led police during the Czechoslovak coup - was the last straw that drove the first large contingent of Western student unions from the IUS in 1948. The Czech student leaders, the IUS Secretariat argued, were undeserving of





support; they were "corrupt," and "undemocratic." <sup>141</sup>

The IUS refused to intervene in August, 1949, when a Yugoslav student delegation en route - by invitation - to Sofia for an IUS Council meeting was arrested by Bulgarian State Security Police, held incommunicado, and subjected, in the words of the Yugoslav government protest, "to the harshest ill-treatment and chicanery." <sup>142</sup>

Hungarian students played a leading role in the 1956 uprising, but when the Soviet Army returned to Budapest to crush the insurgents, students included, the IUS refused to raise a finger in their defense. When it did issue a statement, after many hesitations, it merely followed the Soviet line, condemning the uprising as a "counter-revolution." <sup>143</sup>

The IUS has likewise maintained throughout its existence an ironclad silence on the subject of the treatment of national-minority students within the USSR itself (Georgia, Ukraine, Latvia). <sup>144</sup> It has expressed fewer compunctions about advising other nations as to how to handle their student minorities.

The IUS had no comment on the International Commission of Jurists' finding in 1960 that the Chinese Communists had been guilty of genocide - and the violation of some 16 articles of the U.N.

<sup>141</sup>Jones, op. cit., pp. 47-57; Apeland, op.cit., pp. 27-8.

<sup>142</sup>Ibid., pp. 35-6.

<sup>143</sup>Savage, op. cit., p. 15.

<sup>144</sup>The Ukrainian Review, IV, 4 (Winter, 1957), pp. 77-9.



Declaration of Human Rights - in Tibet.<sup>145</sup> Nor was its voice heard when, in 1964, Chinese Communist troops killed some four students and arrested 16 others during a demonstration at a school in Lhasa, Tibet's capital.<sup>146</sup>

The IUS's olympian unconcern likewise extended, in the pre-1950 period, to the plight of suppressed students in the then-Russian zones of Germany and Austria, and in the Communist-controlled area in Greece, during the civil war.<sup>147</sup>

The IUS has always shown great concern for students in Western countries discriminated against on account of their race or colour. Yet when a number of African students left Bulgaria in 1963 and 1964 complaining of intense racial discrimination, the silence of the IUS was deafening.<sup>148</sup>

The IUS has historically not limited its concern for students to incidents of specific repressions. Wherever its "research teams" have uncovered, in the non-Communist world, social or political systems in any way deficient in the extent to which they cater to students' aspirations, the IUS has publicized the exposure in flaming headlines.<sup>149</sup>

<sup>145</sup>Youth and Freedom, VI, 6, p. 22, and The New York Times, August 28, 1964.

<sup>146</sup>Ibid., p. 22.

<sup>147</sup>Jones, op.cit., pp. 54-5.

<sup>148</sup>The Student, VII, 4 (April, 1963), p. 1.

<sup>149</sup>See, for example, its published reports, 10 Years of Struggle in Guatemala (Prague, n.d.), and Morocco: A Police State (Prague, 1963).





The IUS has never, however, published a single substantive criticism of the educational systems of the Communist bloc. The life of the student under Communism - if one believes the IUS - is trouble-free and idyllic indeed. Whenever outside investigations show otherwise, they are ignored, or their authors villified.<sup>150</sup>

The attitude of the IUS toward suppressed Communist-oriented student groups under non-Communist governments has to some extent already been noted. The two finest examples are Brazil and Venezuela.<sup>151</sup>

Two further incidents pointing to the tie-up between the IUS and the global Communist apparatus are matters of record. The first was the IUS's joining of the 1963 campaign to "ban fascist students" in Greece. The "fascists" in this case were the members of the national student group opposing the Communist student organization. A more direct use of IUS machinery for organizational purposes can scarcely be imagined.<sup>152</sup>

The second case concerned the IUS's 1962 creation of a new target for ire: the growing anti-Communist movement in the U.S. and throughout the West. The vehemence of the attack,<sup>153</sup> its only indirect relevance to the student movement, and its peculiar timing - it appeared

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<sup>150</sup>For example see the ISC's two reports of the Research and Information Commission, East Germany (Leiden, 1962), and Higher Education in Hungary, 1959-60 (Leiden, n.d.).

<sup>151</sup>Supra, p. 140.

<sup>152</sup>World Student News, XVIII, 12 (December, 1963), pp. 12-13.

<sup>153</sup>World Student News, XVI, 4 (April, 1962), pp. 5-6.



coextensively with a new Communist line on anti-Communism, heralded in the Party newspapers around the world - all point very suggestively to a direct command link between the Communist movement and the IUS. Never was the IUS's use as an organizational weapon more concretely demonstrated.

x. Defense of the 'Social Base.'

Fronts must defend their social base at all costs, in Selznick's view, for if they lose their base of power, they become impotent. The basic similarities of the IUS and ISC on a number of counts will therefore not contribute to their mutual amity; rather, it will heighten the tensions between them. Operationally, the defense of the social base of the IUS extends along two fronts: the organization issues calls for "unity," but unity only upon its own terms, ie., unity within the prevailing structure and terms of reference of the IUS; further, it employs sanctions of various kinds - disruption, the informal veto, graduated terror - against those who threaten it internally (dissenters) and externally (the ISC).

We saw earlier that the IUS leadership was unwilling to make sufficient compromises in policy or structure to keep the dissident Western unions within the organization in its early years.

On the surface, the present policy is more liberal. Resolved the Fifth IUS Congress:

Congress notes with regret that the international student movement remains divided...one of the important tasks of the IUS and its member organizations is to try to overcome the existing division and to work for the further development of international co-operation to bring together student





organizations, whose traditions, political and social backgrounds are very different, around the common student interests and their common desires and endeavours...the IUS should co-operate with any other student organization, national or international, which accepts these principles even in part or parts...this co-operation and unity should be developed in the spirit of mutual respect and equality. Such co-operation does not in any way imply conformity of ideological conceptions or identity or organizational structure.<sup>154</sup>

The IUS, by and large, lays the responsibility for its first split upon the non-Communist unions - upon the "most virulent attacks of the imperialists," in the words of former IUS President Giovanni Berlinguer.<sup>155</sup> In the IUS view the responsibility for the split in the international student community remains today the responsibility of others, not of the IUS: "I am firmly convinced that the imperialists are working behind the scenes of COSEC and that it is they who are trying to prevent the establishment of unity because they fear... (the IUS's) great strength."<sup>156</sup>

The attitudes manifested by the IUS Secretariat and various leading delegations in the IUS at full Congresses would appear to belie somewhat the generous ideals held forth in the organization's resolutions on unity. This has particularly been noted by the various Western observers at the IUS meetings. Christensen writes:

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<sup>154</sup><sup>16</sup> Questions..., op. cit., pp. 39-40.

<sup>155</sup>"IUS History Not a Mythology," World Student News, XVI, 1 (January, 1962), p. 17.

<sup>156</sup>Ibid., p. 18.



...it is with these organizations - which they continually vilify - that the IUS says that it wishes to have joint actions on the basis of principles such as the 'fight for peace, national independence, against colonialism and imperialism.' The fact is that the attitudes taken at the IUS Congress (by the leadership and many delegations) created such a 'Cold-War' atmosphere that any cooperation was made to appear meaningless unless it was within the ranks of the IUS.

Despite this atmosphere the Congress stated in one of its resolutions that if felt that 'a basic change in the relations between the IUS and the ISC/COSEC would contribute to the improvement of the atmosphere in the international student movement and would...open new possibilities for the establishment of unity.' Everyone should be able to support this statement, but does the IUS itself believe it? What in fact happened at the 7th IUS Congress was to make these relations worse than they have ever been.<sup>157</sup>

There thus continues to be an air of deceptiveness about the entire IUS campaign for "unity." It has made it clear on a number of occasions that it construes unity within the terms of its own purposes and its own interpretations of what is best for students. It did not value unity sufficiently to make the substantive compromises called for in the movement's early days, when the dissatisfaction of a large bloc was increasingly evident. Rather, it seemed almost to be anxious to drive out dissenters. It continues to refuse to alter the frame of reference of its calls for unity - its own peculiar interpretation of the content of the "fight for peace," for example - even though it has been notified by outside unions on countless occasions that it is

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<sup>157</sup> Christensen, op.cit., p. 33





precisely the frame of reference that is objected to.<sup>158</sup> CUS Observer

Frank Griffiths has put the matter succinctly:

To my mind, the IUS call to achieve world student unity on the basis of joint peace actions is an attempt to subvert the widespread desire for unity to serve the particular purposes of the IUS leading group. For although the IUS leaders are sincere in the basic desire for world peace, they are consistently partisan in their analysis of the causes of war and, more important, in their practical proposals for peace action. A glance at the record of the dispute over the peace resolution shows whose peace the IUS bureaucrats are working for. It is the peace which follows the long-term and arduous political struggle to mould reality to a so-called 'Leninist' image. It is the peace which follows from monolithic support of Soviet bloc positions, and the mobilization of pressure to inhibit and indiscriminately condemn Western policies. Because the IUS leaders know that many National Unions willing to criticize their own governments will not bow to the interests of the USSR and its allies, they also know that the call for international student cooperation on such a basis can in fact only divide the student movement.<sup>159</sup>

The historical behavior of the IUS would appear to largely confirm Selznick's operational hypothesis concerning the "unity" ploy.

Some aspects of the second point - actions in defense of the social base - have already been noted. We have seen the harassment

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<sup>158</sup>The last set of IUS unity proposals - see World Student News, XVIII, 7-8 (July-August, 1964), p. 6 - called for "joint action" on some 11 points, including action in "defense of the peoples and students" of South Korea, North Kalimantan (a part of Malaysian Borneo threatened by Sukarno's Indonesian guerillas), Puerto Rico, and, of course, South Vietnam.

<sup>159</sup>Griffiths, op. cit., p. 13.



of the Zengakuren and Chinese Communist delegations. Both, of course, constitute in effect - particularly the latter - an internal challenge to the IUS's social base. The pro-Soviet figures now in control of the IUS executive and Secretariat seem to particularly fear the Chinese in this regard; the Chinese, again as we noted in Chapter Three, are apparently contemplating the establishment of an all-new international students' movement. If such a movement did materialize, the Chinese threat to the IUS's social base would cease being an internal threat, and become an external one, similar to the threat presently posed by the ISC. In that event, we might not be amiss in anticipating the employment by the IUS of anti-Chinese tactics (and vice-versa) similar to the kind presently used against the ISC.

The IUS, together with its proxies, has employed all the gradations of terror against its opponents, when circumstances have dictated it.

In 1961, for example, the then-President of the IUS, Jeri Pelikan, was involved in the kidnapping of a prominent West German student leader whom the IUS apparently considered particularly dangerous. The student, Dieter Koniecki, received a telephone call from Pelikan on January 15, asking him to meet Pelikan in East Berlin. Koniecki accepted the invitation.

Nothing more was heard of him for a month.

After that time, the official Czech news agency disclosed that Koniecki was in the custody of the Czech secret police. Without





disclosing how, when, or where he had been apprehended, the news agency said Koniecki was a member of a "dangerous spy ring."

He was later sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment at a secret trial, the precise charges of which have never been made public.<sup>160</sup>

The employment of "goon squads" at the various IUS-sponsored World Festivals of Youth and Students has been recognized by a number of observers.<sup>161</sup> A number of Festival delegates have apparently at various times been marked down by Communist officials and later beaten.

The IUS-organized Second Latin American Youth Congress, held in 1964 in Santiago, Chile, featured a door guard made up of some eight Ecuadorian youths identified as militants of a terrorist guerilla organization from Ecuador, the URJE (Union of Revolutionary Youth of Ecuador).<sup>162</sup> At least one was armed. All performed strong-arm duties.

The Helsinki Festival also saw the employment of a stink bomb against the headquarters of the International Union of Socialist Youth (IUSY), which was distributing anti-Festival literature. The culprits were not discovered.<sup>163</sup> There is certainly room for suspicion, however.

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<sup>160</sup>The Communist International Youth and Student Apparatus, op. cit., p. 4. See also East Germany, op. cit., p. 44.

<sup>161</sup>See Helsinki Supplement, op. cit., together with Communist Training Operations, Part 3 (Communist Activities and Propaganda Among Youth Groups) (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), passim.

<sup>162</sup>Youth and Freedom, VI, 4, p. 3.

<sup>163</sup>Helsinki Supplement, op. cit., p. 15.



In any case, the IUS never condemned such tactics.

The use of physical violence, it should be parenthetically noted, has come in recent times to increasingly characterize the internal relations of a number of Communist-oriented national student groups. The Sino-Soviet split has occasioned, in recent times, most of the outbursts.<sup>164</sup>

The employment of verbal abuse has been noted throughout this chapter. By and large it has been true that the IUS executive, together with a number of leading Communist student organizations, have been prepared to stoop to any depths in their verbal calumny against political opponents. Personal insults and innuendoes have been the order of the day, rather than the exception.

So too is there one outstanding example of the employment of the tactic of disruption and the informal veto.

We refer to the tumultuous Tenth International Student Conference, held in Quebec City in 1962. The Quebec Conference - probably the most controversy-dominated in the ISC's history - saw the development of a deep split in the membership, culminating in the walkout and withdrawal of 25 of the 80 member unions present.

What happened, very briefly, was this.

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<sup>164</sup>For an account of the Sino-Soviet violence in the Peruvian student union see Youth and Freedom, VII, 1, p. 18: News Features, IV, 7, July 31, 1963), reports on Sino-Soviet-inspired fisticuffs in the Japanese Zengakuren.





The deliberations of the Conference were marked by bitter feelings and recriminations right from the beginning. A number of delegations, chiefly from Latin America, seemed to be anxious to disrupt the proceedings at every turn, to question every floor ruling, and to take the Secretariat to task for a host of its actions.

For some time it was not quite clear what was troubling these delegations. When the time came for the Conference to discuss the seating of the delegation from Puerto Rico, FUPI, the mystery became less murky. FUPI had been previously investigated by COSEC's research and information commission, on the basis of on-the-spot surveys on the island, in order to determine its representativity. The commission concluded in its pre-Conference report that FUPI - bitterly anti-American and heavily Communist-influenced - represented, at the very outside, no more than 500 of Puerto Rico's 26,000 students.

The restive bloc of Latin American delegations was determined not to accept that, however. In a long and bitter debate, they argued for the seating of FUPI as a full member with full rights and privileges. They threatened to walk out if their demands were not met.

After some 13 hours of continuous debate, the Conference decided to accept a very generous Chilean compromise, providing full speaking rights for FUPI, and an official Conference endorsement of FUPI's position (full independence for Puerto Rico).

The dissident bloc refused to be bound by or accept the compromise vote. Its members marched from the hall. Their attitude upon



leaving - one shouted gleefully, "The ISC is dead!" - indicated to some that they never had any intention of remaining. They promptly issued a statement in which they demanded as the condition of their return that the Congress reverse its position. They also disassociated themselves from all prior and later work of the Conference.<sup>165</sup>

The significant aspect of the incident - apart from what it revealed during the course of the Conference - was the fact that these same unions had earlier met at the Fourth Latin American Student Congress in Natal, Brazil, and had there too stalked from the meeting after refusing to accept another majority decision.<sup>166</sup> It is widely thought that these unions - most of them under heavy student Communist influence - planned their disruptive tactics and final walkout some time prior to the Quebec Conference, and that they entered into its deliberations with the purposeful intent of disrupting them. As writes former CUS President Dave Jenkins, present at the Conference:

There was nothing spontaneous about the walkout...the ringleaders, all national unions controlled by Communists, were known to have been discussing tactics for some time prior to the holding of that particular ISC. While the conference was in session, almost all the unions that eventually walked out were holding late-night meetings to co-ordinate their disruptive interventions from the floor - and eventually the walkout.<sup>167</sup>

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<sup>165</sup>This account is taken from Mailand Christensen, "A New Clarification of an Old Problem," The Student, VIII. 2-3 (February-March, 1964), pp. 7-10.

<sup>166</sup>Ibid., p. 8.

<sup>167</sup>Jenkins Memorandum, p.2.





Not long after the incident, many of the ringleading unions applied for membership in the IUS. It would therefore seem not wholly unreasonable to suspect some element of conspiracy in the whole affair, with the shadow of the IUS Secretariat in the background. The tactic of disruption and the informal veto has therefore been employed at least once.



## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSIONS

What has been said in the foregoing about the International Union of Students - as well as what will be said, briefly, below about the International Students Conference - must be read against the context of student politics in general. Probably no one has better described the nature of student politics than Bernard Crick:

The ultimate absurdity of this kind of political anti-politics is a style of behaviour which I do not think it is too parochial to call 'student politics'...It is the style of the amateur (who avoids real political work) joined to that of the enthusiast (who wants a doctrine and 'a cause' more than he wants criteria for judging between doctrines and causes)... 'Student politics' is the politics of affirmation. Groups must be got, typically student groups themselves whatever their nominal purpose, to affirm certain principles or 'their stand' on each and every great issue of the day. If necessary, groups must be invented to do just this. Such a process of affirmation is quite endless. A judgement has to be delivered on everything of any conceivable importance. This affirmation usually carries with it a certain arrogance that they - as youth - have a particular right to be heard - as youth; for they are the next generation, or through the positive power of in-experience they have the innocent-eye, a Rousseauistic purity in a corrupt and artificial age...there is almost nothing that can do less harm or good to man or beast, or which has less political power, than students' politics.<sup>168</sup>

A powerful statement with a very large grain of truth. The last sentence for all its wisdom, must be taken cautiously, however. For the growing importance of international student politics for our age - however much some may dread or deride the fact - is undeniable.

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<sup>168</sup>In Defense of Politics (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1964), pp. 134-5 his italics.





The political forums of the world are increasingly filled with young statesmen from the newly-emergent nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. It is precisely these people, often, upon whom international student politics has had its greatest impact.

Neither the IUS nor the ISC devote their greatest resources to - nor, in many ways, anticipate the greatest results from - the large Congresses at which student politics, as Crick describes it, is practiced. The greatest influence of both organizations arises, it seems from the observations of the participants, from the smaller meetings organized by both, the meetings of the regional-seminar type where face-to-face contact is greatest. Writes one observer:

A surprisingly high degree of importance can be attached to the face-to-face contacts made at international congresses conducted by the ISC and IUS. The most significant aspect is, of course, the influencing of delegates from the emerging nations in Africa, Latin America and Asia. Such delegates are from countries where only a handful - or a few hundred - persons have university degrees. With high school and a number of years at university already to their credit, such delegates are already among the best-educated persons in their countries and will almost certainly be called upon to shoulder heavy responsibilities.<sup>169</sup>

The close fellowship, the atmosphere of fatigue and tension, the late-night and social gatherings, all contribute - along with the frequent youth of the participants - to a considerable emotional impact arising from such meetings.<sup>170</sup> Such emotional impacts can persist.

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<sup>169</sup>Jenkins Memorandum, p. 3.

<sup>170</sup>Ibid., p. 4.



Long-term political influence can be the result. Practical experience shows, apparently, that the greatest influence is exerted in the smaller regional meetings, where the group is smaller, inter-personal relations are closer and more intense, and the subject-matter is often of more direct relevance than at larger international congresses. Both kinds of meetings are important, of course.<sup>171</sup>

Part of the context against which this inquiry must be viewed is the nature of student politics generally, noted above. The other factor is the existence of the non-Communist student organization, the International Student Conference (ISC), together with its effective secretarial body, COSEC (the Co-ordinating Secretariat). Although this is not the place for an analysis of the ISC, a few words about it are certainly in order.

The organization was originally founded by those dissident Western student unions who had left the IUS in disgust before 1951.

These were chiefly Western European and North American unions. The original structure of the ISC was very loose and uncoordinated. The 21 national unions were properly wary of centralized power, and were determined to create an organization which would avoid the abuses of the IUS. Originally the delegates planned to have no central machinery. Under the principle of "delegated responsibility," various National Unions would be given the responsibility of organizing specific

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<sup>171</sup>Ibid., p. 4.





projects approved by the general conference.

The system soon broke down.<sup>172</sup> In 1952 the Conference created COSEC. The Secretariat was mandated only to administer the policies consented to, and the projects devised by, the larger Conference; it had no independent policy-making powers whatever.

Over the years the internal character of the ISC changed. The breakdown of the colonial system saw the entry into the arena of international student politics of a host of new student groups from the newly-independent countries. By 1950, the ISC was made up of some 73 National Unions, 49 of which were from Asia, Africa, and Latin America.<sup>173</sup> The growing internal complexity of the ISC, the burgeoning of its activities, and the continual competitive pressure of the well-organized and well-financed IUS brought about many changes. In the realm of policy, the ISC became more anti-colonial and Afro-Asian oriented in outlook, even while retaining its traditional independence of power blocs. It retained its non-Communist character - the term is preferable to "anti-Communism," for one reason that the latter term is too tied to the Western bloc - but in the process became more and more concerned with student needs in the emergent world.

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<sup>172</sup>For histories of these years and of the rise of COSEC see "The Co-ordinating Secretariat Ten Years Later," The Student, VI, 1 (January, 1962), pp. 19-23.

<sup>173</sup>Ibid., p. 21.



The IUS perceived this change in the 'social base' as well, and tailored its programmes accordingly. After the post-1953 shift in the Soviet attitude towards the neutralist nations, the IUS was particularly well-equipped to effect such a transition.

In the 1960's, it should finally be noted, the ISC began to perceive the need for another structural re-alignment. The limited - very limited - powers of COSEC were again proving less than were needed to properly fulfill the ISC's needs in a competitive world. The ISC has broadened somewhat over the years its concept of what it is to be a student. The social-responsibility theory of the IUS - which finds students playing a particular political role in society - has not been duplicated, but it has been more closely approached than was previously the case. In a special international seminar held in Leysin, Switzerland in 1963, the ISC found broad support for a wider concept of the role of students. The participants agreed, for example, that

Every National Union of Students has the responsibility to engage its members in the task of social progress: the eradication of hunger, poverty, disease and illiteracy wherever these blights exist. Every National Union has the responsibility to work for the establishment of lasting peace in a world community of democratic nations working for an end to all forms of suffering and oppression.<sup>174</sup>

Nor is that the only way in which the ISC and the IUS have

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<sup>174</sup>The Declaration of Leysin, Part III, published in The Student Mirror, November 1, 1963, supplement, p. 1. For the previous half of the full text see ibid., October 16, 1963, pp.1-6 of supplement.





drawn more closely together. In the 11th ISC, held in Christchurch, New Zealand in 1964, the movement underwent a broad structural change, with the allocation of wider powers of initiative to COSEC.<sup>175</sup>

The upshot of all this is not that the IUS and ISC have become identical; it is only that the ISC, while retaining many of those features that have traditionally distinguished it from the IUS, eg., its internal democracy and the limited powers of its leadership, has come to gain more structural similarity to the IUS, and more similarity in program and outlook, than it had ever a decade previous. The relevance of this to our discussion lies in the difficulties it introduces, concretely, in distinguishing Communist front organizations from similar kinds of groups not under Communist control. It is a difficulty more in theory than in practice, it should be emphasized: no observer in the field would likely have much difficulty in determining which was which, given a modicum of sophisticated common sense and experience.

But perhaps the point can be got at best in this way:

Our testing of the operational hypotheses of the Selznick model for front organizations can be quickly summarized. We found that the International Union of Students closely corresponds to the model on all points, differing only in some details. More particularly, we found it to be politicized in much the way Selznick described. We found it to

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<sup>175</sup>See "A New Opportunity for Student Action," The Student VIII, 4 (April, 1964), pp. 2-5, 30-3.



manifest certain evidences of conspiratorial behavior and conspiratorial control from above (or within - from the leadership and secretariat), although the evidence was hardly detailed or complete. We found that its press conformed generally to the operational hypothesis; the only point not accounted for was the general propaganda role of the press in the student field as a whole, as distinguished from its house-organ features. We found, in considerable evidence, that the IUS practices deception, more particularly that the leadership, the controlling body, practices deception on the crucial questions of the organization's finances, and on the representativity of many of its member delegations. We found that the IUS mobilizes its membership in much the way that Selznick describes. The evidence on its administration of patronage was skimpy, and the importance of the financial contributions system was shown to be only marginal. As to the other sub-points, there was a general "fit."

We saw that on the sixth hypothesis, that of organizational tendencies, the Communist fraction within the IUS behaves pretty well in accordance with the model.

On the seventh point we saw that while the IUS identification with non-Communists was a marginal point, the other assertions did in fact "fit;" in particular we noted that the organization's attempts to legitimize local Communists played a vital role in its raison d'etre, possibly a part underestimated by Selznick.





We saw that the IUS confirmed abundantly the eighth hypothesis by following the Communist line consistently, never taking an anti-Communist position. The evidence was abundant and unequivocal, both on that point and on the next, namely, the selective quality of the organization's interventions on behalf of students' rights. On that point we found the IUS to be completely partisan.

On the last point, we noted some evidence of every kind of action in defense of the social base Selznick noted.

Now no mystical claims were or are made for the ten tests devised from the Selznick model for this study. Our inquiry has certainly demonstrated in practice, considerable overlap amongst them, indicating, certainly, that they could be refined and re-defined still further. This study may have contributed to the clarification of the term "front organization," certainly, but it certainly has not removed all final definitional difficulties.

We said at the outset of this inquiry that our test of Selznick would be the extent to which he made sense of, lent rationality to, the International Union of Students. We have seen that he - as we have interpreted him - makes quite considerable sense of the history and structure and behavior of the organization.

Selznick, to that extent, is very profound and very useful. To that extent, the high reputation in which The Organizational Weapon is held is justified.



But a theoretical problem remains: What are the crucial defining characteristics of the Selznick model of front organizations? The problem is suggested by what we have noted concerning the growing similarity of the IUS and ISC. If the ISC were evaluated against the ten tests for front organizations, it seems safe to say, from this distance, that it would roughly approximate hypotheses three, five, and ten. It would approximate to a lesser degree, I think, hypotheses one and six. (By a "rough approximation," we mean that the ISC would exhibit, in degree at least, some of the characteristics outlined in hypothesis). This is due, to a large extent, to organizational exigencies: the ISC works in the same social base as does the IUS, organizes similar projects, has similar aims. It is therefore only reasonable to anticipate that these similarities will have their impact upon organizational tendencies.

In other fields, similar difficulties might well crop up. If they did - if the researcher were confronted with two organizations, similar in many ways, one of them allegedly a "front," the other not - there is room to inquire whether the Selznick model would prove an adequate tool of research, an adequate conceptual device.

What we are saying, then, is this: the "model" of front organizations sketched in The Organizational Weapon is a very useful tool, and a very considerable accomplishment - the achievement of which no one would want to deny. But it is not yet fully adequate. In particular, it does not distinguish between the crucial defining





characteristics of front organizations and the options, the peripheral characteristics, conditioned by the environment in which the front functions.

The Selznick model, then, does meet a part of our test. It does lend rationality to and make sense of the history, structure, and behavior of the International Union of Students. On the other hand, while it is a useful conceptual tool, in the field of front organizations it lacks the piercing sharpness we require of a definitive instrument.



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